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ABSTRACT
A theoretical study of the feasibility of socialism. Politically, 
socialism is characterised by equality, democracy and liberty. 
Economically, it is assumed (i) that the feasibility of socialism 
depends upon its ability to generate growth, and (ii) that growth 
is secured through entrepreneurial activity. Economic theory is 
used to delineate the concept of entrepreneurship and to explore 
the nature and limitations of capitalist entrepreneurship and 
political theory is used to identify possible incompatibilities 
between socialism and entrepreneurship. Underlying many of these 
arguments is a claim for the existence of a trade-off between 
efficiency and equality. The capacity of market socialism to 
either transcend or minimise this trade-off is considered.
Three forms of market socialism are examined. The first is drawn 
from Joseph Carens' work on moral incentives, the second from 
theories of the labour-managed firm and the third from new public 
management. The socialist credentials and capacity of each to 
generate entrepreneurial activity are appraised. Examples drawn 
upon include Israeli Kibbutzim, the Spanish Mondragon 
cooperative, British nationalised industries and the Japanese 
computer industry.
Economic new institutionalism, welfare economics and Austrian 
economic theory are all on occasions used but che principle 
methodology is rational choice. Specifically. ^me theory, 
princip<-~ agent analysis and VI j.iam Niskanen's :>unt of the 
budget- r sing bureaucracv shown capable 1 Luminating
discussion. Given even the assumption of egoism it is argued that 
through careful institutional and organisational design, tensions 
between socialism and entrepreneurship can be alleviated.
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1Preface
The entrepreneur has become the focus of political as well as 
economic interest. Allegations of neglect has been a stick the 
Conservative Party has used to beat social democracy and the 
post-war consensus. The construction of an 'enterprise economy' 
is now established as the fundamental goal of economic policy 
whilst 'entrepreneurial' has become the ultimate accolade a 
minister can bestow on a business, government department or 
university faculty. For Lady Thatcher, entrepreneurs are economic 
and cultural heroes: the shock troops of a revolutionary regime. 
A political monopoly has been claimed. The Conservatives portray 
themselves as the entrepreneur's friend and depict the Labour 
Party as the entrepreneur's implacable opponent. A Labour 
government, it is claimed, will roll forward the frontiers of the 
state, raise taxation, impose red tape and stifle individual 
initiative.
Socialists have done little to assist their own cause and when 
faced with this indictment frequently act as if the best form of 
defence is capitulation. The belief that socialists are more 
comfortable discussing the distribution rather than the creation 
of wealth has not been dispelled. The sacred text of the post-war 
Labour Party, Anthony' Crosland's The Future of Socialism (1964), 
is assembled around the assumption that economic constraints have 
been loosened and that sustained growth is asssc- . Ever since 
in Karl Marx' s work they t . i*,ie an agent of • .tafionT- the
entrer, • e ir has been vie< bivalently. For on the left
2of the Labour Party, Robert Maxwell, Asil Nadir and Ernest 
Rachman embody an entrepreneurial spirit of greed and corruption, 
securing wealth for themselves at the expense of the welfare of 
others. Times are perhaps changing. 'New Labour' has reconciled 
itself to the existence and importance of the entrepreneur and 
promised to tend to their needs and respect their achievements. 
Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle (1996, 3) pledge that a Labour 
government will not only tackle 'vested interests and class 
barriers' but release 'entrepreneurial energy in business and the 
public services'. But New Labour has only been able to embrace 
the entrepreneur, critics suggest, because it has abandoned 
socialism.
This doctorate examines, clarifies, defends, develops and 
challenges the assumption that socialism and entrepreneurship are 
in some way incompatible. Two immediate justifications can be 
offered for this choice of topic. First and as suggested in 
Chapter One, socialists cannot afford to ignore the 
entrepreneurial function because entrepreneurs generate economic 
wealth. If socialism and entrepreneurship cannot be reconciled, 
the future of socialism is uncertain. Second, the relationship 
between socialism and entrepreneurship remains largely 
unexplored. The issue has become a political football but has 
rarely troubled social scientists. Of course 'madmen in 
authority' are distilling their frenzy from somewhere and there 
are . . ,.?rous justifications of and attacks on the economics of 
soci But with a few notable exceptions, the entrepreneur
rema rgely hidden in the background of these: disputes.
The relationship between socialism and entrepreneurship is 
analyzed using rational choice theory. The choice may seem a 
surprising one. Particularly in American Universities, rational 
choice offers a formalistic and perhaps even sterile approach to 
the study of politics. To its critics, rational choice copes with 
the complexity of individual behaviour by either ignoring it or 
reducing it to a set of simple mathematical axioms or utility 
schedules. Rational choice does not seem to lend itself to 
popular images of the entrepreneur as a dashing individualist.
The entrepreneur is certainly resistant to many of the 
conventional tools of political and economic analysis but the 
difficulty of a topic does not itself justify its neglect. To 
study the relationship between entrepreneurship and socialism it 
is necessary to approach the entrepreneur indirectly. 
Entrepreneurs do not operate in an economic vacuum. Their 
incentives to act and the efficacy of their action depends upon 
the environment in which they operate. Laws of taxation, 
property, patent and bankruptcy can make or break the 
entrepreneur. A discussion of the compatibility of socialism and 
entrepreneurship can be brokered through a examination of the 
affinity between socialist values and the institutions and 
organisations necessary to create, animate and direct 
entrepreneurial action. Above all much will be seen to depend 
upon the relationship betwet -ntrepreneurship and the market and
the market and socialism. he preface to his rational choice
deft of democracy, Do:. ‘ ttman (1995, 1) rites "that~7most
cont ■ sies in the so iences are ul -ately arguments
4over the nature of the market'. The argument here offers little 
comfort for those who would wish to dispute Wittman's conclusion.
As this description suggests, the scope of this thesis is 
extremely broad. The entrepreneur is encountered in and lessons 
drawn from a wide variety of settings: Israeli kibbutzim,
capitalist corporations, Spanish cooperatives, nationalised 
industries and public bureaucracies. Diversity is an inevitable 
consequence of studying the entrepreneur but it raises the danger 
that disparate observations will frustrate generalization and 
leave discussion lacking coherence. It is for this reason that 
rational choice is valuable. A commitment to a small number of 
methodological principles allows for both the imposition of a 
stable framework and the use of a set of established theories. 
The entrepreneur is the subject of the argument: game theory, 
budget-maximising and principal-agent analysis the method of 
approach.
5Chapter One
Creating a Context: Three Assumptions and a Methodology
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Defining the Terms
1.2.1 The Meaning of Entrepreneurship
1.2.2 The Meaning of Socialism
1.3 The Failure of Socialism
1.3.1 Socialism, Economic Growth and Entrepreneurship
1.3.2 Przeworski's Evasion
1.3.3 The Limits of Growth
1.4 Rational Choice and Socialism
1.4.1 The Meaning of Rational Choice
1.4.2 Rational Choice and Socialism: The Case Against
1.4.3 Rational Choice and Socialism: Initial Defence
1.5 Concluding Comments and Future Directions
6'We believe that the creation of wealth is a social 
process - one which involves the co-operative efforts 
of countless men and women. No one person - nor indeed 
any one family or group of shareholders - can be said 
to 'create' great wealth, great companies or great 
estates. It is the people who create; it is the 
fortunate few, blessed by the customs and laws of the 
land, who are deemed to own. We intend to change those 
customs and laws - to begin to load the scales in 
favour of greater equality' (The Labour Party 
Programme, 1982, quoted Crick, 1987, 76)
'the personal qualities that make for entrepreneurial 
alertness [are]: restive temperament, a thirst for
adventure, ambition and imagination. All such 
qualities may be nurtured or suppressed. They are 
presumably similar .... in Korea North and South of 
the 3 8th parallel . . . but the results are very 
different according to the institutions created by 
government. In some environments, the innate urge of 
mankind to discover new techniques and new ideas is 
given freest rein in competitive markets. In others 
men of the s. r race, culture and instincts are not 
allowed to £•.-•• • ' js these qualities' (Seldon, 1980, XI- 
XII)
1.1 Introduction
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In 1951 South Korean citizen Kim Sun-myung was arrested for 
proclaiming his loyalty to the North Korean Government. Having 
refused to recant, he was jailed, tortured and finally released 
forty four years later. In his report of the story, Nicholas 
Kristof comments
Mr. Kim's courage seems especially poignant because of 
the way the world has changed under him . . . South 
Korea, impoverished and dictatorial when it imprisoned 
Mr. Kim is now a prosperous democracy . . . North Korea, 
once the great economic and social hope . . . today 
stagnates in poverty and dictatorship (The Guardian,
21st August, 1995, p. 8).
South Korea's status as a democracy is questionable. Its 
prosperity and North Korea's political and economic bankruptcy 
are not. The unleashing of entrepreneurial forces has contributed 
to the South's success and their emasculation to the North's 
failure. As the article remarks, if the South Korean regime had 
wanted to break Mr. Kim's resolve it should simply have sent him 
on a visit to the North. Scores of South Korean's have been 
arrested in recent years for political 'subversion' but few have 
expressed support for Kim Il-Sung. Given the choice between 
living in a economically flourishing a economically"s .. '-rant 
dictatorship, most individuals choc.- the former.
8Mr. Kim, it appears, is made of sterner stuff. Upon his release 
and having been driven through Seoul's city centre, he remarks
this kind of thing doesn't impress me, because there 
are still a lot of poor people. These tall buildings 
are the labour of poor people. Did you ever see any 
rich people digging on a construction site? The fight 
against poverty goes on (The Guardian, 21st August,
1995, p.8).
To a socialist, such sentiments are admirable. As the extract 
from Labour's 1982 programme indicates, socialists believe that 
the creation of wealth is a social process from which all must 
benefit. But if the opportunity cost of equality is prosperity, 
socialism's political future is uncertain as Britain and 
America's embrace of 'conservative capitalism' suggests that most 
voters are willing to sacrifice social(ist) justice for economic 
affluence (Hoover and Plant, 1988).
If socialism can be shown capable of sustaining both economic 
success and social justice, the electoral prospects of socialist 
parties will be enhanced. Critics deny the feasibility of this 
objective and assert the necessity of a trade-off between 
efficiency and equality (Okun, 1982). Through an examination of 
the concept of entrepreneurship, this thesis examines whether and 
to what extent t.l.ey are right to do so.
91.2 Defining the Terms
1.2.1 The Meaning of Entrepreneurship
Whilst Cole (1959) describes the entrepreneur as the central 
figure in economics, economists have struggled to understand 
their activities. In a much quoted article, Peter Kilby (1971, 
1) employs the following analogy.
The search for the source of dynamic entrepreneurial 
performance has much in common with hunting the 
Heffalump. The Heffalump is a large and rather 
important animal. He has been hunted by many 
individuals using various ingenious trapping devices, 
but no one so far has succeeded in capturing him. All 
who claim to have seen him report that he is enormous, 
but they disagree on his particularities. Not having 
explored his current habitat with sufficient care, 
some hunters have used as bait their own favourite 
dishes and have then tried to persuade people that 
what they caught was a Heffalump. However, very few 
are convinced, and the search goes on.
Different theories of entrepreneurial behaviour are considered 
in Chapter Two. Here, entrepreneurship itself is defined 2 i terms 
of three functions: innovation, coordination and the b<- ng of 
uncertainty.
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(i) Innovation Whilst this is the activity most closely 
associated with entrepreneurship in the popular imagination, its 
importance is frequently neglected. Despite the experience of the 
industrial revolution, British classical economists like Adam 
Smith, John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo ignored innovation, 
leaving it to the German's, Max Weber (193 0) and Joseph 
Schumpeter (1943, 1961). Schumpeter (1934, 64) contrasts
innovation with both invention and imitation. Its effects are 
likened to those of a revolution, involving sudden and massive 
change.
That kind of change arising from within the system 
which so displaces its equilibrium point that the new 
one cannot be reached from the old one by 
infinitesimal steps. Add successively as many mail 
coaches as you please, you will never get a railway 
thereby.
The process of innovation is not restricted to the introduction 
of new goods. As Schumpeter emphasises, it also includes the 
introduction of new methods of production, the introduction of 
new raw materials into the production process and the use of new 
methods of business organisation.
(ii) Coordination Successful innovation is comparatively rare. 
Most entrepreneurial activity is less ambitious and consists of 
'market-making': attempts by individuals to either 'find hew 
customers for existing products or 1 " sell to existing customers
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at a more profitable price. Coordination can be easily contrasted 
with innovation. The latter involves the destruction of an 
existing equilibrium and the former its painful reconstruction 
through a large number of distinct transactions. The significance 
of coordination was first recognised by a French businessman and 
economist, Richard Cantillon. He observes that if the price of 
food varies between Paris and outlaying rural districts 
individuals will
buy at the low price the products of the villages and 
transport them to the capital to be sold there at a 
higher price (quoted Hebert and Link, 1982, 18).
Coordination continues until markets are cleared and equilibrium 
prices reached. Cantillon's insight is important as his arguments 
are refined and developed in the work of Friedrich Hayek (1935a, 
1982a) and Israel Kirzner (1973, 1985): trenchant critics of
socialism whose work will be examined in Chapters Two and Three.
(iii) Uncertainty Bearing Cantillon (1931, 85) also emphasises 
that when entrepreneurs engage in trade they do so 'without an 
assurance of the profits [they] will derive'. The sources of 
uncertainty in the entrepreneurial process are numerous: changing 
prices, competitor's actions, erratic demand and government 
policy. The entrepreneur accepts uncertainty, seeing in it a 
potential source of profit. The significance of uncertainty for 
the entrepreneur was celebrated by G.L.S Shackle (1955, 1.966-) and 
Frank Knight (1971) but Schumpeter (1942, 75) and other . ustrian
economists (see Wu, 1989, 79) deny that the bearing of
uncertainty is a entrepreneurial function. Professional gamblers 
bear uncertainty and attempt to profit from it but are not 
entrepreneurs. Uncertainty, Schumpeter argues, whilst a salient 
feature of the entrepreneurial environment does not describe what 
the entrepreneur does. Uncertainty is an only an input, 
innovation and coordination the outputs. To an extent, this 
argument is accepted and subsequent chapters concentrate on 
innovation and coordination. Socialism is compatible with 
entrepreneurship to the extent that it can cope with each of 
these functions. At the same time, entrepreneurship is seen as 
an inherently uncertain activity and it is argued that this 
uncertainty creates particular difficulties for the concept of 
socialist entrepreneurship.
1.2.2 The Meaning of Socialism
Definitions of socialism are problematic. Socialists can disagree 
with both friends and critics about its meaning. As Anthony 
Crosland (1964, 64) remarks
the word does not describe any present or past 
society, which can be empirically observed, and so 
furnish unimpeachable evidence for what is or is not 
'socialism Thus statements about socialism can never 
be defini r/ verified . . . there is therefore no point 
in sea': -a the encyclopedias for a definitive”
meaninc as none, and never' could.
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In this thesis, socialism is seen to require the pursuit of three 
values: equality, democracy and freedom. Working definitions of 
these terms are presented but no attempt is made to (i) explore 
their development within socialist thought, (ii) to trace in any 
detail the contours of philosophical debate about their meaning,
(iii) to justify the exclusion of other possible values like 
community or self-realisation, (iv) to devise possible priority 
orderings between them, or (v) to distinguish between different 
variants of socialism.1
(i) Equality Equality generates the most passionate criticism 
of socialism and most clearly differentiates socialism from 
capitalism. Equality can be described as the 'classical 
principle of socialism' (Berki, 1975, 25) and for this reason
subsequent chapters devote considerable attention to the tensions 
between entrepreneurial efficiency and equality. Brian Barry 
(1990, 120) distinguishes between strong and weak equality. Weak 
equality embraces the demand that 'people's opportunities for 
satisfying whatever wants they may happen to have should be 
equal' (Barry, 1990, 120). If weak equality means only equality 
of opportunity then socialists are unimpressed. Preference is 
given to 'strong equality' in which 'all the members of a group 
get an equal share in some (tangible or intangible) good 
regardless of any personal characteristic' (Barry, 1990, 122).
A more precise specification of equality is given in Chapter 
Four. The good on which attention is focused in su> ,quent
1 Chapter Four draws a distinction between soc . a and 
social democracy on the basis of the nature of the t -off 
between efficiency and equality.
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chapters is income and this provides the first criterion by which 
the compatibility of socialism and entrepreneurship can be 
assessed.
Criterion One
Socialism is compatible with entrepreneurship to the 
extent that equality of income does not adversely affect 
the volume of entrepreneurial activity generated within 
an economy. The greater the degree of inequality required 
to generate a particular volume of entrepreneurial 
activity, the more incompatible socialism and 
entrepreneurship can be said to be.
(ii) Democracy Socialists see in democracy a means of ensuring 
that outcomes - particularly economic ones - 'fall under
collective control' (Barry, 1988, 146). It is not necessary that 
control be exercised at any particular level or in any particular 
way. Chapter Six, Labour Managed Firms and Socialist
Entrepreneurship, examines a form of socialism in which control 
is exercised by workers at the level of individual firms. Chapter 
Eight, Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial Socialism: Structure,
envisages a system in which decisions are taken at the national 
level. The demand for control nonetheless suggests a second 
criterion by which the compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship can be judged.
Criterion Two
Socialism is compatible with entrepreneurship to the 
extent that collective control of economic decisions 
does not adversely affect the volume of entrepreneurial 
activity generated by a society. The greater the number 
of areas chat must be sheltered from collective control 
to generate a particular level of entrepreneurial 
activity, tb«: more incompatibje socialism and 
entrepre ip can be said be.
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(iii) Freedom Socialists are much exercised by the distinction 
between positive and negative freedom. As positive freedom will 
be secured through the extension of equality, priority is given 
to negative freedom by which is meant the absence of coercion and 
where by coercion is meant
the control of the environment or circumstances of a 
person by another such that in order to avoid a 
greater evil he is forced to act not according to a 
coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of 
others (Hayek, 1960, 20).
Schumpeter (1943, 212) imagines a socialist society to be one in 
which individuals are punished by the state if they do not act 
in desired ways. Entrepreneurs will be warned that if they do not 
innovate and coordinate they will be imprisoned. This is not a 
socialist society and freedom provides the final criterion by 
which the compatibility of socialism and entrepreneurship can be 
j udged.
Criterion Three
Socialism is compatible with entrepreneurship to the 
extent that the absence of coercion does not adversely 
affect the volume of entrepreneurial activity generated 
by a society. The greater the degree of coercion 
required to generate a particular volume of 
entrepreneurial activity, the more incompatible 
socialism and entrepreneurship can be said to be.
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1.3 The Failure of Socialism
1.3.1 Socialism, Economic Growth and Entrepreneurship
Although the demise of capitalism has long been predicted, 
democratic socialist parties have rarely attained let alone 
retained elected office. One frequently cited explanation for 
capitalism's continued success is its record of generating 
economic growth (Friedman, 1962, 190, Rand, 1967, 298, Seldon, 
1990, 15-17). The triumphs of capitalism can be exaggerated.
Growth is interrupted by frequent recession and has not 
eliminated pockets of absolute poverty in Britain and America. 
First world affluence exists alongside and may only be bought at 
the expense of third world deprivation. But much has changed. The 
working class has more to lose than their chains and socialists 
must recognise that economic growth has generated a 'culture of 
contentment' (Galbraith, 1992).
What causes economic growth? Economists variously emphasise the 
importance of institutional arrangements (North, 1990), 
population size (Malthus, 1970), division of labour (Smith, 1993) 
and the influence and extent of pressure group activity (Olson, 
1982) . In this thesis, attention is focused on entrepreneurship. 
This is the first of the three assumptions alluded to in the 
title to this chapter. To achieve economic growth it is necessary 
to stimulate entrepreneurial acu.vlty. _____ _____
Economic growth is desirable use it allows f.c' welfare
17
growth. In Figure 1.1. The utility (u) of two individuals, X and 
Y, is shown on the vertical and horizontal axis respectively. It 
is assumed that utility is derived from the consumption of goods 
and services. The greater the volume of consumption, the greater 
aggregate utility. The production possibility frontier (B-B) 
indicates maximum possible consumption given existing resource 
constraints and technical knowledge. Economic growth is 
represented by movement away from the origin. There are two kinds 
of entrepreneurial growth. The first, innovation, results in 
movements in the production possibility frontier itself (B-B -> 
B'-B'). The second, coordination, results in movements toward the 
existing production possibility frontier (D -> E) . In each case, 
growth results in increases in utility.
Figure 1.1 Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth
Xu
Yu
0
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Despite claims for the emergence of a 'post-material' society 
(Inglehart, 1977), voters show few signs of tiring of growth.
Whether the case [for economic growth] is accepted by 
writers and intellectuals, the people themselves are 
quite determined on a rapid improvement in their
living standards; and government will have to attend
to their wishes (Crosland, 1964, 287-8).
Socialism's success is contingent upon its ability to convince
individuals that it is not economically inferior to capitalism.
This is the second of the three assumptions to be introduced in 
this chapter.
When socialists discuss economic efficiency, they frequently do 
so in terms of static efficiency. Roy Jenkins (1952) and Roy 
Hattersley (1987, 13 5) argue, for example, that because the
utility of income is subject to diminishing marginal returns, 
redistribution of income will secure greater total utility. 
Socialism's critics retort that redistribution retards 
entrepreneurial activity and undermines dynamic efficiency. 
Reference is usually made to the importance of creating rather 
than distributing wealth. In Figure 1.2 worker's (material) 
welfare in a capitalist system is mapped against the passage of 
time. The embrace of socialism at Tl leads to a temporary surge 
in welfare - a 'valley of bliss' - but the eventual consequences 
are delete'
19
Figure 1.2 The Transition to Socialism
Worker's 
Welfare
Time
Tl
1.3.2 Przeworski's Evasion
Adam Przeworski (1985) offers an apparently interesting exception 
to the general rule that socialists discount the importance of 
dynamic efficiency. His argument is worth examining as it 
illustrates the casual way socialists treat the entrepreneurial 
function. Przeworski recognises that if it is to survive, a 
socialist government must (i) satisfy worker's material interests 
more effectively than capitalism, and (ii) generate economic 
growth in order to do so. Neither creates any problems for 
socialism. Przeworski (1985, 23 6) argues that even in the 'worst 
case', socialism will only be as efficient as capital: cm. In his 
model, workers retain an allegiance to capitalism not cause it 
is economically superior to socialism but bec-uj ;i) the
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dynamics of party competition erode class consciousness, and (ii) 
worker's fear a 'valley of transition' caused by capitalist 
disinvestment.2 The practical lessons socialists can draw from 
Przeworski's argument are political: the limitations of the
parliamentary road to power and the need to seize immediate 
control of state and society once socialism becomes politically 
feasible.
Much in Przeworski's argument depends on the claim that socialism 
is better able to satisfy worker's interests. If untrue, problems 
of transition - real though they may be - are largely irrelevant. 
Why is socialism economically superior to capitalism? The engine 
of growth in Przeworski's model is investment and investment is 
made possible by the capture of profit. In a capitalist system, 
not all profit is used for investment as some is taken by the 
capitalist for the purposes of conspicuous consumption.
Investment and growth is retarded.
If the capitalist were personally [only] as well off 
as the rest of the people ... the rate of growth would 
be much higher. In general, the inequality between 
personal incomes derived from profits and from wages 
means that the growth of consumption over time is
inferior to one that would have been achieved in an 
egalitarian society when other conditions are the same 
(Przeworski, 1985, 151-2),
2 The assumption of a ' ey of bliss' in Figure 1.2 is
inspired but is the inv . of Przeworski's cbncept of a
'valley onsition'.
21
Socialism is economically superior to capitalism because 
investment funds will be deducted directly from gross product and 
investment decisions taken by 'all citizens' (Przeworski, 1985, 
175). The assumption in his argument that all other things will 
remain equal can be challenged. Investment may be a necessary but 
it is not a sufficient condition for growth. It is not only the 
quantity but the quality of investment that determines growth. 
Resources must be invested effectively. In capitalist economies, 
entrepreneurs take responsibility for investment decisions but 
Przeworski simply ignores the role of the entrepreneur and offers 
no explanation of why investment decisions by 'the citizens' will 
be of a higher quality than those taken by Richard Branson or 
Bill Gates. Workers may find it in their interests to tolerate 
the use of some profit for consumption instead of investment if 
the alternative is the sacrifice of entrepreneurial excellence. 
Przeworski's argument is presented as being dynamic but it is 
rigidly static.
1.3.3 Socialism and Limits to Growth
Economic growth requires entrepreneurship and socialism requires 
economic growth if it is to prosper. Two objections to the second 
of these assumptions can be raised. The first is inspired by the 
Marxist theory of historical materialism which sees capitalism's 
function as being that of promoting growth to the point where 
economic abundance is achieved. When demand for goods and
services satisfied and additional consumption I d s  either
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zero or negative marginal utility, capitalism will 'subvert 
itself and give way to a classless society' (Cohen, 1978, 198-9) . 
Some (socialist) economists still defend the concept of abundance 
(Mandel, 1986) but drawing a distinction between needs and 
desires, most dismiss it as utopian. Whilst needs are finite, 
desires are infinite and further growth will always be required. 
The need to travel can, for example, be satisfied by a car but 
the desire for cars is insatiable as they can always be designed 
to travel faster in more comfort and with louder speaker systems. 
Aidan Foster-Carter (quoted Nove, 1991, 18) insists that
abundance is out: arguably it was always a meaningless 
notion, but henceforth, scarcity will have to be 
accepted as more than just a bugbear of bourgeois 
economics.
A second objection to the assumption that socialism requires 
growth is more serious. Green political thought is critical of 
the economics of both socialism and capitalism, seeing in them 
a regrettable commitment to a 'super ideology' of industrialism 
and growth (Porritt and Winner, 1988). Green political theorists 
challenge the assumption - found in Figure 1.1 - that economic 
growth is always we1fare-enhancing. The opportunity cost of 
unending growth is, they argue, frequently the satisfaction of 
basic needs: to breath clean air, to eat non-toxic foods and to 
have open and natural public *:es in which to relax.
There are certain affinit:! tween the Marxist: and Green
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argument. In the former and beyond a certain point, growth ceases 
as further growth becomes unnecessary. In the latter and beyond 
a certain point, growth must cease as further growth becomes 
deleterious. In both cases, economic justifications for 
capitalism and the economic deficiencies of socialism become 
irrelevant. The compatibility of socialism and entrepreneurship 
is unimportant as socialism will not have to cope with the demand 
for continued economic growth.
The Green argument appears intuitively plausible and now attracts 
the support of once zealous free marketeers (Gray, 1993). This 
does not mean that the assumptions on which this thesis is built 
need be abandoned. To see why, a basic distinction can be drawn 
between environmentalism and ecologism (Dobson, 1990). 
Environmentalists believe (i) that limits of growth have not yet 
been reached, and (ii) that they need not be reached if adequate 
changes are made to the economic process. The key concept for 
environmentalists is that of 'sustainable development'.
All economic growth in the future must be sustainable: 
that is to say, it must operate within and not beyond 
the finite limits of the planet (Porritt, 1986, 120).
The demand for sustainable growth is not equivalent to the demand 
for zero growth and recognition of the limits of growth may 
require not less but more innovation in, for example, 
technologies that economise on scarce resources (Dobson, 1990, 
17). Ev n if resources are exhausted and innovation becomes
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impossible, efficient coordination will still be required to 
maximise welfare within this constraint. Environmentalism does 
not free socialism from the entrepreneurial imperative.
Ecologists believe that (i) the limits of growth have already 
been reached, (ii) that additional growth will be harmful, and 
(iii) that negative growth may well be desirable. Rudolf Bahro 
(1986, 18) illustrates the difference between the two by
suggesting that whilst environmentalists favour fitting all new 
industrial chimneys with filtering devices, ecologists oppose the 
building of new chimneys. By conventional economic standards, 
ecological societies will be poorer (Bunyard and Morgan- 
Grenville, 1987) as economic growth is sacrificed in favour of 
spiritual development (Daly, 1977, Roszak, 1979, Devall, 1988, 
Naess, 1989). Ecologism does render the compatibility of 
socialism and entrepreneurship immaterial but the prospects for 
the acceptance of ecologism in the immediate future appear 
remote. The assumption that socialism will need to generate 
growth and for this reason stimulate entrepreneurial activity is 
maybe regrettable but is tenable.
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1.4 Rational Choice and Socialism
1.4.1 The Meaning of Rational Choice
The compatibility of socialism and entrepreneurship is assessed 
using rational choice theory.3 Iain McLean (1987, 1) sees
rational choice as a tool, a means of studying politics. The core 
assumptions of this tool are methodological individualism (MI) 
and rational action.
(i) Methodological Individualism The clearest definition of this 
term is found in the work of Karl Popper. Having condemned 
holistic approaches to the study of social science, Popper (1957, 
13 6) argues that
the task of social theory is to construct and to 
analyze our ... models carefully in descriptive or 
nominalist terms, that is to say, in terms of 
individuals, of their attitudes, expectations,
relations etc.
Rational choice theorists believe it is both possible and 
desirable to explain and predict outcomes on the basis of 
individual action and action in terms of an individual's beliefs 
and desires. The claim that events can be explained solely with 
reference to individual actors does not imply a demand that every
3 The term rational c‘\ "ice theory is tr< - as being
equivalent to that of publ: loice.
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event be explained in this way but it does mean that any 
explanation which does not give analytical primacy to individual 
action can be so revised without damaging the initial conclusions 
(Dowding, 1991, 13).
(ii) Rational Action The actors in rational choice models are 
assumed to have preferences between possible outcomes. Rational 
choice demands that these preferences be (i) complete: 
individuals must prefer one outcome to another or be indifferent 
between them; (ii) Transitive: if outcome A is preferred to
outcome B and outcome B to C then outcome A must be preferred to 
C; (iii) Translated into action: if outcome A is preferred to
outcome B and individual X is offered a choice between A and B 
they must choose A all things being equal. From this assumption 
is derived the expectation of utility maximisation and from this 
the capacity to predict individual behaviour.
The lines of battle between rational choice theorists and
sociologists, historians and assorted political scientists are 
clearly drawn. Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994) argue that 
rational choice lacks supporting evidence for most of its 
predictions. Barry Hindess (1988, 1989) objects to its structural 
determinism whilst Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky 
(1982) and Herbert Simon (1982) provide ammunition which others 
have used to challenge the assumption of rational action. A
further criticism is that rational choice is anti-socialist and, 
if true, the implications this are serious visit would be
inappro;!"-. L- e to assess ompatibility of socialism and
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entrepreneurship using a method that is itself incompatible with 
socialism and for this reason, the claim of ideological bias must 
be carefully considered.
1.4.2 Socialism and Rational Choice: The Case Against
The charge of ideological bias is made in two very different 
ways. At the 'macro' level, Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary 
(1987), Desmond King (1987), Peter Self (1993) and Hugh Stretton 
and Lionel Orchard (1994) identify a close relationship between 
rational choice theory and the policy output of the New Right. 
These authors focus on rational choice's political status and 
proclaim guilt by association. Supplementing and substantiating 
their work are those who find the source of the problem to lie 
in the assumptions employed by rational choice theorists. This 
is the 'micro' approach within which four distinct arguments can 
be identified.
(i) The assumptions of MI and rationality lead rational choice 
to place too great an explanatory emphasis on the mechanics of 
individual decision-making. The extent to which class structure, 
political culture and power relationships determine preferences 
and the constraints under which choices are made is ignored. 
Capitalism leaves individual preferences as much structured by 
life as determinants of it and does so in ways that are harmful 
to the ‘ vidual. By denying or at least ignoring this, rational
choic> ounts a large part of the socialist £ &
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(ii) The assumption of rational action is held to carry within 
it a covert commitment to the postulate of self-interested 
behaviour. Theorists like George Stigler (1981, 190) assert that 
all action is self-serving and given this assumption, rational 
choice sees its normative task as being one of
constructing, or re-constructing, a political order 
that will channel the self-serving behaviour of 
participants towards the common good in a manner that 
comes as close as possible to that described for us by 
Adam Smith with respect to the economic order 
(Buchanan, 1978, 17).
The belief that self-interest can always be reconciled with the 
public good is contestable and socialists assert both the 
possibility and necessity of individuals acting altruistically. 
As rational choice demands egoism and egoism is incompatible with 
socialism, socialism is incompatible with the use of rational 
choice.
(iii) From this a related claim is drawn: that rational choice 
justifies and encourages selfish behaviour by propagating the 
myth that to act in any other way is irrational (Stephens, 1991, 
429). Such reasoning lends itself to a 'logic of accommodation' 
(Stephens, 1991, 43 0) in which individuals accept sub-optimal 
(capitalist) outcomes be Ting collective . action to be 
impossible.
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(iv) Completing the indictment, it is argued that the exclusive 
attention paid to endogenously determined individual preferences 
promotes the belief that individuals are all that counts, that 
'there is no such thing as society'. Robert Nozick's (1974, ix) 
declaration that 'individuals have rights, and there are things 
no person or group may do to them' is built into the rational 
choice programme.
1.4.3 Rational Choice and Socialism: Initial Defence
The assumptions rational choice makes and the portrait of human 
behaviour it offers are aesthetically unappealing but there are 
six reasons for doubting the claim that rational choice is 
'inherently' (King, 1987, 104) anti-socialist.
(i) Just as it is possible to point to anti-socialist rational 
choice theorists, so too is it possible to identity if not 
socialist, then certainly anti-conservative theorists. John 
Roemer (1982) uses rational choice to illuminate the concept of 
capitalist exploitation and Alan Carling (1991) to account for 
the origins of sexual and racial discrimination. Jon Elster's 
(1985) analysis of Marxism is frequently scathing but does affirm 
Marx's critique of capitalism. Elsewhere, Michael Taylor (1987) 
uses game theory to establish the feasibility of anarchism whilst 
Keith Dowding (1991) finds in rational choice a tool capable of 
illui rating the importance of power in determining outcomes in 
a Cc ilist society. The value of such examples is not to be 
eas:; 1 smissed but by,..themselves they cannot establish the
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absence of bias. It may occasionally be possible to derive 
support for socialism even if there is a methodological force 
pushing conclusions in the opposite direction. For this reason, 
it is necessary to return to rational choice's 'micro' 
assumptions.
(ii) Rational choice can deny that rational action leads 
inexorably to the assumption of self-interest. David Collard 
(1981) and Howard Margolis (1982) have shown that it is possible 
to construct models in which individual utility is in part a 
function of the utility of others. The assumption of self- 
interested behaviour is nonetheless retained in subsequent 
chapters and this is the third of the three assumptions to be 
introduced in this chapter. Any form of socialism that rests on 
assumptions about the emergence of an altruism is vulnerable to 
accusations of utopianism. This is not to deny that preferences 
might indeed change in a socialist society but it is to assert 
that the feasibility of socialism should not come to depend upon 
such a transformation. In subsequent chapters, attention is 
focused not on the psychological make-up of the entrepreneur but 
on the institutions and organisations which surround and 
constrain their action.
(iii) Markets are not incompatible with socialism but socialists 
are not slaves to the market. They recognise that it (i) exists 
within r.ud is moulded by a wider social environment, and (ii) 
frequr o generates undes - ble outcomes. I- lysis of market 
failu: facilitated by ■ e use of rati< choice. Barry
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(1988, 147) goes so far as to claim that 'the paradigm of
socialism is the prisoner's dilemma'. In the place of markets, 
socialists frequently invoke the need for collective action. 
Critics are mistaken when they see in rational choice an 
assertion of the impossibility of collective action. Successful 
collective action may be problematic but Mancur Olson (1965), 
Dennis Chong (1991), Russell Hardin (1982) and Keith Dowding 
(1994a) all assert its feasibility. Furthermore, the difficulty 
of collective action can be used to justify coercive state 
action.
(iv) A more general response is to assert that the nature of the 
conclusions drawn from rational choice models depends largely 
upon 'auxiliary assumptions'. William Niskanen (1971) suggests 
that bureaucrats derive utility from larger budgets. Patrick 
Dunleavy (1991, 202) offers an alternative account in which
bureaucrats value collegiate atmosphere, proximity to political 
power, stimulating work, co-operative work patterns and high- 
status social contacts. The models share the same 'core 
assumptions' but reach very different conclusions about 
bureaucratic behaviour. In the absence of such 'auxiliary 
assumptions' there is no easy route from MI and rational action 
to either bureau-shaping or budget-maximising and critics have 
failed to show why auxiliary assumptions need be 'anti­
socialist' . Similarly, whilst socialists affirm the value of 
freedom, critics argue that the use of rational choice and 
specifically the assumption of MI leads to a myopic focus on 
individual preferences. In some respects, this c, ament is truly
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bizarre. There is no reason to believe that a methodological 
focus on individual preferences need lead to their canonization. 
Those who study anarchism need not become anarchists. The 
sanctity of individual preferences is a normative auxiliary 
assumption.
(v) Rational choice offers positive descriptions of political 
events. From these, rational choice theorists offer (frequently 
right-wing) policy prescriptions. Socialists should realise that 
they can accept the initial analysis without having also to 
embrace the policy advice. Take the treatment of democracy. Many 
rational choice theorists argue that decisions taken in the 
political marketplace are necessarily inferior to those taken in 
the economic one. Attention is paid to the difficulty of 
aggregating individual preferences, of the absence of feedback 
mechanisms, of economic electioneering in the run-up to an 
election and the possibility of collusion between parties. For 
these reasons, James Buchanan (1984, 1988) claims that the
frontiers of the state should be rolled back. Democratic 
socialists recoil and rid themselves of the message through 
efforts to discredit the messenger. It is open to socialists to 
offer more palatable accounts of democracy (Wittman, 1995) but 
in the absence of such attempts, the necessity of democratic 
privatisation is not the only message that can be drawn. Radical 
democrats could also, for example, assert the desirability of 
selecting politicians by lot for fixed periods of time (Goodwin, 
1992' as this will not only secure legislative independence and 
prev ' • electoral manipul t:c ,i but ensure a more substantive form
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of political equality.
(vi) Finally, it does not follow that the (disputed) existence 
of any bias in rational choice means that the method is of no 
value for socialists. If rational choice is to be condemned as 
right-wing its travelling companions within the social sciences 
are sociology and Marxism which have long been considered the 
preserve of the left. Looking at these two, it seems that the 
effect of their perceived bias has been to reduce the value of 
their academic coinage. Sociologists who decry the pernicious 
impact of capitalism are dismissed precisely because they are 
sociologists. The other side of this coin is the significance 
attached to sociologists who reach 'anti-socialist' conclusions 
through the use of a 'socialist' method. For so long as critics 
assert the prejudice of the method, socialist rational choice 
theorists are in an enviable position. Critics argue that 
socialism suppresses entrepreneurship and by using a anti­
socialist method to assess this claim, any pro-socialist 
conclusions drawn will be more impressive for having strayed on 
to what is considered enemy territory. But Socialist rational 
choice theorists are in a 'win-win' situation as anti-socialist 
conclusions generated by the method can be dismissed precisely 
because the method is anti-socialist. The academic probity of 
this tactic is debatable but its political value significant.
34
1.5 Concluding Comments and Future Directions
'Feasible socialism' (Nove, 1991) has recently attracted 
considerable attention and philosophers and economists like Jon 
Elster (1989), John Roemer (1994), Philippe Van Parijs (1995) and 
Gerry Cohen (1995) have invigorated its study. Of this group, 
Roemer's work comes closest in spirit to capturing the intentions 
of my work. Six parallels can be identified which can be used to 
locate my argument. First, discussion is constrained by the 
assumption of self-interested behaviour. Second, the intrinsic 
superiority of socialist over capitalist values is assumed rather 
than established. Discussion is of whether these values can be 
realised without sacrificing economic prosperity. Third, the 
competitive market is seen as both a necessary and desirable 
feature of an established socialist society. Fourth and partly 
as a consequence of the assumption of self-interest, it is 
considered appropriate to study the feasibility of socialism 
using rational choice. Fifth, the possibilities for and the 
particular difficulties caused by the transition from capitalism 
to socialism are largely neglected.4 Finally, the intention in 
discussing models of feasible socialism is not to construct a 
detailed blueprint but to identify the mechanisms, institutions 
and organisations on which socialism can be constructed.
4 Elster (1989) ex- is the transition ocialism. Cohen
(1995) thoroughly jus. es the choice c' cialism whilst
expressing reservation: t the compatibil c socialism and
the market (Cohen, 199
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This thesis is neither a review or a development of Roemer's 
work. Subsequent chapters consider different arguments and 
develop distinctive proposals. Three principal contrasts with 
Roemer's work can be noted. First, strong equality is seen as a 
necessary feature of socialism (cf Roemer, 1994, 11) . Second, the 
feasibility of socialism is seen to depend on the compatibility 
of socialism and entrepreneurship. In this respect and although 
the study of entrepreneurship requires a general sensitivity to 
economic theory, the focus of the work is narrower. Finally, 
Roemer's favoured economic tool, neo-classical economics, is 
abandoned in favour of less orthodox approaches. Chapter Two 
accounts for this choice in terms of the analysis of 
entrepreneurship.
The argument is developed in eight chapters. The next three 
provide the necessary background to the debate, the fifth and 
sixth evaluate established models of market socialism and the 
final three develop an alternative model of socialist
entrepreneurship. Having defined the term capitalism, Chapter 
Two, Capitalist Entrepreneurship, distinguishes between three 
images of entrepreneurial activity: new right, elitist and neo- 
pluralist. The compatibility of socialism and entrepreneurship 
depends upon the compatibility of socialism with each of these 
three. The challenge facing a socialist economy is not
irsu"mountable. Although capitalism generates growth it
nc r*less systematically undersupplies entrepreneurial 
ii .on and coordination. Socialism can fail to match
c om in some respects but still remain superior to it.
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Chapter Three, Socialism and Entrepreneurship: The Case Against,
identifies barriers to the realisation of socialist 
entrepreneurship. The principal source of the argument is the 
'calculation debate' conducted between socialists like Oskar 
Lange and Friedrich Taylor and 'Austrian' economists, notably 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. The Austrians believe that 
competitive markets are essential for economic rationality. As 
an examination of the relationship between bureaucracy and 
entrepreneurship indicates, any assertion of the compatibility 
of socialism and entrepreneurship must deal with Mises' and 
Hayek's objections.
Chapter Four, Equality, Efficiency and Socialism, reviews and 
clarifies earlier arguments through a discussion of the trade-off 
between efficiency and equality. In the final part of the 
chapter, much of the Austrians' argument is conceded and this 
means that if it is to sustain new right entrepreneurship, 
socialism must be 'market socialist'. Acceptance of market 
socialism does not, as David Miller (1989) seems to believe, 
require the use of labour-managed firms. Market socialism is not 
a specific solution but a general direction to be taken in the 
search for a solution. All forms of market socialism are 
distinguished by a reliance on the market but their 
organisational and institutional features are in other respects 
very different. The search in subsequent chapters is for the type 
of market socialism that can best generate entrepreneurial 
ac 'vity without sacrif.iti.ng socialist va' •
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Chapter Five, Moral Incentives and Socialist Entrepreneurship,
is a detailed examination of Joseph Carens' Equality, Moral 
Incentives and the Market (1981) . This is the most ambitious 
variant of market socialism considered as it promises to 
eliminate the trade-off between equality and efficiency. Using 
game theory, Carens' argument is defended against the accusation 
that it depends on the presence of altruism. Reservations are 
nonetheless expressed. Moral incentives can only motivate action 
in particular circumstances and the example of the Israeli 
Kibbutz is used to show that these conditions frustrate the 
emergence of neo-pluralist entrepreneurship.
Economic democracy offers a more familiar alternative to 
capitalism and its feasibility is explored in Chapter Six, Labour 
Managed Firms and Socialist Entrepreneurship. Using the example 
of the Spanish Mondragon cooperatives and the methodology of New 
Institutional Economics, labour managed firms are shown in many 
respects to be more efficient than capitalist firms. Although the 
value of this form of socialism is not dismissed, it is argued 
that labour managed firms will struggle to generate elite 
entrepreneurship.
The final three chapters are used to develop a form of socialist 
entrepreneurship based on state ownership of the means of 
production. Chapter Seven, Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial 
Socialism: Incentives, addresses an objection first raised in
Chapter Three: that in the absence of private ownership, markets 
fail, to generate s - icient incentives for entrepreneurir..
38
action. Principal-agent theory is used to assess the merits of 
procedures that generate incentives by binding compensation to 
performance. The use of ordinal tournaments between entrepreneurs 
as an institutional supplement to the market is recommended. 
Whilst tournaments do not eliminate the trade-off between 
efficiency and equality they do reduce it. It was also argued in 
Chapter Three that markets and bureaucracy are incompatible as 
the former also depends on the presence of private property. In 
the first part of Chapter Eight, Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial 
Socialism: Structure, this argument is rejected. Tournaments
offer a different but equally effective means by which 
entrepreneurial competition can be stimulated. Having further 
justified their use, the second part of the chapter builds 
tournaments into a particular organisational design.
Rational choice theory has been used to deride the assumption 
that politicians will act in the public interest (Buchanan, 
1984). In Chapter Nine, Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial Socialism: 
Politics, this insight is used to generate a sustained attack on 
socialist entrepreneurship. Politician's can be expected to 
subvert potential efficiency in their pursuit of elected office. 
The challenge for socialism is of finding a means by which to 
tame the 'Leviathan' of the state without having also to 
sacrifice the pursuit of democracy.
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Chapter Two
Capitalist Entrepreneurship
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Concept of Capitalism
2.3 Images of Capitalist Entrepreneurship
2.3.1 False Start: Neo-Classical Economics
2.3.2 Elite Accounts: Joseph Schumpeter
2.3.3 New Right Accounts: Israel Kirzner
2.3.4 Neo-Pluralist Accounts: John Kenneth Galbraith
2.3.5 Preliminary Conclusions: Socialist Entrepreneurship
2.4 The Limitations of Capitalist Entrepreneurship
2.5 Conclusion: The Unfortunate Legacy of Karl Marx
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'Systems that create the widest opportunities for 
entrepreneurship - commonly known as capitalism - are 
everywhere richer than those societies that suppress 
it' (Seldon, 1980, xi).
2.1. Introduction
'What (if anything) can justify capitalism' (Van Parijs, 1995)? 
Its respect for civil liberties (Friedman, 1962, 7-21), its
compatibility with democracy (Hayek, 1944), its acknowledgement 
of desert (Arnold, 1987), or recognition of entitlement (Nozick, 
1974)? Or all of these? As Chapter One indicated, the defence of 
capitalism with which we are concerned is not ethical or 
political but economic. Capitalism is preferable to socialism if 
it generates more economic growth, if it is better able to 
stimulate entrepreneurial activity.
What is capitalist entrepreneurship? As a preliminary to 
answering this question, this chapter considers three ways in 
which capitalism can be defined: concomitant to these
definitions, the third section identifies three different 
accounts of capitalist entrepreneurship, elitist, new right and 
neo-pluralist. Each offers distinct accounts of how and by who 
the functions of innovation and coordination are undertaken in 
a capitalist society and each is of relevance to an understanding 
of socialist entrepreneurship. Finally, the limitations, as well 
as the strengths of capitalist entrepreneurship are rented.
2.2 The Concept of Capitalism
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Peter Rutland (1989, 199) argues that capitalism and socialism 
are built on 'irreconcilably divergent' values. Given the 
definition of socialism in Chapter One, can capitalism therefore 
be defined as a system that promotes democracy and freedom but 
frustrates 'strong' equality? Such a conception is appealing for 
reasons other than aesthetic symmetry as it is the failure of 
capitalism to sustain equality that generates the demand for 
socialism. The definition has political bite. For our purposes, 
the value of this approach is limited. To assert the 
compatibility of socialism and entrepreneurship is to claim that 
it is not the entrepreneurial process itself but some feature of 
capitalist entrepreneurship that causes inequality. If capitalism 
is defined in terms of its consequences, this issue is obscured. 
Instead of building toward an argument that 'capitalism causes 
inequality' we must commit ourselves to the proposition that 
'inequality causes inequality'.1
Max Weber (1978) and Joseph Schumpeter (1943) define capitalism 
in terms of a particular set of cultural values. The hallmark of 
capitalism is a pervasive spirit of acquisition, 'a desire [for] 
bettering our condition which ... comes with us from the womb, 
and never leaves us till we go into the grave' (Smith, 1993,
1 Thi;- .lot necessarily a meaningless proposition. As a
empirical r ■ it may well be true that ' inequality causes
(further) lity'. In a capitalist society, the rich are
likely to r ..cher and the poor poorer. It is in the. context 
of a discus : socialist entrepreneurship that the definition
is less ust
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240). Out of this desire emerges a distinct rationality, 
economic, egoistic and maximising. Capitalism is a society
cast in a purely economic mould: its foundations,
beams and beacons are all made of economic material.
The building faces toward the economic side of life. 
Prizes and penalties are measured in pecuniary terms.
Going up and down means making and losing money 
(Schumpeter, 1943, 73).
Gerry Cohen (1978, 198-9) suggests capitalism will give way to
socialism when all material desires are satisfied and the spirit 
of acquisition withers. It was argued in Chapter One that this 
point of abundance will not be reached and that socialism will 
need to generate economic growth if it is to retain political 
support. Given this argument, defining capitalism in terms of its 
spirit of acquisition does not allow a distinction to be drawn 
between capitalism and socialism. Furthermore, if a maximising, 
calculative rationality is a consequence only of scarcity and a 
distinguishing feature of capitalism, problems emerge in the use 
of rational choice theory as this assumes the presence of 
precisely such behaviour.
The solution is to describe capitalism in terms of its economic 
mechanisms. According to both critics (Dobb, 1958, 5-6) and
champions (Seldon, 1990, 1-2), the most important of these are 
(i) private ownership of the m : =ns of production, and (ii) 
markets. Ther brief definitior the terms offered here is
preliminary to later and more detailed discussion. In a legal 
sense, full ownership comprises
the right to possess, the right to use, the right to 
manage, the right to the income of the thing, the 
right to the capital, the right to security, the 
rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence of 
term, the prohibition of harmful use, liability to 
execution, and the incident of residuarity (Honore,
1961, 113).
Private ownership suggests that the title to these rights are 
located with a limited number of individuals or organisations and 
can be contrasted with common ownership in which
there is no delimitation of .... rights to any private 
party [and in which] no one has the right to exclude 
others from using it, and all are free to compete for 
its use (Cheung, 1987, 504).
The market is distinguished by its concern with the exchange 
rather than use-value of products. Capital (M) is used to produce 
commodities (C) in the expectation that they can be sold for a 
greater amount of money (M') which can be used to finance future 
production. It is this 'never ending metamorphosis of M-C-M'' 
(Heilbroner, 1987) which characterises market transactions. To 
understand capitalist entreprene.i rsfiip is lo understand how the 
functions of innovation and co ■ nation are performed in an
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economy founded on private ownership and the use of the market.
2.3 Images of Capitalist Entrepreneurship
2.3.1 False Start: Neo-Classical Economics
The most obvious place to search for a theory of capitalist 
entrepreneurship is economics but economic theory is frequently 
reluctant to acknowledge the significance of entrepreneurship. 
Why? The neo-classical proof that competitive markets 
characterised by perfect information and zero transaction costs 
generate Pareto optimal outcomes (Arrow and Debreu, 1954, 
McKenzie, 1959) has been used to defend capitalism against 
socialism (Buchanan, 1984, 14-15) and neo-classical theory
against rival approaches. But the way the proof is constructed 
undermines the capacity of neo-classical economics to recognise 
the need for a theory of entrepreneurship. Take, for example, the 
assumption of perfect information. In their neo-classical model 
of technical change, Partha Dasgupta and George Stiglitz (1980) 
assume that managers have complete knowledge of not only existing 
but future production frontiers: that managers know today what 
the innovations of tomorrow will be, how much they will cost and 
when they will be introduced. But innovation implies discovery 
and the acquisition of additional knowledge. To assume perfect 
information assumes away the entrepreneurial function and 
obscures important questions about the motive;- ror and 
institution*^ ?rrangements that encourage entreprene. action.
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Two additional problems with neo-classical economics can be 
identified. First, its pervasive concern with the properties of 
equilibrium. Whereas the neo-classical world is static, 
entrepreneurial activity imples constant change as risks are 
reassessed, methods of production pioneered and new markets 
opened. Israel Kirzner (1973, 26), whose theory of
entrepreneurship is partially built on the failings of the neo­
classical model observes that 'in equilibrium there is no room 
for the entrepreneur'. Neo-classical models are further 
compromised by their failure to specify in any detail the process 
through which equilibrium is attained (Wu, 1989, 15-49, Kirchoff, 
1994, 9-33). The impression given is not only that the neo­
classical world is perfect but that perfection is spontaneously 
attained. Again, the role of the entrepreneur is ignored.
Second, neo-classical economics assumes that whilst individuals 
may differ in resources they share the same cognitive capacities: 
all maximise and all maximise in identical ways. As Mark Casson 
(1982, 13) argues, 'neo-classical economics ... depersonalises
the market'. The champions of capitalism reach a very different 
conclusion. Whilst all individuals maximise, they react 
differently to the same event because they perceive it in 
different ways. Entrepreneurs are the embodiment of Nietzsche's 
'herenmensch'; their success is due precisely to their 
willingness to challenge com n^al wisdom, to act and react
differently from others. A thf f capitalist entrepreneurship
must account for such variat?
Casson (1982, 9) prefaces his work on entrepreneurship by saying 
that 'it may be stated quite categorically that at present there 
is no established theory of the entrepreneur'. As Casson 
recognises, the problem is not one of too little but of too much 
theory. The entrepreneur may have escaped the clutches of the 
neo-classical economist but she has fallen prey to numerous 
others. Rather than attempt a synthesis of their arguments, this 
section emphasises differences between competing theories of 
entrepreneurship and presents each as token representatives of 
broader schools of thought within the social sciences. Patrick 
Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary (1987) identify elitist, new right 
and neo-pluralist theories of the state. Here, I identify 
elitist, new right and neo-pluralist theories of capitalist 
entrepreneurship.2 All three are best seen as 'ideal types' in 
the sense that they are not descriptions of reality but 
explanatory tools which reflect particular elements of what is 
taken to constitute that reality. As Talcott Parsons (1968, 601- 
3) emphasises, an ideal type is neither a hypothesis to be 
tested, an average or a common denominator. An ideal type
- A discussion of the compatibility ojf new right 
entrepreneurship and socialism may seem curious. For those eager 
to read too much into a name, the term pluralist entrepreneurship 
may be r eferred and Chapter Three identifies th. ; oints of 
connect! between them.
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is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more 
points of view and by the synthesis of a great many 
. .. diffuse and occasionally absent concrete 
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to 
those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified 
analytical construct (Weber quoted Sassower, 1985,
45) .
The relationship between these theories and their relevance to 
socialist entrepreneurship will be considered presently.
2.3.2 Elite Entrepreneurship: Joseph Schumpeter
'Classical' elite theory as found in the work of Gaetano Mosca 
(1939), Robert Michels (1915) and Vilfredo Pareto (1935) is 
grounded on four propositions. First, that elites, be they 
political, cultural or economic, emerge and impose themselves on 
particular societies. Second, that to understand any society it 
is necessary to recognise the existence of elites. Third, that 
political transformation threatens particular elites but does not 
threaten the existence of an elite. Fourth, that the suppression 
of elites, even if possible, is undesirable.
It is Schumpeter's work on democracy that is normally associated 
with and taken to mark a development of 'classical' elite theory. 
Schumpeter defends democracy by demonstrating that, through a 
competitiv .Luggle for votes, accountability and representation
can be se d even in the presence of an elite (Mil er, 1983).
48
But it is in his economic theory (1934, 1939, 1943, 1947) that 
Schumpeter's elitism is most clearly evident.
Schumpeter's argument rests on a distinction between two phases 
of economic activity, the 'circular flow' and 'creative 
destruction' . The former is characterised by vigorous competition 
between established firms and might be described as perfect 
competition. Schumpeter is dismissive of the economic value of 
such activity, denying that it can generate significant economic 
growth. Thankfully, at some - largely unspecified - point, the 
circular flow gives way to a period of creative destruction. An 
entrepreneur discovers a new market or method of production and 
in doing so destroys the existing equilibrium. Moments of 
creative destruction are rare but shape subsequent economic 
activity. Stephenson's 'Rocket', Henry Ford's introduction of 
assembly lines and Bill Gates' launch of Microsoft are obvious 
examples. Following the moment of creative destruction, the 
entrepreneur enjoys a virtual monopoly as existing firms struggle 
to adapt to the new circumstances, many closing in the process. 
Eventually, the entrepreneur's competitive advantage is 
undermined as others react to and improve upon the entrepreneur's 
actions. Creative destruction gives way to circular flow and the 
process starts again.
Within this framework, four elements - some already implicit in 
this account - are worth emphasising. First, very few individuals 
are capable of performing the entrepreneurial function.
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To act with confidence beyond the familiar range of 
beacons . . . requires aptitudes that are present in 
only a small fraction of the population (Schumpeter,
1943, 132) .
Second, attempts at entrepreneurial action are rarely successful. 
Entrepreneurs must surmount not only others natural resistance 
to change but the fallibility of their own judgement. The dilemma 
facing a entrepreneur is this. Only a person blessed with 
entrepreneurial talent will be successful but an individual 
cannot know whether they have that talent until they attempt 
entrepreneurial action. Finally, even those with entrepreneurial 
talent often fail.
[Rewards] are not proffered at random; yet there is a 
sufficiently enticing admixture of chance: the game is 
not like roulette, it is more like poker . . . though 
the incompetent men and the obsolete methods are in 
fact eliminated, sometimes very promptly, sometimes 
with a lag, failure also threatens or actually 
overtakes many an able man (Schumpeter, 1943, 73-4).
Failure is certainly a pervasive feature of capitalist 
entrepreneurship. Sixty three per cent of American firms go 
bankrupt within five years (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988) 
and sixty per cent of new Bricish firms suffer the same fate 
within three years (Stanworth and Grey, 1991, 11).
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Third, those entrepreneurs who do succeed are rewarded with 
'spectacular prizes much greater than would have been necessary 
to call forth the particular effort' (Schumpeter, 1943, 73).
Schumpeter himself does not claim that entrepreneurs are 
motivated by the (remote) prospect of pecuniary success. He 
instead emphasises the desire 'to conquer, the impulse to fight 
... the joy of creating' (Schumpeter, 1943, 93-4). Capitalist
entrepreneurs themselves appear eager to confirm the importance 
of non-pecuniary incentives (Young, 1990, 11) and a developing 
literature on female entrepreneurship reaches the same conclusion 
(Young and Carter, 1992, 22). At the same time and without
reservation, David Robinson (1990, 101) concludes his study of 
capitalist entrepreneurship with the assertion that 'all the 
available research shows that it is the drive to become rich 
which is the prime motivator'. The issue is controversial and 
further discussion postponed.
Finally, Schumpeter emphasises the relationship between monopoly 
and entrepreneurship. Monopoly is the inevitable price of 
economic progress, its presence during moments of creative 
destruction to be treated as a sign not of economic stagnation 
but of vitality.
The introduction of new methods of production and new 
commodities is hardly conceivable with perfect - and 
perfectly prompt - competition from the start . . . 
perfect competition is and always has been temporarily 
suspended whenever anything new is been introduced 
(Schumpeter, 1943, 105).
2.3.3 New Right Entrepreneurship: Israel Kirzner
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987, 74) argue that the origins of new
right philosophy lie in public choice theory and Austrian 
economics. Kirzner's (1973, 1979, 1980, 1985) work is inspired 
by the latter but his assumptions and prescriptions echo 
mainstream rational choice arguments. Specifically, his work can 
be considered as belonging to the new right for the following 
reasons. First, it is robustly individualistic. Not only are all 
the actors in Kirzner's economic world individuals but each 
individual is endowed with different capacities. Second, it is 
subjectivist. The mind of each individual is taken to be the 
ultimate source of knowledge and uncertainty and individual's 
limited capacities to process information are emphasised. Third, 
'invisible hand' explanations are favoured. The pursuit of self- 
interest in the market allows individuals to serve the interests 
of all. Finally, government is treated as a malevolent force.
Kirzner's criticisms of the Lassical model have already been
encountered. Kirzner argues 'O account is given within neo­
classical theory of how ec- are pushed toward equilibrium
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and he uses this oversight as the foundation for his own theory 
of entrepreneurship. In any disequilibrium, he argues, there will 
by definition be the possibility of further profitable trades. 
Disequilibrium means that apples are selling for twenty pence 
that can be sold for a profit at twenty one pence. The 
entrepreneur is the person who is 'alert' to, 'discovers' and 
acts upon these previously overlooked opportunities. Through a 
series of such actions undertaken by a large number of 
individuals, the economy is pushed toward equilibrium.
In the absence of such complete equilibrium 
coordination of decisions, a market process is set in 
motion in which market participants are motivated to 
learn to anticipate more accurately the decisions of 
others: in this process, the entrepreneurial, profit- 
motivated discovery of the gaps in mutual coordination 
of decisions is a crucial element (Kirzner, 1985, 43).
In the absence of entrepreneurship it is only out of 
the purest chance that market transactions by 
different pairs of buyers and sellers are made on 
anything but the most widely inconsistent forms 
(Kirzner, 1985, 59).
Presented in this way, Kirzner's model of capitalist 
entrepreneurship is remarkably simple. The complications and 
implic ions of his work are examined in Chapter Three. For-now, 
four . ts can be emphasised. First, whilst entrepreneurs
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forever push the economy toward it, equilibrium is never attained 
as consumer's tastes change and new products are forever being 
introduced. There is always a requirement for entrepreneurial 
action. Second, perpetual change means that uncertainty pervades 
the entrepreneur's world. Individual expectations about the 
future can diverge in innumerable ways from what actually 
happens. The entrepreneur cannot eliminate this uncertainty but 
is the person who (i) is prepared to act despite it, and (ii) 
events reveal as having made the most accurate judgements about 
the future. Third, the concept of profit is central to the 
account. Kirzner (1973, 76) goes so far as to argue that 'the 
notion of entrepreneurship is inseparable from the opportunity 
for profit'. This is for two reasons. First, profit acts as a 
signal that the possibility for entrepreneurial action exists and 
as a confirmation, when captured, that the action was successful. 
Second and because 'human beings tend to notice that which it is 
in their interest to notice' (Kirzner 1985, 28), the possibility 
of making a profit stimulates entrepreneurial alertness. Kirzner 
accepts, in principle, that individual's interests need not be 
egoistic but remains sceptical of the salience of such motives.
It is doubtful in the extreme if ideals such as 
benevolence or patriotism can be relied upon to enable 
a potential discoverer to identify his own personal 
interest with that of the discovery of an opportunity 
(Kirzner, 1973, 32).
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2.3.4 Neo-Pluralist Entrepreneurship: John Kenneth Galbraith
Neo-pluralism is less coherent than either elitist or new right 
theory. Whilst the politics, methodology and analytical interests 
of neo-pluralist theorists are diverse, it is possible to discern 
the following and related points of agreement. First, a 
preoccupation with the distinctiveness and complexity of modern 
society. Second, a conviction that prevailing social science 
orthodoxies are obsolete. Third, a recognition of the political 
and economic significance of the growth of corporate 
organisation. Fourth, awareness of the growing importance of 
technocracy. Fifth, a claim that traditional distinctions between 
left and right, markets and planning, public and private sectors 
are breaking down.
John Kenneth Galbraith's (1965, 1967, 1973, 1975) work is central 
to neo-pluralism. For our purposes, Galbraith's most significant 
claim is that the 'classical' entrepreneur and small firm which 
drove the industrial revolution have been eclipsed by the 
technocrat and the giant corporation.
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In the past, leadership in business organisation was 
identified with the entrepreneur - the individual who 
united ownership or control of capital with capacity 
for organising the other factors of production and, in 
most contexts, with a further capacity for innovation.
With the rise of the modern corporation, the emergence 
of the organisation required by modern technology and 
planning and the divorce of the owner of the capital 
from control of the enterprise, the entrepreneur no 
longer exists as an individual person in the mature 
industrial enterprise (Galbraith, 1967, 85).
Corporations are themselves an innovation: a response to the
demands of high-technology whose potential was first recognised 
by imaginative business leaders. The source of the competitive 
advantages corporations enjoy can be traced to their greater 
size. First, their additional resources allow them to absorb the 
cost of occasional failures, costs that would either paralyse or 
bankrupt a small company. Second, their resources allow them to 
finance entrepreneurial activity internally. Freed from the 
burden of paying interest on loans, entrepreneurial activity is 
more profitable: ventures that small companies are unable to 
undertake become viable. Third, size allows the corporation to 
employ a large number of specialists. Rather than having to rely 
on the experience and knowledge of one individual, the 
corporation can draw on the talents of
56
a large group of anonymous specialists, a balanced 
team of product planners, engineers, advertising and 
sales executives, public relations men, scientists, 
lobbyists, accountants, economists and others 
(Reisman, 1980, 7-8).
As Galbraith argues and as Schumpeter (1943, 132) foresaw,
capitalist entrepreneurship has become more predictable, driven 
less by the flash of occasional inspiration and more by 
committees and collective decision-making. The motives for 
entrepreneurial action have also changed. Technocrats do not 
acquire spectacular prizes when a successful new product is 
launched and it is shareholder's and not technocrat's capital 
that is lost when projects fail. Technocratic entrepreneurs act 
in the expectation of promotion or wage rises. 'The marketing man 
who successfully persuades the public to buy some abnormally 
improbable artifact ... [is] promoting himself along with the 
product' (Galbraith, 1975, 118).
Galbraith views the rise of the corporation with ambivalence. On 
the one hand, corporations have facilitated increased 
entrepreneurial activity.
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No important technical development of recent times - 
atomic energy and its applications, modern air
transport, modern electronic development, major 
agricultural innovation - is the product of the 
individual inventor ... individuals still have ideas.
But - with rare exceptions - only organisations can 
bring ideas into use (Galbraith, 1965, 88).
But corporations exist to serve their own interests and 
frequently do so to the detriment of broader social ones. Two 
specific concerns are raised. First, the resources of
corporations allow them to subvert the market process: to
manipulate consumer preferences through mass advertising in such 
a way as to create a demand for products prior to their launch. 
Whether consumers 'really' want the fruits of corporate research 
and development is, Galbraith argues, disputable as corporations 
can 'create the wants [they] seek to satisfy' (Galbraith, 1973, 
151) . Second, corporations invade the political arena and use the 
state to secure their economic objectives. Sources of assistance 
are numerous. First, government uses monetary and fiscal policy 
to minimise the chance of recessions which threaten corporate 
sales strategies. Second, government secures for corporations the 
collective good of a skilled workforce free of charge. Third, 
government subsidises research activity and underwrites the debts 
of corporations faced with closure. Finally, through military and 
civilian contracts, gove- offers corporations high-profit,
low-risk, contracts.
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2.3.5 Preliminary Conclusions: Socialist Entrepreneurship
What can we learn about the likely nature of and demands to be 
placed upon socialist entrepreneurship from this? For two reasons 
it could be argued very little. First, because socialism and 
capitalism are very different, capitalist and socialist 
entrepreneurship, it might be suggested, will be very different. 
Capitalism is built upon private ownership. Galbraith's 
description is of the actions of a privately owned corporation 
and for this reason has little relevance to socialist 
entrepreneurship. This argument is rejected. There is no 
immediate reason for believing that socialism and capitalism must 
be mirror images of each other as the former has been defined in 
terms of political values and the latter in terms of economic 
mechanisms. Socialism may require the elimination of either the 
market or private ownership or both but the definitions of 
socialism and capitalism do not demand this.
More generally, the three models emphasise aspects of the 
entrepreneurial process which apply independently of the 
political system. The transition from capitalism to socialism 
will be associated with massive but not total change. The laws 
of physics and at least some of the laws of economics will remain 
constant: objects will fall when dropped and for most goods
marginal utility will diminish as consumption increases. 
Furthermore, it was assumed in Chapter One that individuals will 
reiru a egoistic. Particular- features of the entrepreneurial 
prc will also remain-. Galbraith argues that large
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corporations are more able than small firms to stimulate 
entrepreneurial activity. The argument does not hinge on 
questions of ownership but on economies of scale and applies to 
socialism as well as to capitalism.
Second, it might be argued that lessons cannot be drawn as the 
three accounts are contradictory. Kirzner and Schumpeter 
emphasise the importance of individual action and Galbraith that 
of teams of individuals within organisations. Schumpeter sees 
entrepreneurship as uncertain whilst Galbraith does not. 
Schumpeter presents entrepreneurial activity as pushing the 
economy away from equilibrium whilst Kirzner does not and whilst 
Galbraith and Schumpeter (albeit for different reasons) argue 
that the capitalist entrepreneur creates a demand for their 
product, Kirzner maintains that they simply 'discover' an 
existing one. Must one of these accounts be sacrificed or do all 
contain important truths? Ideal types emphasise different 
features of reality and this reality is sufficiently complex and 
varied to allow for the co-existence of different and competing 
ideal types. Capitalism generates both innovation and 
coordination. Whilst Schumpeter tells a plausible story about 
innovation, Kirzner tells an interesting one about coordination. 
Capitalist entrepreneurship is driven by both large corporations, 
as Galbraith suggests, and by the formation of small firms, as 
Schumpeter implies. Capitalist entrepreneurcl. ip is frequently 
risky, at other times routine; sometimes a l .... of 'creation' 
at of1 .:j times of 'discovery' . Capitalism pr 5 because it is
fie. because capitalist entrepreneurs elitist, new
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right and neo-pluralist.
The three accounts can be used to formulate six requirements 
which socialist entrepreneurship must satisfy. Later chapters 
will show how this seemingly innocuous set of demands generates 
considerable difficulties.
Requirement 1. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism offer a mechanism through 
which information about consumer's preferences for goods can be 
judged and translated into entrepreneurial action. If this 
mechanism is to be profit-driven markets, their compatibility 
with socialism must be established. If this mechanism is not to 
be profit-driven markets the efficacy of an alternative mechanism 
must be established.
Requirement 2. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism offer a mechanism through 
which the success of any particular entrepreneurial venture can 
be judged. If this mechanism is to be profit-driven markets, 
their compatibility with socialism must be established. If this 
mechanism is not to be profit-driven markets the efficacy of an 
alternative mechanism must be established.
Requirement 3. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demand,- -.hat socialism must provide reasons for 
a sufficient number ■ . .dividuals to remain alert to the
pos ' dlity of entrepr al discovery.
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Requirement 4. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism must offer a 'balanced' 
cost-benefit schedule. For Schumpeter, entrepreneurial activity 
is risky but promises large rewards. For Galbraith, 
entrepreneurial activity is safe but promises only minor rewards. 
If socialist entrepreneurial activity is costly and/or risky 
possible rewards must be spectacular.
Requirement 5. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism must offer a mechanism 
through which new entrepreneurs can be drawn into economic 
activity and through which unsuccessful ones can be removed.
Requirement 6. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism be capable of generating 
the kind of activity described in neo-pluralist, elitist and new 
right theories of capitalist entrepreneurship
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2.4 The Limitations of Capitalist Entrepreneurship
As Allen Buchanan (1985, 29) rightly observes, criticisms of
capitalism are telling 'only if there is a feasible alternative' 
but before determining in subsequent chapters whether socialism 
is feasible, it is first appropriate to establish whether 
socialism can hope to exceed or only match capitalism's 
performance. For if capitalism offers the perfect shell within 
which entrepreneurial activity can take place, the prospects for 
socialism are uncertain.
Marxist and welfare economics have been used to construct a 
number of economic charges against capitalism. Many are now 
familiar and form a standard part of any appraisal of economic 
systems. Variously, it is argued that capitalist growth is 
impeded by a lack of coordination manifested in periodic 
recession, a falling rate of profit (see Elster, 1985, 155-61), 
monopolies and other forms of imperfect competition (Nove, 1991, 
3, Winter, 1989, 150, Miller, 1989, 191) and entrepreneur's
reluctance to introduce products or methods of production that 
will undermine their dominant position as capitalists (Braverman, 
1974, Marglin, 1976) . The debate has become increasingly stale, 
each side having settled in for a war of attrition in which 
crit.7 risms and defences have become well honed.3 Rather than 
s: review the arguments, a new line of attack is opened: one
*n Parijs (1995, 186-233) offers a reasonable summary of 
t ments. Objections framed in terms of monopoly and a lack
c ination need to be seen in the conte*- of Schumpeter's
a rer's models of entrepreneurship resp 'tively.
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derived from the concerns of welfare economists about the impact 
of externalities. In Chapter Six, a further assault on capitalist 
efficiency is mounted in the context of a discussion about 
economic democracy.
'Invisible hand' arguments like Kirzner's are frequently used to 
defend market arrangements. The pursuit of individual interest 
leads, unintentionally, to the realisation of the broader social 
interest. Welfare economists are likely to respond that 
externalities generate market failure, with either too much or 
too little being produced by entrepreneurs. In their standard 
economics text, David Begg, Stanley Fischer and Rudiger Dornbusch 
(1984, 334) write that 'an externality arises whenever an
individual's production or consumption decision directly affects 
the production or consumption of others other than through market 
prices'. Consider first the example (Figure 2.1) where the 
marginal social costs (MSC) of production are greater than 
marginal private costs (MPC) of production. Through a series of 
discoveries, entrepreneurs push the economy toward equilibrium 
at point E where consumer's marginal benefit of production (MPB) 
is equal to entrepreneur's private MPC. Because MSC > MPC welfare 
will only be maximised if production takes place at point E' . 
Entrepreneurial action generates a welfare loss of E'EF. Too much 
is sold by entrepreneurs at too low a price. Environmental 
pollution is often taken to be a example of this kind of market 
failure (Dryzek, 1987, Barry, 1988). One possible implication is 
that capitalism genera.. too much entrepreneurship. Presumably, 
if socialism is unat to generate as much entrepreneurial
activity it is to be preferred for this reason.
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Figure 2.1 The Social Cost of Negative Production 
Externalities
Quantity
Price
0
Source: Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch (1984), 335)
Markets fail in the presence not only of negative but of positive 
externalities. To take another standard example, a gardener's 
neighbour as well as the gardener herself derives utility from 
planting flowers in her front garden. The marginal social 
benefits (MSB) of the action are greater than the private 
marginal benefits (PMB). As Figure 2.2 indicates, in these 
circumstances capitalist equilibrium (E) generates a welfare loss 
(EE'F) as too little is produced.
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Figure 2.2 The Social Cost of Positive Production 
Externalities
Quantity
Price
0
Source: Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch (1984), 336)
Let us return to the issue of entrepreneurship. Private ownership 
and markets generate inequality. 'Trickle-down' theory of which 
several variants will be considered in Chapter Three, offers a 
justification for this inequality. Raymond Plant (1991, 89)
provides a succinct summary of its logic.
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[Trickle down is] the view that a dynamic economy 
requires inequalities if it is to be innovative. 
Innovation requires rich people to provide demand for 
new products, but once produced these products do not 
remain the preserve of the rich. At one time it was 
only because the rich were able to provide a market - 
to take, for example, air travel and refrigerators - 
that these things were developed to any extent, but 
once developed they trickle down gradually to the rest 
of the population (Plant, 1991, 89).
If a wealthy individual pays a entrepreneur to provide them with 
supersonic travel then they both benefit. The entrepreneur 
expects to make a profit and the wealthy individual expects to 
satisfy a previously unrealised preference. 'Trickle-down' 
suggests that eventually a third party, 'the poor', benefit from 
this trade. Although the exchange is bilateral there is a 
positive externality. Because markets founded on private 
ownership do not account for this externality, capitalism 
generates an inefficient volume of entrepreneurial action. A 
specific example can be used to illustrate the argument.
Thatcherism promoted the economics of capitalism. Through 
deregulation and privatisation, the government sought to promote 
the market and private ownership. More specifically, Thatcherism 
sought to recreate 1.:. . n as an enterprise society; to change
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the entire culture of a nation from anti-profits, 
anti-business, government dependent lassitude and 
defeatism, to a pro-profit, pro-business, robustly 
independent ... optimism (Lawson, 1992, 65).
The flagship of the enterprise culture was not the corporate 
sector which was felt to have grown fat on government support 
(Keat and Abercombie, 1990, 56) but small business. But growing 
unemployment in more traditional sectors of the economy and 
ministerial exhortations did not themselves stimulate sufficient 
entrepreneurial activity and the Conservative Party was forced 
to recognise the limitations of capitalism and the need for non- 
market, government, action.
In part, this took the simple form of tax reform. Most obviously 
and in an attempt to make the spectacular prizes on offer to 
entrepreneurs ever more spectacular, the top rate of taxation was 
cut in the 1980 and 1988 budgets. From 1980, absolute tax 
exemption was offered on the building of new premises by small 
firms and in 1988 corporation tax on small companies was reduced 
to twenty five per cent and tax relief made available to 
entrepreneurs who borrowed money to launch new ventures. Finally, 
it was also announced in the 1988 budget that losses sustained 
by entrepreneurs in the first three years of a new business would 
be made eligible for tax relief. But support went further than 
tax reform and also included direct financial assistance. The 
Department of Trade and Industry's Loan Gna- '-iutee Scheme offered 
credit to entrepreneurs hoping to start - business who had
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been unable to attract commercial backing. The British Technology 
Group was also given responsibility for providing finance for 
new, small, high-technology firms. At the same time, the level 
of welfare benefit for unemployed individuals who started their 
own company was increased. In 1985 the government announced the 
introduction of the Small Firm Merit Awards scheme which offered 
additional funding for companies engaged in innovative activity. 
Finally, all this took place in the context of an increase in the 
number of enterprise zones which offered entrepreneurs exemption 
from local authority property tax, development tax and, in most 
cases, local authority planning restrictions for three years.
It is possible to argue that the government's policies were 
successful. By 1987, over three hundred new businesses were being 
started each week (Sedgwick, 1992, 38) and total employment in 
the small business sector trebled during the 1980's (Stanworth 
and Grey, 1991, 4). But if this was a battle won for capitalism 
it was not won by capitalism. It was not markets and private 
ownership but government power that stimulated entrepreneurial 
endeavour.
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2.5 Conclusion: The Unfortunate Legacy of Karl Marx
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred 
years, has created more massive and more colossal 
productive forces than have all preceding generations 
together. Subjection of nature's forces to man,
machinery, application of chemistry to industry and
agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric 
telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for 
canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out 
of the ground - what earlier century had even a 
presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in 
the lap of social labour? (Marx, 1848, 85).
The Communist Manifesto recognises capitalism's achievements 
which, it argues, make possible the transition to Communism. But
Karl Marx is reluctant to acknowledge the role of the
entrepreneur in stimulating growth (Flew, 1988, 187) . Explanatory 
primacy is instead given to the 'capitalist' but as discussion 
of the three models of capitalist entrepreneurship reveals, 
whilst individuals may be both capitalists and entrepreneurs, 
'the entrepreneur's function is distinct from the capitalist's 
function' (Schumpeter, 1934, 556). Critics argue that capitalism 
constrains entry into the entrepreneurial market as 'credit is 
only given to him who already has' (McLellan, 1977, 114) but this 
is to confuse the ent:* ppreneurial and capitalist function for as 
v.Kirzner (1973, 19) o ’; 'ves, the only resource the entrepre
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requires is alertness. 'An entrepreneur needs no assets to engage 
in profitable market participation. A producer need not own any 
resources to engage in production' (Kirzner, 1973, 19).
Furthermore, Galbraith points to the degree to which not only the 
function but the organisational role of capitalist and 
entrepreneur are distinct. Capitalist corporations rest on a 
division between not only ownership and control (Berle and Means, 
1969) but between shareholders who do not innovate and 
technocrats who do not have property rights. The entrepreneur and 
the capitalist are not one and the same. For socialism, the 
conclusion is positive because if it is possible to have 
entrepreneurship without capitalists it is possible to imagine 
socialist entrepreneurship.
For Marx, it is not only economic credit but moral blame that is 
attached to the entrepreneur. Moral blame because the capitalist 
exploits the worker through the extraction of surplus value.
How that [surplus] value originated we know perfectly 
well. There is not one single atom of its value that 
does not owe its existence to unpaid labour. The means 
of production, with which the additional labour is 
incorporated .... are nothing but component parts of 
the surplus-product, of the tribute annually extracted 
from the working-class (Marx, 1867, 582).
Again, Marx's conc]i.sion can be challenged. Entrepreneurship is 
the single most iir*. r ont factor of production as entrepreneurs
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enhance the value of all other factors, including labour. 
Schumpeter and Kirzner both emphasise the extent to which a 
single individual can transform the economic environment and 
generate enormous wealth. Are workers exploited by entrepreneurs 
in a capitalist system? John Roemer (1982) suggests that they are 
if they can improve their economic position by withdrawing from 
the existing society along with their per capita share of 
alienable resources. By this criterion, entrepreneurs do not 
exploit non-entrepreneurs as resources acquire their value 
through the actions of entrepreneurs. Capitalist entrepreneurs 
not only own but create unequal amounts of wealth. Capitalism 
prospers because markets and private property give individuals 
an incentive to exercise their entrepreneurial talent, to acquire 
spectacular prizes much greater than would have been necessary 
to call forth the particular effort' (Schumpeter, 1943, 73).
Socialist entrepreneurship is a logical possibility but a 
practical uncertainty. Can socialism offer to entrepreneurs as 
palatable an environment as capitalism? The next chapter argues 
that it cannot.
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A detailed critique of the idea of socialist entrepreneurship is 
a necessary prelude to the (re)construction of specific models 
of socialist entrepreneurship. The intention in this chapter is 
to present a set of general arguments which can be subsequently 
applied, developed and questioned. The challenge is to find ways 
in which arguments against socialism can be tied to and 
illuminated by the notion of entrepreneurship. The danger lies 
in the erection of a straw man which can be easily knocked down. 
The defence adopted against this temptation is to concentrate on 
the work of two influential and trenchant critics of socialism, 
Friedrich Hayek and William Niskanen.
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 3.2 considers 
the relationship between markets and entrepreneurship. The 
foundation of this part of the argument is the pre-war 
'calculation debate' between socialist and Austrian economists. 
Willem Keizer (1994, 207) calls this the 'greatest economic
debate of the twentieth century' and it is used to explain why 
entrepreneurial action is stimulated by the decentralised market. 
Section 3.3 assesses the compatibility of markets and socialism 
and draws two conclusions. First, that James Meade (1964, 13) is 
right to argue that 'prices used for .... efficiency purposes 
result in a very undesirable distribution of income and wealth'. 
Second, that the imposition of eqvr.iity necessarily results in 
the destruction of markets. Develc og this argument, sectiion 3.4 
identifies a 'orther barrier to ; list entrepreneurship, the
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inadequacies of public bureaucracy.
3.2 Markets and Entrepreneurship
3.2.1 The Calculation Debate: Concerns and Contours
In the first part of this century, economists rarely questioned 
the economic credentials of socialism (Cockett, 1995, 9-56) .
Joseph Schumpeter (1943, 172) was typical in lamenting what he 
saw as the inevitable passing of capitalism but proclaiming that 
'there is nothing wrong with the pure logic of socialism'. The 
claim that socialism could not only match but surpass the 
economic efficiency of capitalism was challenged principally by 
Austrian economists who argued that a commitment to neo-classical 
economics led socialists to misunderstand the nature of the 
market process. Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises do not, as 
many claim (see Lavoie, 1985, 14), argue that socialism is
unattainable. More modestly, they maintain only that socialism 
threatens economic prosperity (Hayek, 1935b, 3 6-7) . Whilst
Hayek's defence of the market often rests on ethical 
considerations (Sheamur, 1994), his argument here is more 
narrowly utilitarian and centres on the capacity of the market 
to 'improve for all of most the prospects of having their needs 
satisfied' (Hayek, 1982c, 64-5).
Before detailing the nature of the dispute, it is appro - ate to 
identify points of agreement between the participants : t, it
is accepted that the economic viability of socialism upon
its capacity to effectively allocate scarce resources - or value 
- between competing uses. Socialists like Oskar Lange and 
Friedrich Taylor do not hide behind the assumption that socialism 
will emerge only in conditions of economic abundance. Second, it 
is recognised that allocation requires the use of the price 
mechanism to balance demand and supply (Hoff, 1949, 202). Third, 
it is agreed that allocation should be determined by consumer and 
not producer or government preferences (Lange, 1964, 72).
Finally, it is believed that socialism requires public ownership 
of the means of production and central planning of the economy 
(Mises, 1935, 89, Hayek, 1935b, 15).
Taylor (1964) and Lange's (1964) initial proposal to allocate 
resources rested on the use of mathematics rather than 
entrepreneurs. Having recognised the need to price resources it 
is argued that having collated exhaustive economic data a central 
planning board (CPB) could use powerful computers to 'calculate 
the prices at which general equilibrium would be reached in a 
socialist economy by solving a series of complicated systems of 
simultaneous equations' (Roemer, 1994, 28). In this way, Lange 
could argue that the market is simply a 'computing device of the 
pre-computing age' (quoted Lavoie, 1985, 95) . Socialist
economists later came to accept that the CPB was not omnipotent 
and could not work alone and the 'competitive' solution was 
instead advanced.1 The CPE ‘ 3 role became that of an
1 The use of Jthe_Jterm 'cor Live' should be treated with 
extreme caution. It has pa£ into the literature as a
description of Lange's model e, 1985, 10-16) and is for
this reason used here. But the tion of the argument in this
chapter is show that cor. on is, at best, 'pseudo-
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'auctioneer', offering particular sets of prices to the managers 
of publicly owned production units. Having calculated their 
minimum costs, managers are to report how much they are prepared 
to supply at a particular price and in conditions of excess 
supply, the CPB responds by lowering prices and in conditions of 
inadequate supply by raising them. After a period of time, this 
trial and error method reveals equilibrium prices, allowing 
production to commence.
As Don Lavoie (1985, 13) demonstrates, many economists argue that 
the socialists won the calculation debate. Robert Lekachman 
(1959, 3 96) is representative in arguing that it was
proved that a central planning board could impose 
rules upon socialist managers which allocated 
resources and set prices as efficiently as a 
capitalist society of the purest stripe, and much more 
efficiently than the capitalist communities of 
experience.
This interpretation is challenged. Hayek and Mises present a 
series of unanswered objections to the (then) economics of 
socialism and while the term is rarely used by participants, many 
of their arguments are best formulated in terms of the 
possibility of entrepreneurial action. Rather than offer a 
chronological account of developments, subsequent sections
competition (Hayek, 1935c, 217).
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identify specific and recurring themes within the argument that 
surround, respectively, the durability, communication and 
creation of entrepreneurial knowledge.
3.2.2 Entrepreneurial Knowledge and the Dynamic Economy
Knowledge is fundamental to an understanding of the 
entrepreneurial process. Accurate knowledge about changing 
consumer preferences, new methods of production and construction 
costs promotes successful entrepreneurial action. If 
entrepreneurs fail to recognise new sources of consumer demand, 
the market will fail to achieve equilibrium. Israel Kirzner's 
entrepreneurs who are alert to new profit opportunities are 
hoping to acquire greater knowledge.
Capitalist entrepreneurship is animated by interaction between 
consumers and entrepreneurs. Whether mathematical or competitive, 
socialist entrepreneurship requires an additional and pivotal 
role to be played by the CPB. Given the incredible volume of 
knowledge which this body has to process, one obvious 
disadvantage of socialist entrepreneurship are delays in the 
pricing of resources. In the competitive solution and because 
price and income elasticities differ, an incorrect price for just 
one good necessitates the recalculation of all others. Hayek 
(1945, 187) alludes to such difficulties when contrasting
decentralised capitalist markets with centralised socialist ones.
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The difference between a system of regimented prices 
and a system of prices determined by the market seems 
to be about the same as that between an attacking army 
in which every unit and every man could only move by 
special command and by the exact distance ordered by 
headquarters and an army in which every unit and every 
man can take advantage of every opportunity offered to 
them.
The irritant would be a minor one if the economy were static or 
the number of goods limited. Time would be lost but equilibrium 
eventually attained and in these conditions Mises (1935, 102-3) 
accepts that socialism is feasible. But in a dynamic economy the 
costs of organising economic activity in this way are 
prohibitive. As economic conditions change, the CPB is forced to 
constantly modify its prices. Assuming that it takes time to 
recalculate prices and that change is constant, equilibrium is 
never reached. Lange and Taylor neglect this obvious possibility 
because they operate within the constraints of a neo-classical 
model of economic activity. Only by imposing static solutions on 
a dynamic world, only by assuming away the very possibility of 
entrepreneurial action, can socialists claim to offer a feasible 
solution.
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3.2.3 The Communication of Entrepreneurial Knowledge
Lange and Taylor's socialism depends on the centralisation of 
knowledge. In either its mathematical or competitive variants, 
information is passed up a hierarchy to the CPB and passed back 
down to managers. Whilst socialists recognise that the volume of 
information required is immense, powerful computers are seen to 
finally establish the practicality of the process. But Hayek's 
fundamental objection does not concern the volume of information 
required but its particular nature. Knowledge, he argues, is 
frequently 'tacit', of a kind that cannot really be said to 
'exist at any moment of time' (Hayek, 1935c, 210) and because 
such knowledge cannot be effectively communicated, the 
relationship between the CPB and production managers will break 
down.
Michael Polanyi (1967, 20) offers instructive examples of the
nature and kinds of tacit knowledge and of the difficulty of 
translating it into simple rules and precepts which can be easily 
clarified and relayed.
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The skill of a driver cannot be replaced by a thorough 
schooling of in the theory of the motorcar; the 
knowledge I have of my own body differs altogether 
from the knowledge of its physiology; and the rules of 
rhyming and prosody do not tell me what a poem told me 
. . . the aim of modern science is to establish a 
strictly detached, objective knowledge. Any falling 
short of this ideal is accepted only as a temporary 
imperfection, which we must aim at eliminating. But 
suppose that tacit knowledge forms an indispensable 
part of all knowledge, then the ideal of eliminating 
all personal elements of knowledge would, in effect, 
aim at the destruction of all knowledge.
Entrepreneurial knowledge is frequently tacit. Whilst the 
socialist manager can send to the CPB a simple statement about 
the amount they can produce at a given price, they cannot 
communicate intuitions about likely developments in consumer 
demand, the reliability of suppliers and the efficiency of 
workers. In demanding that managers produce at the lowest cost, 
the CPB will not always be able to say precisely how this can be 
achieved as the ability to produce at the lowest price does not 
consist of a simple set of rules but is rather a 'technique of 
thought' (Hayek, 1935b, 210).
The decentralised, competitive market offers a frame r rk within 
which this problem can be resolved. Because informal does not
have to collected before being acted upon, '.ows the
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inclusion in pricing decisions of tacit information. The benefit 
of the division of knowledge within the market is as important 
as the division of labour within the firm. It allows for the
spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each 
possessing only bits of knowledge, bringing about a 
state of affairs in which prices correctly correspond 
to costs, etc., and which could be brought about by 
deliberate direction only by somebody who possessed 
the combined knowledge of all those individuals 
(Hayek, 1937, 35).
3.2.4 The Discovery of Entrepreneurial Knowledge
Hayek emphasises the capacity of markets to communicate and 
coordinate information, Ludwig von Mises (1920), Don Lavoie 
(1985) and Mirini Biachini (1994) the importance of the 
'discovery' of knowledge through rivalrous competition. 
Verification rather than creation of knowledge is perhaps the 
more appropriate description as markets offer entrepreneurs the 
opportunity to test their tacit knowledge by launching new 
products or adopting different prices. The capture of profit 
shows that the their intuitions are justified and signals to 
other entrepreneurs a need to respond. Willem Keizer (1994, 216) 
argues that 'the competitive price mechanism discovers ... the 
specific information individu ■ need'. This is also misleading. 
It is alert entrepreneurs who over and verify knowledge. Free
markets provide the framewor iin which they act-.
The suppression of the decentralised market and its replacement 
by a centralised one frustrates the creation of knowledge. In 
part and as suggested presently, this is because centralisation 
requires the extension of public ownership and the elimination 
or distortion of entrepreneurial incentives. It is also because 
centralisation is achieved at the expense of individual 
discretion. Socialist managers respond to prices set by the CPB 
and must treat these prices 'parametrically' (Lavoie, 1985, 24). 
Individuals are not free to test their competing beliefs about 
the market. Knowledge may be discovered but entrepreneurs lack 
the opportunity to verify it and as intuition cannot be 
communicated, potential knowledge is wasted. Lavoie (1985, 107) 
doubts whether, in these circumstances, managers can even be 
described as entrepreneurs as 'the element of entrepreneurship 
is absent not only from the end state of equilibrium itself - as 
it must be - but also from the proposed process of adjustment 
toward that equilibrium'.
One further problem caused by the centralisation of knowledge can 
be identified. It has been emphasised that entrepreneurship is 
inherently risky. Even the most able of entrepreneurs will on 
occasions fail. By giving entrepreneurs the opportunity to test 
competing and conflicting knowledge, the market sustains the 
pluralism necessary to ensure that some projects succeed. The CPB 
will not only struggle to find a single 'right' answer but will 
have to commit itself to only one guess about the future (Butler, 
1983, 73 Given the uncertainty which must surround any guess 
about t uture, the placing of all economic eggs in one basket
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is undesirable.
Is it really likely that a national planning office 
would have a better judgement of the number of cars, 
the number of generators, and the quantities of frozen 
food we are likely to require in, say five years, than 
Ford or General Motors, etc., and, even more 
important, would it even be desirable that various 
companies in an industry all act on the same guess? 
(Hayek, 1978, 240) (emphasis added).
3.2.5 Markets and Entrepreneurship: Conclusions and Objections
Decentralised competitive markets provide a suitable framework 
within which new right entrepreneurial action can occur. Attempts 
to either replace the market - the mathematical solution - or to 
centralise it - the competitive solution - distort and retard 
entrepreneurial action. This conclusion appears vulnerable to two 
objections. First, the Austrian eulogy to the market cannot 
account for neo-pluralist entrepreneurship and Galbraith's 
argument that capitalism too has forsaken the market. Second, the 
mathematical and competitive models are particularly extreme 
examples of centralisation which few socialists now recommend. 
Socialism, it may be argued, can regulate and guide the market 
without eliminating it.
John Kenneth Galbraith (1974, 17) emphasises tfc -rtance of
corporate organisation in modern industria :.ety but
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exaggerates the autonomy of corporate organisation from the 
market. Certainly full markets do not operate within 
organisations.2 Employees are tied to long-term wage contracts 
and are paid, in the short-term at least, independently of the 
value of their output but the suppression of the market within 
capitalist organisations has not meant the suppression of markets 
between organisations. General Motors and Ford are free to set 
different prices for their products and can do so without 
reference to any CPB. The market is an imperfect one, distorted 
by barriers to entry, manipulation of demand and government 
subsidy but it is still a decentralised market. Galbraith's 
confusion stems from his account of planning. The mathematical 
and to a lesser extent the competitive solutions depend on 
planning by the CPB. Because capitalist organisations plan their 
pricing and marketing strategies, Galbraith suggests that there 
is little difference between the two. But as Meade (1968) 
observes, it is inappropriate to compare planning that takes 
place in the context of market competition with planning that is 
formulated as an alternative to the market. Planning in the 
latter involves the imposition of decisions on others: the CPB 
decides and eventually managers implement. Planning in the former 
is non-coercive. Consumers do not have to purchase products whose 
development has been carefully planned by companies.
Hayek and Mises arguments suggest another and more damning 
response to Galbraith. In so far as the neo-pluralist model
vrons for the suppression of the market within 
organic ' : 3 are examined iv- Chapter Six.
85
establishes the possibility of entrepreneurial action 
independently of the market, it also confirms the value of the 
market. For in the 'revised sequence' of the new industrial 
society, it is not the consumer but the organisation which can 
'create the wants [they] seek to satisfy' (Galbraith, 1973, 151). 
The neo-pluralist model violates one of the values upon which 
both socialists and Austrians agreed solutions must be 
established: consumer sovereignty. There is a tension between
this and the first argument. If neo-pluralist entrepreneurship 
is dependent on the market then the market, too, is damned by its 
subversion of consumer preferences. Either the first or second 
arguments can be discarded. Alternatively, the simple and 
absolute distinction between market and non-market allocation can 
be abandoned. The critic of socialism may then argue that neo­
pluralism is a hybrid form that offers a warning of the dangers 
of a more complete suppression of the market.
Whereas the socialism of Lange and Taylor eliminates the market, 
social democrats hope only to regulate and mould it through 
indicative planning, price ceilings, minimum wages, safety 
requirements, tariff protection and licensing requirements. In 
an extension of Hayek and Mises' argument, Israel Kirzner (1985) 
condemns such interference. Because regulation constrains but 
does not entirely destroy the decentralised market, he concedes 
that it will be less damaging. It might also be noted that for 
this reason regulation will be less likely to realise socialist 
values. Nonetheless, Kirzner c ! .aims that regulation will retard 
the process of entrepreneur!". scovery and the orification and
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coordination of knowledge.
Several examples given by Kirzner can be easily dealt with as 
they echo the logic of arguments already developed. First, 
licensing requirements and safety laws act as a barrier to entry 
and reduce competition. By limiting the number of participants, 
market pluralism is constrained. Second, price ceilings and wage 
legislation block the discovery of knowledge and discourage 
entrepreneurs from remaining alert to potentially profitable 
trades. Instead, entrepreneurs will divert their attention to the 
discovery of possible loopholes in legislation, to 'wholly 
superfluous ... and not necessarily desirable opportunities for 
entrepreneurial discovery' (Kirzner, 1985, 144).
3.3 Socialism and the Market
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3.3.1 Socialism and Equality
The last section established the compatibility of market 
allocation and entrepreneurship and the incompatibility of non- 
market allocation and entrepreneurship. The question of 
socialism's compatibility with entrepreneurship comes to hinge 
upon its compatibility with the market. Here, hope can be found 
for socialism as the definition employed by Mises and Hayek in 
terms of public ownership is very different to that adopted in 
Chapter One. There is no immediate reason why socialism should 
not use the market. Furthermore, the narrow set of values chosen 
as embodying socialism - liberty, democracy and equality - allow 
us to tieat as irrelevant arguments that socialists should oppose 
the market as it destroys feelings of fraternity (Buchanan, 1985, 
51) and encourages exploitation (Roemer, 1982, 1988).
As it has been defined, is socialism compatible with the market? 
Of the three values, the relationship between liberty and the 
market appears least problematic. Socialists (Selucky, 1979, 
Miller, 1989) can simply mimic the arguments of socialism's 
critics that markets secure individual freedom through minimising 
coercion (Friedman, 1962) . The relationship between the market 
and democracy has provoked greater concern (Lindblom, 1977, 172- 
88) but normally only on the assumption that markets generate 
inequality and it is on : is third value that attention is 
focused.
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Capitalism appears to promote inequality. In Britain, the 
'rolling back of the state' in the 1980's was accompanied by a 
growth in relative poverty. In 1979, the poorest fifth of the 
population claimed just under ten per cent of national post-tax 
income. By 1989 this share had fallen to seven per cent (Gilmour, 
1992, 138). In this section it is argued that market allocation 
necessarily leads to inequality. Two propositions are developed. 
First, incentives which result in inequality are necessary to 
motivate entrepreneurial action. Second, the prior existence of 
inequalities facilitates successful entrepreneurial action.
3.3.2 Entrepreneurship and the Prospect of Inequality
Capitalist markets are animated by private ownership of the means 
of production. Entrepreneurs enter the market having staked their 
own resources and if successful acquire 'spectacular prizes' 
(Schumpeter, 1943, 73). Entrepreneurs have powerful incentives 
to remain alert to the discovery of additional knowledge. As Alan 
Williams (1991, 7) comments, 'profit-seeking behaviour is the
mainspring of the enterprise system, and is the fundamental 
source of a nation's wealth'. In a capitalist economy, 
unsuccessful entrepreneurs will have lower incomes than 
successful ones and successful entrepreneurs will have larger 
incomes than individuals who choose not to accept the risk of 
entrep ''neurial action.
.:' • Vi no
At ter.” o ensure a more equal distribution of income stifle
entrc irial incentives and reduce the income of the poorest.
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As Peter Bauer (1983, 3 80) concludes, 'to make the rich poorer 
does not make the poor richer'. Given the assumption of egoism 
it cannot be claimed that in a socialist society entrepreneurs 
will be motivated by a love of their fellow man and the belief 
that entrepreneurs might be motivated by non-pecuniary rewards 
like, for example, a knighthood or life peerage, is a poor 
foundation on which to build a model of feasible socialism. To 
deny individuals the chance to acquire spectacular prizes it will 
be necessary to restrict private and extend public ownership but 
as Schumpeter and Mises argue, lacking sufficient incentives 
individuals will then be insufficiently alert to the possibility 
of entrepreneurial discovery.
[T]he entrepreneur's commercial attitude and activity 
arises from his position in the economic process and 
is lost with its disappearance .... it is not a 
knowledge of bookkeeping, of business organisation, or 
of the style of commercial correspondence, or even a 
dispensation from a commercial high school, which 
makes the merchant, but his characteristic position in 
the production process, which allows of the 
identification of the firm's and his own interests 
(Mises, 1935, 121).
[S]omething of the psychology of the sala:: . employee 
... his will to fight and to hold on is r . ’ cannot
be what it is was with the man who knew o lip and
its responsibilities (Schumpeter, 1943,
3.3.3 Entrepreneurship and Prior Inequality
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Arguments about equality are usually intended to demonstrate that 
only the prospect of capturing spectacular prizes will motivate 
entrepreneurial action. Less attention is paid to the importance 
of the prior existence of inequality in facilitating and securing 
the success of entrepreneurial action. Two examples are given of 
the ways in which existing inequalities can stimulate 
entrepreneurship.
First, inequality among entrepreneurs is valuable. Profits and 
losses lead to inequality but also send necessary signals to 
others in the market. An entrepreneur whose venture is 
unsuccessful because they entered an already saturated market 
provides a salient warning to others. As Hayek (1993c, 71)
comments, 'we can make use of . . . dispersed knowledge only if ... 
we allow the principle of negative feedback to operate'. Equally, 
an entrepreneur who is successful and captures large profits 
invites competition. Eventually and as Kirzner argues, 
coordination is improved and profits eliminated. In the pursuit 
of equality, socialism will have to eliminate profit and so 
reduce the capacity of the market to transmit and subsequently 
coordinate knowledge.
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It is impossible, not only to replace the spontaneous 
order by organisation and at the same time to utilise 
as much of the dispersed knowledge as possible, but 
also to improve or correct this order by interfering 
in it by direct commands (Hayek, 1982b, 51).
Second, inequality among consumers is also valuable. When new 
products are introduced, they are likely to be both relatively 
expensive - reflecting research costs and the burden of 
entrepreneurial risk - and unreliable - reflecting initial 
production difficulties. Only the relatively wealthy will be able 
to purchase such goods and in doing so ensure entrepreneurial 
profit and product refinement. The subsequent entry of new 
producers attracted by initial profits increases coordination and 
eventually goods once considered luxuries will be available to 
all. This is the 'trickle-down' effect championed by Hayek. The 
market works and works best in conditions of prior inequality.
If today . . . the relatively rich can have a car or 
refrigerator, or aeroplane trip or radio at the cost 
of a reasonable part of their income, this was made 
possible because in the past others with large incomes 
were able to spend it on what was then a luxury 
(Hayek, 1982b, 44).
The imposition of equality retards this process. The effect is 
not absolute as individuals who have a partic.'.- r preference for 
a ceitain kind of good, fc.. example, comput will still be
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willing to spend a large (r) amount of their money on a new 
product. But for any given intensity of preference, the capacity 
to act upon it is reduced by equality. With the chances of 
successfully launching a new product reduced, entrepreneurs have 
less reason to remain alert to the possibility of new 
discoveries.
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3.4 Bureaucracy, Socialism and Entrepreneurship
3.4.1 Bureaucracy and Entrepreneurship: The Weberian Legacy
The concept of bureaucracy is a contested one. Martin Albrow 
(1970) identifies seven distinct senses in which the term is 
used. The study of bureaucracy only really began with and 
continues to be influenced by the work of Max Weber (Albrow, 
1970, 37) whose work provides a natural starting-point for
discussion. In its most rational, or 'ideal' form, Weber (1978, 
218-9) sees bureaucracy as characterised by (i) the personal 
freedom of individual employees, (ii) the existence of a clear 
hierarchy, (iii) a precise division of labour, (iv) reliance on 
contracts of employment, (v) selection through competitive 
examination, (vi) the determination of remuneration by position 
within the hierarchy, (vii) employees having no other major 
occupation, (viii) prohibitions on employees appropriating either 
the post or its resources for their own use, (ix) promotion 
according to seniority or merit, and (x) the existence of a 
unified control system. Bureaucracy can also be recognised, Weber 
suggests, by its essential subservience. Not only are individual 
bureaucrats appointees (Albrow, 1970, 42, Mises, 1944, 3) but
bureaucracy itself is established by others to perform functions 
on its behalf. Bureaucracy is a means to realise ends selected 
by others. Eugene Kamenka's (1989, 157) definition neatly
summarises Weber's position.
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Bureaucracy means a centrally directed, systematically 
organised, hierarchically structured staff devoted to 
the regular, routine and efficient carrying out of 
large-scale administrative tasks according to policies 
dictated by rulers or dictators standing outside and 
above the bureaucracy.
Whether in the form of Soviet Communism or English Fabianism, 
socialism has historically relied upon bureaucracy. This is no 
coincidence as the decentralised market must be suppressed and 
central planning promoted if equality is to be realised. A 
necessary condition for effective planning is coercive 
allocation. If, for example, it is decided by the CPB that the 
price of a disposable biro should be twenty pence, it is 
essential that those producing biros sell them at that price. The 
pluralism which characterises the decentralised market is the 
antithesis of central planning. Defined precisely by its lack of 
autonomy, bureaucracy is the organisational form consistent with 
the requirements of planning.
Weber is frequently interpreted as asserting the efficiency of 
bureaucracy. Anthony Downs (1987, 296) claims that Weber has a 
'generally positive' view of bureaucracy whilst Peter Blau (1956) 
presents himself as Weber's heir in championing the merits of 
bureaucracy. It is not difficult to find passages within Weber's 
wc; that can be used to support this conclusion.
Bureaucracy is, from the purely technical point of 
view, capable of attaining the highest degree of 
efficiency and it is in this sense the most rational 
known means of exercising authority over human beings 
(Weber, 1978, 223).
The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares 
with other organisations as does the machine with the 
non-mechanical modes of production .... Precision, 
speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, 
continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, 
reduction of friction, and of material and personal 
costs - these are raised to the optimum point in the 
strictly bureaucratic administration (Weber, 1946,
214) .
That Weber asserts the efficiency of bureaucracy is disputed. 
David Beetham (1987, 66) chides Weber precisely for neglecting 
this issue. If Weber did believe bureaucracy to be efficient he 
did so, it can be concluded, in only a very limited sense. 
Specifically and having carefully distinguished between the 
entrepreneurial and the bureaucratic class, Weber suggests that 
bureaucracy will be unable to undertake the entrepreneurial 
function. Beetham (1987, 82) interprets him as arguing that 'the 
maintenance of any dynamism, whether in econrcu:or social life, 
depends on the continuation of [the] entrv \eurial class'. 
Bureaucracy is an efficient administrative t_ - ^fering a means:
through which policies determined outside e. ureaucracy canr
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be implemented. But entrepreneurial action rests on the 
appropriate selection of ends as well as of means. The 
entrepreneur must decide not only how best to produce a new 
product but must first perceive the need for this product 
(Kirzner, 1985, 49). Those characteristics of bureaucracy which 
make it an efficient administrative machine also frustrate 
entrepreneurial action.
Bureaucracy is hierarchical. Before pursuing an entrepreneurial 
discovery, a bureaucrat must first receive the permission of 
their superior. At the very least, this will take entrepreneur's 
time and energy. Furthermore, bureaucrats will be reluctant to 
recommend the adoption of novel courses of action as this may be 
taken to imply criticism of a superior who authorised the pursuit 
of existing policies (Thompson, 1977). Ultimately, the presence 
of hierarchy implies the existence of only one entrepreneur: the 
person at the apex of the hierarchy. Dangers in eliminating 
entrepreneurial pluralism have already been identified but in 
this case particular concern can be expressed as the senior 
individual in a public bureaucracy will be a politician. Not only 
are politicians unlikely to have sufficient ability to judge 
accurately the merits of competing proposals but and as will be 
argued in Chapter Nine, politicians may have incentives to 
undermine entrepreneurial efficiency in the pursuit of 
reelection.
Bureaucracy is hierai -al and hierarchy rests on the precis, 
spe*.f .cation of cled efined roles for each bureaucrat ar
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rules for them to follow (Weber, 1946, 51) . For three reasons, 
the presence of rules retards entrepreneurial action. First and 
as Robert Merton (1952) argues, the formulation of rules is 
likely to lead to 'goal displacement' : a process that occurs when 
bureaucrats follow rules so rigidly they frustrate the 
realisation of goals the rules were intended to realise. Second, 
the importance of tacit knowledge within the entrepreneurial 
process is such that it must be doubted whether any set of rules 
can ensure entrepreneurial alertness. Third, the specification 
of rules will give- bureaucracy an inherently conservative 
disposition. Rules ensure the preservation of the status quo but 
entrepreneurship demands its (creative) destruction. As James 
Wilson (1989, 69) observes, 'all [bureaucratic] organisations by 
design are the enemy of change'.
The capitalist entrepreneur is not only unconstrained by existing 
rules but can profit by her refusal to accept received wisdom. 
For this reason, it is difficult to reconcile Schumpeter's 
general endorsement of bureaucratic socialism with his 
recognition of the 'depressing influence' bureaucracy exerts 'on 
the most active of minds ... due to the difficulty, inherent in 
the bureaucratic machine, of reconciling individual initiative 
with the mechanics of its working' (Schumpeter, 1943, 207) . Weber 
recognises the significance of this constraint, seeing in 
bureaucrats individuals who
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need 'order' and nothing but order, who are so totally- 
adjusted to it that they become nervous and cowardly 
if this order falters for a moment, and quite lost if 
they are torn away from it (quoted Beetham, 1987, 81) .
Contingency theory can be used to clarify this difference. Tom 
Burns and Gordon Stalker (1961) distinguish between mechanical 
organisations characterised by the presence of hierarchy and 
rules and organic organisations which have a more fluid 
structure. They argue that the efficiency of either depends upon 
the environment in which it functions and the nature of the tasks 
it is called upon to perform. Mechanical organisations are suited 
to conditions of stability, certainty and technological 
simplicity. Organic organisations cope better in conditions of 
instability, uncertainty and complexity. As Weber's definition 
reveals, bureaucracy is a mechanical organisation but 
entrepreneurship is best undertaken within organic organisations.
3.4.2 Public Entrepreneurship: The Legacy of Hyman Rickover
At the end of the Second World War, the United States Navy was 
largely composed of increasingly vulnerable aircraft carriers, 
lacked any clear enemy and faced demands for rapid 
demobilisation. The future of warfare was thought to lie in the 
development of nuclear weapons and the Navy had played only a 
peripheral role in the Manhattan project and did not have a role 
V clay in the deliver"/ of nuclear weapons. The Navy's position'
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was further jeopardised by the decision in 1946 to create and 
give to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) a legal monopoly on 
all matters of nuclear policy.
The Navy's saviour, Captain Hyman Rickover, was an unlikely hero. 
The Navy promoted generalists over specialists and Rickover, 
already recommended for retirement, was a technician, Director 
of the Engineering Division of the Bureau of Ships. But Rickover 
alone saw that because nuclear powered submarines could remain 
submerged and therefore invulnerable to attack, nuclear power 
could revolutionise naval warfare. Through persistent lobbying, 
Rickover convinced first his superiors in the Bureau of Ships, 
then the Navy and finally Congress to commit research money into 
what was felt at the time to be a technically infeasible project. 
By 1949, Rickover had been promoted to Admiral, tasked with the 
creation of the Naval Reactors Division of the Bureau of Ships 
and given sufficient funds to develop two prototype submarines. 
The first of these, The Nautilus, made its maiden voyage in 1953. 
By this time, Rickover had persuaded Congress of the need to 
build not only a fleet of nuclear submarines but to convert 
almost the entire navy to nuclear power. Growth in the Naval 
budget outstripped that of the other armed services and most of 
this money flowed through the Naval Reactors Division of the 
Bureau of Ships. In 1954 and again against the wishes of the AEC, 
Rickover was given the first contract to build a civilian nuclear 
reactor.
Rickover's achievement .. alongside those o..f FBI director,
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Edgar Hoover and architect of New York's post-war reconstruction, 
Robert Moses, are presented by Eugene Lewis (1980) as examples 
of bureaucratic entrepreneurship. This term - which has recently 
attracted frenzied academic attention (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992)
- is frequently used in a purely metaphorical way as shorthand 
for any bureaucratic success. In Rickover's case, it is not
merely embellishment. The application of nuclear energy was a 
genuine innovation, an example of creative destruction. Rickover 
himself acted as both innovator and coordinator, directing 
technical research, courting publicity and marshalling resources.
To achieve his goals - the Nautilus was launched three years 
ahead of schedule - Rickover subverted traditional bureaucratic 
practise. Rickover did not work alone as he had to rely on the
organisation of the Bureau of Ships but as Lewis (1980, 60)
comments, 'it was organisation as it had never been seen before. 
It was unroutinised: formal rules meant little; existing
structure altered as fast as the task environment did' . Naval 
rules about procurement and testing were ignored, individual 
bureaucrats were simultaneously assigned to perform several 
functions and Rickover emphasised the importance of technical 
knowledge over hierarchical position. In short, the Bureau of 
Ships was turned from a mechanical into a organic organisation.
The critic may respond by arguing that bureaucratic entrepreneurs 
a ; -i an exception to a c :neral rule of bureaucratic inertia and 
t.. they succeed c e not because of their bureaucratic
s. Nonetheless example casts doubt on the conclusion
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that bureaucracy frustrates entrepreneurial action. As Lewis 
(1980, 244) concludes, 'the public entrepreneur ... is an
emulator of his more earthly capitalist predecessor'.
3.4.3 Budget-Maximising: The Legacy of William Niskanen
William Niskanen's has been the most influential rational choice 
model of bureaucracy. His argument rests on a behavioural 
assumption about the source of bureaucratic utility and a 
equilibrium argument from which conclusions about bureaucratic 
efficiency are drawn. The behavioural assumption can be easily 
stated.
Among the several variables that may enter the 
bureaucrat's utility function are the following: 
salary, prerequisites of the office, public 
reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, 
ease of making changes, and ease of managing the 
bureau. All of these variables except the last two are 
a positive monotonic function of the total budget of 
the bureau during the bureaucrat's tenure in office 
(Niskanen, 1971, 38).
Senior bureaucrats will attempt to maximise the size of the 
bureau's budget. As in Figure 3.1, margii: . private costs of
V > \
production (MPC) rise and the marginal b~ . its of production 
(MPB) - as valued by the bureau's spons:. - fall as output
•i** • *4 ?
increases. Niskanen suggests that an eff: :utput is at point
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A where marginal costs are equal to marginal benefits and 
consumer surplus (DAE) is maximised. This is the equilibrium to 
which the capitalist market is pushed through entrepreneurial 
coordination. Output Q1 will be produced at price PI. Monopoly 
power and information asymmetries allow bureaucrats to make 7 take 
it or leave it7 offers to their political sponsors. Bureaucracy 
will locate at B where the welfare gain of 7 efficient7 production 
(DAE) is equal to the welfare loss of excessive production (BCA). 
This is the bureau's budget constraint and output Q2 will be 
produced at price P2.
Figure 3.1 Niskanen and the Budget-Maximising 
Bureaucrat
Price
Pi
Pt
Quantity
Al
It appears that Nislu'on's account of bureaucracy conflicts with 
Weber's 7 ideal tyr in which bureaucrats pursue only othe rs
goals but Weber is that in practise, bureaucrats will o* < '
•• - £ '
exempt to exceed authority and pursue their own g
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(Beetham, 1987, 74-5). Niskanen's model builds upon and
formalises this insight with the difference that bureaucrats are 
seen to pursue their self-interest rather than, as Weber assumes, 
the interests of the social class from which they are drawn.
One previously neglected implication of Niskanen's argument can 
be used to account for the actions of individuals like Hyman 
Rickover. Bureaucrats have an incentive to undertake 
entrepreneurial action to the extent that this can be used to 
secure larger budgets. This will be the case where innovation or 
coordination either lowers the marginal costs of production or 
inflates marginal benefit. The argument is illustrated with 
reference to Rickover's actions in Figure 3.2. In the late 
1940's, the United States was at war with North Korea and 
confronted a superpower rival, the Soviet Union, that had just 
conducted its own atomic tests. Rickover's entrepreneurial action 
convinced the Navy that the marginal benefits of expenditure on 
nuclear submarines had been increased (MPB1-MPB2). Rickover was 
promoted and the (budget-maximising) output of the Bureau of 
Ships expanded from Q2 to Q3 . Relative to capitalist 
entrepreneurs, Rickover's utility gains were perhaps minimal. 
Rickover retired not a millionaire but an Admiral on a state 
pension. But the costs of entrepreneurial failure were also 
reduced. As with the neo-pluralist model, it was the American 
taxpayer's and not Rickover's money that was staked on the 
success of the project.
cognition of the-, possibility of entrepreneurial ac^
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transforms the budget-maximising model. Bureaucrats have an 
incentive not only to maximise utility within existing cost- 
benefit schedules but to actually create, to 'discover', new 
ones. Because entrepreneurial action 'requires aptitudes that are 
present in only a small fraction of the population' (Schumpeter, 
1943, 132), not every bureaucrat will manage to budget-maximise 
in this dynamic sense but this is a constraint which also limits 
capitalist entrepreneurship.
Figure 3.2 Rickover and the Budget-Maximising 
Bureaucrat
Price
Quantity
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The famous conclusion Niskanen (1973, 33) derives from his
budget-maximising model and one from which important policy 
recommendations follow is that 'all bureaus are too large ... 
both the budget and the output of the bureau may be up to twice 
that of a compet"'viv- firm'. Ironical-’ m d  given Niskanen's
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assumptions about efficiency it now appears that the problem with 
bureaucracy is one not of too little but of too much innovation. 
But it is precisely the claim of capitalist efficiency which we 
had reason to question in Chapter Two. Because entrepreneurial 
action generates positive externalities, capitalist markets do 
not maximise consumer welfare and bureaucratic entrepreneurial 
budget-maximising may actually fully compensate for this 
inefficiency. This possibility is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Here, output (Q) is assumed to be a function of the level of 
entrepreneurial activity (E) . Capitalist firms will locate at 
point A (Ql-Pl). Because marginal social benefits (MSB) of 
entrepreneurial action are greater than marginal private benefits 
(MPB) this results in a welfare loss of ABC. A budget-maximising 
bureaucracy will produce at point B (Q2-P2) and in doing so 
maximise welfare. Bureaucracy can not only generate 
entrepreneurial activity but may inadvertently generate an 
efficient volume of it.
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Figure 3.3 Externalities and the Efficient 
Bureaucracy
Price
Q=E
0
It of course possible that bureaucratic budget-maximising 
production will lead to a greater welfare loss than capitalist 
production. In Figure 3.4, marginal private costs (MPC) and 
marginal private benefits (MPB) are held constant and marginal 
social benefits reduced (MSB'). Here, capitalist production (Q2- 
P2) will take place closer to the optimum level (Ql-Pl) than 
bureaucratic production (Q3-P3). Neither capitalism or 
bureaucracy are intrinsically efficient. Without a precise 
quantification of the divergence between private and social 
marginal benefits, nothing, it appears, can be said of the 
relative merits of bureaucracy and capitalism.
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Figure 3.4 Externalities and the Inefficient 
Bureaucracy
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n
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3.4.4 Bureaucracy, Profit and the Market
The analysis in this section has twisted from one conclusion to 
another and necessitated - for the critic of socialist 
entrepreneurship - some uncomfortable concessions. In this 
section, the case against bureaucracy is reconstructed in the 
context of earlier arguments about the efficacy of markets. 
Bureaucratic entrepreneurs may, as Weber suggests, be unable to 
appropriate the resources of office in the form of profit but 
they can enhance their own welfare through budgetary growth and 
for this reason have incentives to budget-maximise. Rickover's 
example demonstrates that budget-max mi sing may require 
entrepreneurial action but this need :c ; 'ways be the case.
In his discussion of bureaucracy, Charles Wolf (1988) suggests 
that bureaucrats may have both a predilection for and an aversion 
to technological innovation. As an example of the former he cites 
the American armed forces. For the latter, he points to the 
American educational establishment and its resistance to 'even 
the experimental use of new technology like videotaping for 
presentations to large classes' (Woolf, 1988, 73) . Within Woolf' s 
argument, the tension between these two is not resolved. Within 
the framework of Niskanen's analysis, it is perfectly explicable. 
New and ever more complex technology can sometimes be used, as 
Rickover demonstrates, to inflate budgets but the introduction 
of video technology allows a smaller number of teachers to 
conduct classes for a larger number of students. Here, technical 
innovation, as Woolf (1988, 73) notes, will 'reduce the demand 
for teachers' and frustrate budget-maximising. Neither does the 
bureaucrat have any incentive to cut organisational costs for if 
they were to do so, either their sponsor would require that they 
produce the same amount for a lower budget or produce more for 
the same budget. Either way, bureaucrats will not personally 
benefit from this form of entrepreneurial activity (Hayek, 1935c, 
230) . The relationship between budget-maximising and 
entrepreneurship is purely contingent.
Capitalist firms are superior to public bureaucracies because 
entrepreneurs are motivated directly by the search for profit and 
will pursue entrepreneurial discoveries even if this reduces the 
demand for or cost. . their product. Capitalist markets generate 
entrepreneurial rity because they 'are animated by ■“•vate
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property and allow for the capture of profit. Socialist 
bureaucracies retard entrepreneurial activity because they rest 
on public ownership and deny entrepreneurs the opportunity to 
capture profit.
A further difference between bureaucratic socialism and 
capitalist firms can be observed. Bureaucracy derives its revenue 
from budget appropriations (Mises, 1944, 47, Downs, 1967, 29-30, 
Niskanen, 1971, 25). To secure funds for entrepreneurial action, 
the bureaucrat must convince superiors of the merits of their 
proposal. The valuation of marginal benefit of output is a 
political process and is undertaken by politicians. Capitalist 
entrepreneurs derive revenue from the sale of output to 
consumers. Before committing funds to entrepreneurial action, the 
capitalist entrepreneur must form a judgement about the likely 
demand for and costs of the product and capitalist entrepreneurs 
succeed and prosper to the extent that their judgement is 
vindicated. Bureaucratic entrepreneurs have less of an incentive 
to form accurate judgements as it is not their money which is 
being risked. Bureaucratic entrepreneurs will have an incentive 
to pursue funding for a project even if they suspect that a 
better use of resources can be made in another area of government 
activity. For this reason, bureaucratic entrepreneurs also have 
an incentive to exaggerate to politicians the benefits of any 
project and to underestimate its costs. When a review of 
Rickover's nuclear programme was finally authorised in 1963 - ten 
years after the launch of the Nautilus - it was, for ex - 'e, 
concluded that the programme represented poor value for nv - nd
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that the Soviet threat had been wildly exaggerated by defence 
staff (Lewis, 1980, 45).
Politicians and not bureaucrats are the real entrepreneurs in a 
socialist system. They arbitrate between competing proposals, 
monitor costs and authorise funding. There are a number of 
reasons why they are unlikely to do so effectively. First, like 
bureaucrats, they lack a direct financial stake in the success 
of any project. It is taxpayer's and not politician's capital 
which is risked. Second, their abilities and training as 
politicians may not equip them to take such decisions. The 
politician may be impressed by the bureaucrat who is the best 
advocate and not the one who has the best proposal. Third, 
politicians are likely to be unduly risk-adverse. When funded by 
government, entrepreneurial failure may lead to political 
embarrassment. The capitalist entrepreneur does not have to 
account for his actions to a political opposition eager to 
establish culpability (9.2) . Fourth, politicians are unlikely to 
authorise expenditure on competing projects. Capitalist 
entrepreneurs are free to pursue conflicting and contradictory 
projects, each believing that they alone have 'discovered' 
valuable opportunities. Given inevitable limits to individual 
knowledge, the resulting pluralism ensures at least some success. 
Finally, politicians may have preferences that extend beyond 
profit-maximisation. Proposals that, for example, generate jobs 
in marginal constituencies may !'■ given more favourable 
attention.
Since state ownership places the machinery of the 
whole economy in the hands of politicians, it is naive 
to expect that production can ever be 'depoliticised'. 
On the contrary, it will invariably be subject to the 
ever-changing political winds. Important though 
efficiency, growth, technical advance, and so on, 
remain as tasks, they can be pushed quite easily into 
second place if the day-to-day considerations of 
politics so require (Kornia, 1993, 49).
3.5 Conclusion
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Spanning many decades and numerous areas of research, Hayek's 
career can be seen as an attempt to establish the fallacy of one 
proposition: that 'human institutions will serve human purposes 
only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes' 
(Hayek, 1982b, 8) . A fallacious knowledge derived from neo­
classical economics encouraged socialist economists to advocate 
the suppression of functioning although imperfect spontaneous 
orders (nomos) and their replacement with organisations designed 
to perform in particular ways (taxis). In this way it was hoped 
that central planning could be used to both enhance economic 
prosperity and secure the realisation of socialist values.
No matter how exhaustive the preparation or dedicated the 
technicians, such ambitious organisational goals can never be 
realised as the necessary knowledge is too great, is dispersed 
among countless individuals and is frequently tacit, of a kind 
that cannot be communicated to others. The belief that such 
knowledge can ever be known by one individual Hayek (1982b, 14) 
calls the 'synoptic delusion'. Only the market can make use of 
dispersed knowledge and as Hayek (1982b, 51) concludes 'it is 
impossible ... to improve or correct this order by interfering 
in it by direct commands.
Hayek's contributions to the 'Calculation Debate' emphasise the 
limitations of human knowledge and the virtues of decentralised 
markets. At t;h' time, his arguments were misunderstood and
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thought to be of only marginal interest. The failure of central 
planning in the former Soviet Union vindicates his judgment and 
any form of socialism must now deal with the objections Hayek 
first raised nearly sixty years ago.
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4.1 Introduction
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The value that most clearly distinguishes the aspirations of 
socialism from the reality of capitalism is equality. It is the 
pursuit of equality that has been argued to make socialism and 
entrepreneurship incompatible because whilst markets animated by 
private ownership are necessary to stimulate entrepreneurial 
activity, these markets generate inequality. Given its 
significance, section 4.2 examines the concept of equality more 
carefully and defends the choice made in Chapter One to define 
equality in terms of equality of income. Sections 4.3 and 4.5 
examine the trade-off between efficiency and equality. As the 
term is commonly used, efficiency is an economic virtue. A more 
efficient economy is better able to secure individual wellbeing. 
As economic wellbeing depends on stimulating entrepreneurial 
activity (1.3.1) and because equality is fundamental to the 
definition of socialism, asserting the existence of a trade-off 
between efficiency and equality is equivalent to arguing that 
socialism and entrepreneurship are to some degree incompatible. 
Discussion of the nature of the trade-off between efficiency and 
equality generates a framework through which arguments in 
subsequent chapters can be understood. In the final part of the 
chapter, the focus of the argument shifts. To deal with the 
requirements of new right entrepreneurship, any form of feasible 
socialism will have to be market socialist. In section 4.6, a 
definition of. this term is offered and the evolution of the 
theory of market socialism documented.
116
4.2 Equality: The Nature of and Difficulties With
The concept of equality is a complex one. Douglas Rae (1981) 
distinguishes between over one hundred uses of the term. For our 
purposes, the relevance of many is limited as socialists will 
not, for example, be impressed by demands for equality of 
opportunity in the narrow sense favoured by neo-liberals. But the 
possibilities from which socialism can choose are still numerous 
and include equality of welfare, of potential welfare (Musgrave, 
1974) of opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989), equality of 
resources (Dworkin, 1981), equality of status (Miller, 1993), 
equality of initial assets (Roemer, 1988), equality of basic 
capabilities (Sen, 1980), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989) 
and equality of relative benefit (Gauthier, 1986). Socialists now 
rarely advocate equality of income and given that equality in any 
one sphere may require inequality in others (Sen, 1992), it is 
necessary to justify this particular choice. The defence offered 
here is pragmatic. Other indices of equality are (i) more 
difficult to measure, and (ii) problematic in the context of a 
discussion of entrepreneurship. The argument will be illustrated 
with reference to specific alternatives.
It is often argued that it is impossible to make interpersonal 
comparisons of utility (see Hausman, 1994). If so, pursuing 
equality of welfare or some derivative of it is an impossible 
goal. In the absence of any : ed measurement, equality of
status seems equally unattaii,.-b And Gerry Cohen accepts that 
equal access to advantage is -able to the saire objection.
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Measuring equality of income is easier and this is a desirable 
feature as it means that discussion of socialist entrepreneurship 
can concentrate on issues of production rather than consumption. 
In Figure 4.1, the income (i) of two individuals (A and B) is 
plotted. The line X'-X' marks all the points at which income is 
equally distributed. The greater the deviation from this line, 
the greater the inequality.
Measuring equality of income is easier but is not easy. Two 
questions raised by this choice are (i) what assets should be 
taken as '/instituting income, and (ii) over what time period 
should e ity and inequality be measured? The answer to the
first c ■ ose d e p e n d s t h e  form of socialism under
conside and particularly its pattern of ownership. No
single :an or should be given at this stage The second
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choice appears more fundamental and is of particular relevance 
to the discussion of entrepreneurship. If luck partially 
determines entrepreneurial success, individual entrepreneurs may 
have either more or less than the average income in the short­
term but an average income in the long-term. It is a agreeable 
feature of many of the models of socialist entrepreneurship 
considered that they reduce such fluctuations.
Cohen (1989, 908) suggests that egalitarians should compensate 
an individual only for ' (bad) brute luck when his bad luck is not 
the result of a gamble or a risk which he could have avoided'. 
For the same reason and subject to the requirement to provide 
compensation for the unlucky, individuals are, it must be 
supposed, to be rewarded for actions which are not the result of 
'brute' good luck. There may be a clean path to income inequality 
such that distribution M in Figure 4.1 need not be less socialist 
than distribution N. Does this mean that as individuals are not 
forced to be entrepreneurs, socialists should tolerate their 
spectacular prizes? If so, a simple answer to the question of 
whether socialism is compatible with entrepreneurship is in 
sight. But this argument concedes too much ideological ground, 
bearing an uncomfortable resemblance to neo-liberal claims that 
entrepreneurs 'deserve' their success (Arnold, 1987). Socialists 
can respond to such claims by emphasising the salience - 
acknowledged by Friedrich Hayek (1982c, 81) as well as Joseph
Schumpeter (1943, 73-4) - of luck in determining entrepreneurial 
success but in attempting to urtangle the relative importance of 
brute luck and skill, proble : measurement ago ■ arise.
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By defining equality in terms of equality of income, the 
arguments of Chapter Three can be directly confronted. 
Entrepreneurial alertness partially determines entrepreneurial 
success and (genetic) luck partially determines individual's 
capacity to remain alert (Rawls, 1971, 74). Do socialism's
critics have to disassociate themselves from the second part of 
this statement? No because they can also claim that incentives 
partially determine entrepreneurial success and that socialism 
eliminates entrepreneurial incentives. Equality of income is 
where the critique of socialism most clearly bites. If it can be 
shown that equality of income is compatible with 
entrepreneurship, equal access to advantage or equal welfare 
should not pose additional difficulties. In Chapter One it was 
suggested that the efficacy of socialism is best tested by 
assuming egoistic behaviour as the severity of the assumption 
means that any 'pro-socialist' conclusions reached are of greater 
value. Income equality is used for the same reason.
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4.3 Efficiency and Equality: Trade-Offs Found and Lost
4.3.1 The Equality-Efficiency Trade-Off: Initial Formulation
The arguments of Chapter Three can be taken to imply the
existence of a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Because
markets generate inequality socialism will have to rely on 
central planning but as Hayek (1935a, 37) argues
in so far as it had been hoped to achieve by means of 
central direction of all economic activity ... a
distribution of income independent of private property
in the means of production and a volume of output 
which was at least approximately the same or even 
greater than that procured under free competition, it 
was more and more generally admitted that this was not 
... practicable.
One way of depicting this trade-off is illustrated in Figure
4.2.1 Here, more equality means less efficiency. Whether in 
these circumstances priority should be given to achieving 
equality or efficiency will provoke (political) argument but it 
is significant that writers as diverse as Milton Friedman (1962),
1 The example is taken from Brian Barry's Political 
Argument. Barry rejects the suggestion that if a choice is to be 
made between two values that it must be possible to compare them 
-in terms of a .common denominator. Using the exci, i s of equity 
and efficiency he argues that 'one can sensibly s. of rational 
choices on che basis of principles which are nc reducible
to a si*" rV- one provided that . . . the choices s consistent
patterr - reference' (Barry. 1990, 4).
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James Meade (1964), John Rawls (1971), Arthur Okun (1975) and 
Gary Dymiski and John Elliot (1988) accept the existence of this 
trade-off. John Roemer (1992, 151) suggests that 'the view that 
equality of income and efficiency .... inherently conflict has 
become almost a dogma in the West'.
Figure 4.2 The Efficiency/Equality Trade-Off
Efficiency
0
Equality
4.3.2 Pareto Efficiency
The trade-off between equality and efficiency has been introduced 
in the absence of any clear definition of efficiency. Allen 
Buchanan (1985, 4) suggests that the 'most widely accepted
concept of efficiency' is Pareto efficiency and goes on to argue 
that 'the Pareto optimality and Pareto superiority principles 
appear to provide the most comprehensive tools for assessing a 
system ' f';iciency' (Buchanan, 1985, 7). The Pareto principle
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is employed on the assumption that (i) each person's preferences 
are the only appropriate indicators of their welfare, (ii) that 
the welfare of a society is composed only of the welfare of the 
individuals within it, and (iii) that interpersonal comparisons 
of utility are impossible. Robert Sugden (1992, 343) suggests 
that the first two of these judgements are 'for most economic 
purposes ... probably fairly acceptable'. The Pareto principle 
is useful as it allows economists to comment upon the welfare 
implications of different policies without having to make 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. The Pareto Principle is 
worth stating in Vilfredo Pareto's own words.
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Let us consider any particular position and let us 
suppose that a very small move is made compatible with 
the relations involved. If in doing so the well-being 
of all the individuals is increased, it is evident 
that the new position is more advantageous for each 
one of them; vice-versa, it is less so if the well­
being of all individuals is diminished. The well-being 
of some may remain the same without these conclusions 
being affected. But, if on the other hand, this small 
move increases the well-being of certain individuals 
and diminishes that of others, it can no longer be 
said that it is advantageous to the community as a 
whole to make such a move. We are, hence, led to 
define a position of maximum ophelimity as one where 
it is impossible to make a small change of any sort 
such that the ophelimities of all individuals with the 
exception of those that remain constant, are either 
all increased or all diminished (quoted Cirillo, 1979,
43) .2
A distinction is drawn between Pareto-superiority and Pareto- 
optimality. A Pareto-superior change is one which increases the 
utility of at least one individual without decreasing the utility 
of any Recause none lose and at least one gains, a Pareto-
to draws a distinction - since abandoned - between 
ophel which the individual derives from market purchases-and
utili 2h the individual derives from pursing the entire
range eir desires. Pareto's ophelimity has become today's
util: iough Pareto also believed that it was possible to
make rsonal comparisons of utility.
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superior change necessarily increases the welfare of society. In 
Figure 4.3, the utility (u) of two individuals, A and B, is shown 
on the vertical and horizontal axis respectively. The move from 
Y to Z is Pareto-superior as A benefits and B does not lose. 
Conversely, the move from M to N is not Pareto-superior as A 
benefits but B loses. Pareto-optimality is achieved when 
possibilities for making Pareto-superior moves have been 
exhausted. Any point along the frontier D'-D' is Pareto-optimal. 
As in the move from Y to Z, Pareto-superior moves do not 
necessarily result in the achievement of Pareto-optimality and 
as in the move from S to T, movement to points of Pareto- 
optimality need not be Pareto-Superior.
Figure 4.3 Efficiency: The Pareto Criterion
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4.3.3 The Efficiency-Equalitv Trade-Off: Initial Problems
Commitment to the Pareto principle casts into doubt the existence 
of a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Although 
different from, my argument is grounded on Julian Le Grand's 
(1990, 1991) observation that efficiency in the Pareto sense
should not be treated as a political value to be traded off 
against others.
There are two values, for example, liberty and equality both of 
which are valued and between which there exists a trade-off. In 
Figure 4.4, the line D'-D' shows the maximum possible 
combinations of liberty and equality which can be realised. At 
point A, for example, equality is absolute and this point 
corresponds to all points X'-X' in Figure 4.1. Society can locate 
on or within this frontier but not beyond it. Applying the Pareto 
principle, efficiency demands that society locate on the frontier 
(D'-D' ) as the possibility of making Pareto-superior moves exists 
at any point within it. Statements about the efficiency of any 
location can be made but efficiency itself cannot be traded-off 
against either liberty or equality as it refers only to the 
desirability, or efficiency, of trade-offs made between other 
values.
The notion of a trade-off is meaningless. For 
acceptance of this interpretation implies that 
efficiency can be defined only in relation to the 
ability of social and economic organization to attain 
their primary objectives and that therefore efficiency 
cannot itself be one of those primary objectives ... 
Efficiency is not an objective in the sense that 
[equality] ... is an objective; rather, it is a 
secondary objective that only acquires meaning with 
reference to primary objectives (Le Grand, 1990, 560) .
Figure 4.4 Efficiency and Value Trade-Offs 
Liberty
A0
Equality
4.4 Socialism and Pareto Efficiency
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A definition of efficiency has been gained but the notion of a 
trade-off between efficiency and equality and with it a way of 
representing the conflict between socialism and entrepreneurship 
apparently lost. In this section it will be argued that the 
definition of efficiency gained is, for socialists, problematic. 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962, 172) describe the Pareto 
principle as 'a very weak ethical postulate' which 'must be 
accepted by those who accept any form of individualistic values'. 
At one level, reasons for rejecting this claim can be easily 
found. Socialism is characterised by a commitment to equality, 
by a concern with redistribution and the Pareto principle is 
blind to considerations of redistribution.
As a natural consequence of ethical neutrality, Pareto 
dismissed the problem of an optimum distribution of 
wealth as one of concern to social ethics rather than 
economics (Cirillo, 1979, 43).
In the case of Pareto-optimality, no grounds exist for saying, 
in Figure 4.5, that position X is preferable to position Y. It 
is the absolute utility of individuals rather than relative 
distribution which drives the principle of Pareto-superiority. 
Pareto-superior changes which result in greater equality - from 
M to N - are no more likely and have no more appeal than those 
that re It in greater inequality - from M to 0. The case against 
the T'c.: :o principle i. -^raightforward. That redistribution
should be treated as irrelevant is itself a value judgement and 
one which socialists reject (Little, 1950, 87, Stretton and
Orchard, 1994, 147).3
Figure 4.5 Equality and the Pareto Criterion
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The Pareto principle's dependence on initial conditions can also 
be questioned. What constitutes a Pareto-superior move is 'path 
dependent'. In Figure 4.6, movement to point M is Pareto-superior 
if the initial starting-point is point N but not if it is point 
P. The Pareto principle has the effect of giving existing 
distributions a privileged position. The privilege carries less 
weight if the starting-point is near the origin (0) but is 
restrictive if the initial starting-point is near the Pareto
3 Again, the criticism s really- directed not- at Pareto but 
at his disciples. Pareto -.quoted Barry & Hard! n 1982, 140) is 
careful to emphasise that : ^ nsiderations fc.! : to economics 
. . . ethics, social utility omething else' ■ . ■ d also be used
to determine policy'.
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frontier. Why is this so bad? Socialism operates with a 
'patterned' rather than a 'process' theory of justice (see 
Nozick, 1974, 155-60) . This means that the desirability of
distributions is judged in terms of the distribution itself and 
not in terms of the way it was attained. Equality is valued 
regardless of whether the existing distribution is equal or 
unequal and for this reason, the conservatism of the Pareto 
principle is anathema to socialism.
Figure 4.6 Path Dependency and the Pareto Criterion
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Buchanan (1985, 7) suggests that the Pareto principle offers the 
'most comprehensive' tool for assessing efficiency but this claim 
can a;? :■ be challenged. The limitations of the Pareto principle 
are \ical as well as political. Whilst the Pareto principle
car ;d tcl pronounce on^the.welfare .implications_of movements
bet . oints, it is frequently unable to say which of two 
poj itself preferable. In Figure 4.6, the movement from P
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to M is not Pareto-superior but points P and M are themselves 
Pareto-incomparable. Whilst the Pareto principle can be used to 
support the conclusion that point M is better than point N, it 
cannot be used to derive a complete and transitive preference 
ordering between all points.
The same objection can be raised against the use of equality of 
income. To return to Figure 4.1, equality can be used to 
establish the desirability of N over M but not that of N over P 
or between any points that are equally equal and this may also 
be taken to constitute not only a technical but a political 
limitation as, intuitively, point N appears preferable to point 
P. Socialism can rely upon its other values to generate a 
complete and satisfactory preference ordering. Even if points N 
and P are equally democratic and free, elections can be expected 
to yield a preference for N over P as individuals will be 
unlikely to vote for the latter. Alternatively, socialism can 
make use of the Pareto principle as a second order means by which 
to rank otherwise equal outcomes as point N is Pareto-superior 
to P. Many rational choice theorists use the Pareto principle in 
a stronger way. In Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) hands the claim 
that Pareto-superior moves should be made is joined by the far 
stronger and more controversial claim that only Pareto-superior 
moves should be made (Barry, 1990, 51-2). That the conclusions 
they then reach are anti-socialist is not surprising but this 
does not mean that the Pareto principle need be anti-socialist 
if it is used more sparingly. The socialist should only object
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to its use as a 'fully fledged ultimate principle' (Barry, 1990, 
50) .
4.5 Beyond Pareto: The Ecrualitv-Efficiencv Trade-Off Again
If the trade-off between efficiency and equality is to be 
reconstituted, an alternative definition of efficiency must be 
found. Rather than define it in terms of allocation, efficiency 
is here thought of in terms of productive efficiency and to tie 
discussion to entrepreneurship use is made of the concept of the 
production possibility frontier (PPF). In Figure 4.7,
combinations of two goods, A and B, which it is feasible to 
produce are shown along the PPF, X'-X'. The greater the number 
of goods produced, irrespective of the mix, the greater the 
efficiency of the economy. At point M, total production is O-B-M- 
P and at point N is O-C-N-Q. All possible points within and on 
the PPF will be either more, less or as efficient as all others. 
The ranking will be both complete and transitive. Entrepreneurial 
coordination - movement toward the PPF - and entrepreneurial 
innovation - movement beyond the existing PPF - increase 
efficiency.
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Figure 4.7 Production and Efficiency
Q
P
It has already been argued in Chapter One that productive 
efficiency is positively related to income. The discovery of 
profit opportunities through entrepreneurial action generates 
income growth. In Figure 4.8, the PPF is drawn against the 
background not of the production of two goods but of the income 
(i) of two individuals, A and B.
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Figure 4.8 Income, Production and Efficiency
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The PPF is equivalent to Le Grand's 'objective possibility 
frontier' and depends on knowledge of existing 'resources, 
economic system, individual's psychologies, etc.' (Le Grand, 
1991, 26). In Le Grand's argument, in standard economic texts 
(Hardwick, 1982, 99, Beardshaw, 1984, 38, Eaton and Eaton, 1988, 
24, Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1992, 25) and in Figures 4.7 and 4.8, 
it is assumed (i) that the PPF is convex to the origin, and (ii) 
that there is only one PPF. Both assumptions can be challenged.
Convexity in the PPF is built on the assumption of diminishing 
marginal returns. This is appropriate if, as in Figure 4.7, the 
PPF refers only to production of goods. The assumption of a 
positive relationship ween income and production in Figure 4.8 
complicates discussio ■ Chapter Three it was argued that the
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prospect of inequality and the prior existence of inequalities 
facilitates entrepreneurial action and increases efficiency. The 
PPF should, as in Figure 4.9, be concave rather than convex to 
the origin.
Figure 4.9 Income, Production and Efficiency 
Reconsidered
4pz v,c / ) * y
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Le Grand, it will be recalled, isolates three factors which 
determine the position of the PPF and two of these three can be 
expected to remain constant following the transition to 
socialism. Individuals will remain egoistic utility maximisers 
and resources - at least natural ones like, for example, coal - 
will remain as plentiful. But capitalism and socialism are likely 
to have very different economic systems. In Chapter Two it Wc 
argued that capitalism is characterised by private ownership a-
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decentralised markets and in Chapter Three it was assumed that 
socialism is characterised by state ownership and central 
planning. Each system will be likely to have a different PPF. 
Furthermore, economists will disagree about their relative 
position. As shown in Figure 4.10, Taylor and Lange believe that 
the socialist PPF (SOC1) lies above the capitalist one (CAP1). 
Hayek and Mises argue that this claim rests upon an inadequate 
understanding of the nature of the market and of the importance 
of incentives. The 'true' socialist PPF (SOC2), they argue, lies 
below the capitalist one.
Figure 4.10 Political Argument and the Production 
Frontier
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rther complication arises here. Socialism has been defined 
ms not of ownership or allocation mechanism but of
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political values. It was assumed by Lange and Taylor that to 
achieve equality it is necessary to suppress private ownership 
and markets but given the definition of socialism in Chapter One 
and even though it lies on the socialist PPF, point M in Figure 
4.10 cannot be described as socialist as it depicts an extremely 
unequal distribution of income between A and B. Equally, it was 
argued in Chapter Three that private ownership and markets will 
not generate income equality. Whilst point N in Figure 4.10 lies 
on the capitalist PPF, it will not be reached. It is not possible 
to stipulate any thresholds beyond which a society becomes 
socialist. It cannot be said that point R in Figure 4.10 is 
socialist but not point M. It can only be said that point R is 
more socialist. The PPF's in Figure 4.10 cannot be drawn in such 
a way as to accommodate this insight but the qualification should 
not be forgotten.
Roemer (1993, 90, 1994, 54) argues that socialist values are no 
different from social democratic ones and may even be embraced 
by liberal egalitarians. Values like exploitation or community 
which might easily distinguish socialism from its rivals have 
been excluded from the adopted definition. In a sense, this 
should not be regarded as a substantive problem. If the reader 
wants to replace the word socialism with that of social democracy 
they are free to do so but the framework developed can be used 
to distinguish between them.
■■■; - v X t t -
Social democrats hope to realise the values of socialism withinor 
a capitalist system. Whilst social democrats accept that
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capitalism will not naturally achieve equality they argue that 
it can be made to do so through redistributive taxation. Through 
social engineering, social democrats attempt to push society 
toward those points - like N in Figure 4.10 - that would
otherwise not be attained. Roemer (1994, 54) doubts whether in
the absence of 'the very special conditions necessary for its 
success' social democracy is a viable strategy and although they 
start from a very different ideological position, Hayek, Mises 
and Kirzner agree. They argue that the long-term effect of 
interference in capitalism will be the destruction of capitalism 
as redistribution erodes incentives for entrepreneurial action. 
Without having to assess the merits of their argument, socialism 
can be distinguished from social democracy by its willingness to 
transcend capitalism, to move to a new PPF.
There are two trade-offs between efficiency and equality. The 
first occurs within production frontiers and the second occurs 
between production frontiers. In each case, equality - as 
measured by proximity to the 45' line - is sacrificed as 
efficiency - measured by total production - increases. As 
entrepreneurial activity is necessary if production is to be 
increased, the greater these trade-offs, the more incompatible 
socialism can be said to be with entrepreneurship. Compatibility 
is not absolute but relative. How this trade-off is best managed 
will provoke political fisagreement but the concern of subsequent 
chapters is with th- ent (if any) of the trade-off itself.
Attention is focused on the demand but on the 'supply-side'
(Barry, 1990, 8) . Ha * Mises argue that the trade-off within
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the mathematical and competitive models is severe but this does 
not exhaust the possibilities for socialism and given the 
limitations of capitalist entrepreneurship (2.4), it is possible 
that a socialist PPF can be found which lies close to or even 
above the capitalist one.
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4.6 Market Socialism and Socialist Entrepreneurship
4.6.1 Market Socialism: An Introduction
Market socialism has a powerful appeal. As social democracy has 
stumbled, the promise of reconciling capitalist efficiency with 
socialist values has attracted considerable attention (Plant, 
1984, Miller, 1989, Le Grand and Estrin, 1989, Nove, 1991, 
Bardhan and Roemer, 1993, Roemer, 1994) . All of the models of 
socialist entrepreneurship considered in subsequent chapters are 
market socialist in that they have three features in common.
First, the competitive, decentralised market is the primary forum 
within which economic decisions are taken. Critics argue that 
market socialism is flawed as it takes as its foundation spurious 
neo-classical arguments about the workings of the market 
(Stiglitz, 1993, Makowski and Ostroy, 1993) but whilst this is 
certainly the case with Lange and Taylor's models of market 
socialism, the variants considered presently are shown to be less 
vulnerable to Austrian attack. It is this feature which 
recommends market socialism as a solution to the problem of 
socialist entrepreneurship. To cope with the objections raised 
in Chapter Three, it is necessary that socialism use 
decentralised markets to stimulate the discovery, communication 
and coordination of entrepreneurial knowledge.4
4 This provide- further -justification for having dispensed 
with the Pareto pri: f  e. An important part of the neo-classical
apparatus is the ce rtration that all competitive equilibria
are Pareto-optimal . ,.ie Austrian critique of the neo-classical
model is also a err of the Pareto principle. As Don Lavoie
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Second, market socialism envisages the need to alter patterns of 
ownership if socialist values are to be realised (Bardhan and 
Roemer, 1993b, 15). Market socialists are not social democrats 
and social democrats do not become market socialists by accepting 
that 'without some market influence the economy will be 
inefficient and unresponsive to consumer's needs' (Hattersley, 
1987, 163). The rejection of capitalist private ownership does 
not commit market socialists to any particular alternative. There 
is no single and unique form of market socialism. Models that 
rest upon common ownership, worker owned firms and state 
ownership are all considered. Third, market socialism embraces 
the political principle of liberty in a way that 'classical' 
socialism does not. As liberty has already been included in the 
definition of socialism, this feature of market socialism 
requires less explanation.
4.6.2 The Evolution of Market Socialism
Roemer (1994) traces five stages in the evolution of market 
socialism. The first was marked by the recognition that prices 
would be needed in a socialist economy to allocate resources. The 
second was the mathematical and the third the competitive 
solution. The nature of the debate here and Mises' and Hayek's 
responses have already been examined. The fourth stage came with 
attempted market socialist reform in some Communist bloc
(1985, 173) comments, 'Hayek was elaborating an approach
reconomics that seeks to replace the neoclassical welfare crir 
of pareto-optimality'.
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countries: Yugoslavia after 1950; Hungary a decade later; Poland 
in the 1980's and the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Confusingly, 
Roemer also argues that the fourth stage of the debate was 
distinguished by a new theoretical assault that accused market 
socialists of neglecting the importance of incentives. The fifth 
stage of the debate surrounds market socialist's response to 
these objections. Roemer (Bardhan and Roemer, 1993b, 8) suggests 
that this fifth stage has pushed debate beyond Hayek's arguments 
as he assumed the 'good intentions of most firm management' . This 
is incorrect. In pointing to the deleterious impact of attempts 
to impose equality, Hayek shows that he is aware of the 
importance of incentives. What can be said is that as market 
socialists have conceded ground to their opponents on, for 
example, the possibility of central planning, incentives have 
become central to the debate.
Market socialists accept that the market is necessary to 
successfully guide entrepreneurial action but deny that the 
market can only operate in conditions of private ownership and 
inequality. Instead and in ways to be shown, they argue that 
incentives can be designed in ways that will motivate 
entrepreneurial action without sacrificing equality. Critics 
suggest that it is impossible to have one without the other: that 
'there is no real decentralization without private ownership' 
(Kornia, 1993, 52). Friedman (1981, 8) makes the same point.
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A second function that prices perform is to provide an
incentive for people to adopt the least costly methods
of production and to use available resources for the
most highly valued uses. They perform that function
because of their third function, which is to, determine*
who gets what and how much - the distribution of 
income (1981, 8).
Subsequent chapters are part of the fifth stage of the market 
socialist debate in that they are specifically concerned with 
incentives for entrepreneurial action. Here, a commitment to 
rational choice analysis and the assumption of egoism is valuable 
as this framework lends itself naturally to the analysis of 
incentives.
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Moral Incentives and Socialist Entrepreneurship
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5.1 Introduction
Like capitalism, market socialism comes in many forms. The next 
two chapters review two models of market socialism and assess 
their compatibility with entrepreneurship. It is not claimed that 
these are necessarily the best or most sophisticated variants but 
they each raise interesting theoretical issues, are amenable to 
rational choice analysis and have the advantage of having 
actually been practised in some way. Joseph Carens's Equality, 
Moral Incentives and the Market (1981) is an ambitious and 
interesting attempt to square a theoretical circle. Carens' 
(1981, x-xi) suggests that "moral incentives [can] be used to pry 
the organisational advantages of the market from [its] 
distributional disadvantages'. Moral incentive socialism (MIS) 
promises to transcend the trade-off between equality and 
efficiency and this chapter will present a heavily qualified 
defence of Carens' argument. Moral incentives can sometimes be 
used to motivate behaviour but only in the presence of specific 
extraneous conditions.
The chapter is divided into three sections. In section 5.2, 
Carens' argument and the assumptions which sustain it are 
introduced and it is argued that MIS can not only emulate but 
enhance capitalist efficiency. The possibility that MIS should 
be regarded as simply a utopian fantasy is considered and 
rejected. The principal objection to MIS is one not of 
desirability but of feasibility. Given the assumption of egoism
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it appears unlikely that individuals will respond to moral 
incentives. Carens' defence, that socialisation can be used to 
secure cooperation, is examined in section 5.3 and the efficacy 
of this solution is shown to depend upon the presence of 
particular environmental features. In section 5.4, this 
theoretical argument is applied to a study of Israeli Kibbutzim. 
The ways in which the organisational structure and social 
environment of the kibbutz make possible the use of moral 
incentives is illustrated. Ultimately, the conclusion is a 
pessimistic one: the demands of neo-pluralist entrepreneurship 
lead to the reemergence of a trade-off between efficiency and 
equality.
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5.2 Equality, Moral Incentives and the Market
5.2.1 Moral Incentive Socialism: The Proposal
The foundations of Carens' argument echo the conclusions of 
earlier chapters. First, decentralised and competitive markets 
are a necessary prerequisite for economic efficiency. 
Specifically, this has been interpreted to mean that markets 
facilitate entrepreneurial coordination and innovation. Second, 
whilst central planning and public ownership protect equality 
they are significantly less efficient. Third, capitalism 
generates inequality and so frustrates the realisation of 
socialist values.
MIS envisages an economy in which the market remains the salient 
mechanism through which production is organised and wages, 
employment and profit levels determined. Subject to standard 
limitations, entrepreneurs are free to either employ, exchange, 
destroy or neglect their resources and in doing so will confront 
a hard-budget constraint: sustained losses will lead to
bankruptcy. Price discrepancies and uncertainty will stimulate 
the discovery, communication and coordination of knowledge.
It is proposals for the distribution of income which distinguish 
MIS from capitalism. Rather than entrepreneurs retain their 
profits (and losses) and employees their wages, all income is 
placed in a central pool from which each individual draws an 
equal amount. In a sense, ownership within MIS remains private.
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In Honore's terms (2.2), entrepreneurs retain the exclusive right 
to possess, use and manage the means of production. By this 
criterion, it appears that whilst MIS utilises the market and 
promotes equality it is not market socialist. The description 
nonetheless remains appropriate because (crucially) entrepreneurs 
do not retain the right to a (unequal) income from their 
property. The fundamental ethos of MIS is public rather than 
private.
Individuals in MIS are not required to attain what Carens (1981, 
41) calls their 'maximum earning capacity': toiling twelve hours 
a day, seven days a week. Such behaviour is not characteristic 
of capitalist systems where individuals trade-off leisure against 
income. MIS requires only that individuals work as hard as they 
do under capitalism: that they deviate no further from their
maximum earning capacity. Instead of working to secure 'income 
consumption satisfactions' for themselves, individuals are 
motivated by 'social duty satisfactions'. The three necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the success of MIS are that:
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First, individuals in the [MIS] system believe they 
have a social duty to earn as much pre-tax income net 
income as they are capable of earning.
Second, individuals in the [MIS] system derive 
satisfaction from performing this social duty to earn 
as much pre-tax income as they can.
Third, individuals in the [MIS] system place the same 
relative value on the satisfactions derived from 
performing their social duty to acquire pre-tax income 
as individuals in the private property markets place 
on the satisfactions derived from acquiring income for 
consumption (Carens, 1981, 25).
5.2.2 Efficiency: Moral Incentive Socialism and Capitalism
MIS retains the methods of capitalist production but 
revolutionises its method of distribution. Carens' intention is 
to demonstrate that - given certain assumptions - socialism can 
be as efficient as capitalism. In terms of the discussion in 
Chapter Four, MIS argues (Figure 5.1) that the socialist (SOC) 
production possibility frontier can be raised to the point where 
it meets the capitalist (CAP) one and that the frontier can be 
reached at the point of absolute equality, M. The trade-off 
between efficiency and equality is eliminated.
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Figure 5.1 Moral Incentive Socialism, Efficiency 
and Equality
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Because MIS retains the capitalist system of production it will 
be burdened by the same entrepreneurial inefficiencies. 
Monopolies and periodic recession will, for example, still 
frustrate growth. The difficulty for MIS is that if it can never 
be more efficient than capitalism, any deviation from the pursuit 
of social duty satisfactions will mean that it is less efficient 
than capitalism. MIS lacks any cushion with which to protect 
itself. Whilst Carens satisfies himself with the conclusion that 
MIS can be as efficient as capitalism, it is useful to consider 
whether MIS has the capacity to be more efficient than 
capitalism.
First, capitalist inequality is itself a source of inefficiency. 
Poverty breeds crime and necessitates the expenditure of
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resources on its prevention, detection and deterrence. Poverty 
also undermines health and psychological well-being and resources 
are squandered through both additional expenditure on health care 
and premature mortality. In an egalitarian society whilst crime 
and disease will not be eliminated they will be reduced and 
efficiency enhanced as additional resources become available for, 
say, government support of entrepreneurial activity.
Second, Carens assumes that the pattern of individual behaviour 
remains unchanged following the transition from capitalism. Given 
the difference in motivation, this assumption can be challenged 
as Carens (1981, 78) himself recognises that capitalism does not 
always encourage optimal entrepreneurial behaviour. Because 
income is subject to diminishing marginal returns, individuals 
are risk adverse and place more value on what they may lose than 
on what they may gain from entrepreneurial action. Capitalist 
entrepreneurs may decide that whilst a particular project is 
likely to be profitable in the sense that expected returns are 
positive, the risk is not worth undertaking. The costs of failure 
may outweigh the benefits of success and opportunities may be 
discovered but not exploited. Given the positive social benefits 
associated with successful entrepreneurial action, such decisions 
although rational for the individual frustrate growth. Because 
under MIS a entrepreneur will bear only a fraction of the costs 
or benefits of any action, this constraint will be removed and 
more entrepreneurial action will be undertaken. Society itself 
may be risk adverse but a single entrepreneur can still calculate 
that the actions of others will neutralise the impact of
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individual failure.
Third, capitalism encourages entrepreneurs not only to eschew 
particular ventures but occasionally to withdraw entirely from 
entrepreneurial activity. Again, diminishing marginal returns are 
central to the argument. If it is assumed that entrepreneurs are 
motivated by profit, the danger is that in acquiring wealth 
successful entrepreneurs lose their reason for being 
entrepreneurs. It is precisely the expansion in 'maximum earning 
capacity' which reduces the incentive to labour. Successful 
entrepreneurs are less likely to remain entrepreneurs than 
unsuccessful ones. Under MIS no such effect is found. Motivated 
by 'social duty satisfactions', the entrepreneur has no choice 
but to continue to work as hard as before.
Fourth, it was argued in Chapter Two that capitalism is 
inefficient because it encourages individuals to take account 
only of the marginal private benefits and costs of their action 
and so undersupplies entrepreneurial activity. Will entrepreneurs 
behave in the same way under MIS? It is easy to see why they may 
not. Intent on maximising total rather than personal income, 
individuals will have reason to account for the marginal social 
benefits of entrepreneurial activity. Average entrepreneurial 
profits will be reduced but total welfare increased through 
increased entrepreneurial activity. The argument here is perhaps 
speculative as the market is intolerant of externalities and many 
entrepreneurs will be forced into bankruptcy by supplying the 
optimal level of entrepreneurial activity but individuals may
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reasonably calculate that their earning capacity is maximised in 
a occupation in which they make lower profits.
These arguments are a mixed blessing for MIS. Positively, they 
suggest that the socialist production possibility frontier (S0C2) 
may lie above the capitalist (CAP) one (Figure 5.2) . Negatively, 
they suggest that even assuming the efficacy of social duty 
satisfactions, behaviour will change following the transition 
from capitalism. Here, the implications are to MIS's advantage 
but recognition that behaviour is dependent upon environment is 
used in the next section to question the feasibility of MIS.
Figure 5.2 Moral Incentive Socialism Reconsidered
0
Whilst MIS is a relatively simple theory, its assumptions are so 
radical that it is nonetheless tempting to dismiss Carens' 
argument as simply utopian. On occasions, Carens himself lends
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credence to such an interpretation. Equality, Moral Incentives 
and the Market is subtitled An Essay in Utopian Politico-Economic 
Theory and Carens (1981, 20) asserts that MIS is possible only 
in the sense of being 'logically possible'; neither physically 
impossible or internally contradictory. But if MIS is a utopia, 
it is a strangely unappealing one. First, it perpetuates aspects 
of capitalist inefficiency. Second and although it secures income 
equality, MIS reaffirms capitalist power inequalities (Carens, 
1981, 179). This does not jeopardise MIS's socialist credentials 
as equality has been defined purely in terms of income but 
neither was it claimed that socialism is utopian. Third and if 
it is purely utopian, MIS does not supplement the theoretical 
armoury with which capitalism can be attacked: an attribute that 
Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor (1982, 22) see as one of the 
primary justifications for utopian theorising. Is Carens simply 
affirming the inevitability of the existing trade-off between 
equality and efficiency in the 'real world'? If so, he is 
offering a powerful defence of capitalism. For these reasons, MIS 
is treated as a serious political programme: in Carens' (1981, 
185) rather confusing terminology, as a 'realistic utopia'. The 
concern of subsequent sections is with identifying the 
'empirically necessary prerequisites' (Carens, 1981, 20) of MIS 
and establishing the realism of the assumptions used.
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5.3 Moral Incentives and Collective Action
5.3.1 Moral Incentives and the Possibility of Cooperation
After the transition to MIS, individuals will face a choice of 
whether to alter their behaviour. Individuals must decide whether 
to continue to realise the same percentage of their maximum 
earning capacity or to reduce their efforts. We will call these 
choices cooperation and defection respectively. Defection may 
mean an individual stopping work, not trying when at work or 
trying as hard in a job in which their maximum earning capacity 
is lower. The feasibility of MIS depends upon most individuals 
choosing cooperation rather than defection.
Carens (1981, 18) claims that his is a rational choice model of 
socialism. It was argued in Chapter One that rational choice 
models are composed of both 'core' and 'auxiliary' assumptions, 
the core assumptions being those of rational action and 
methodological individualism. Auxiliary assumptions attempt to 
describe the environment within which individuals operate. 
Expectations about individual behaviour are derived from both 
core and auxiliary assumptions. William Niskanen's (1971) 
budget-maximising model depends, for example, on the auxiliary 
assumption that politicians lack both the capacity and incentive 
to closely monitor bureaucratic behaviour and it follows that a 
change in the environment may change behaviour. If the number of 
politicians is increased or their pay made to depend upon 
performance then budget-maximising may cease.
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MIS is characterised by a significant environmental change. In 
a capitalist system, individuals can either (i) work and be paid, 
(ii) work and not be paid, or (iii) not work and not be paid.1 
Some individuals choose to 'drop out' and not work and a thriving 
voluntary sector indicates that many choose to work and not be 
paid but most choose to work and to be paid for their work. MIS 
is characterised by the addition of another option: individuals 
can eschew their social duty satisfactions and defect, not 
working but continuing to be paid from the common income pool. 
Carens argues that this environmental change will not alter 
behaviour. Is he right to do so?
If individuals are altruists with 'complete social consciousness' 
(Sen, 1966) the argument is tenable but it has already been 
assumed that motivation will remain egoistic. Equally, if 
individuals derive utility from work and for this reason prefer 
cooperation to defection, behaviour will remain unchanged. Karl 
Marx employs such an assumption in his defence of communism 
(Elster, 1985, 526-7) and Carens (1981, 133) does briefly mention 
the possibility that individuals will develop a 'primary 
preference for work'. More generally, Carens implies that work 
will continue to be seen as a burden, undertaken only for 
instrumental reasons: to acquire social duty satisfactions.
Besides, a primary preference for work does not insulate MIS from 
criticism. Individuals will still be expected to maximise their
1 It may reasonably be objected that (i) the presence of a 
welfare system gives individuals an option to not work and be 
paid (something), and (ii) that unemployment means that not all 
can choose to work and be paid.
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earning capacity and will not be free to 'hunt in the morning, 
fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening and criticise 
after dinner' (Marx, 1846, 169) even if this is what they most 
enjoy doing. MIS appears easy prey to those in the fourth 
generation debate who argue that market socialism destroys 
incentives. Brian Barry's (1990, 7) argument that, 'it is a bad 
idea to set things up so there is a ... incentive to do wrong' 
could have been written as the preface to a critical review of 
Carens' argument. Most individuals will not work to the same 
percentage of their earning capacity and efficiency will be 
impaired. Equality will be realised but only at a low level of 
low income.
Carens is not so naive as to deny the existence of this problem 
and the threat it poses to MIS. The solution he offers is the 
familiar one of socialisation.
I am claiming that there is sufficient evidence based 
on our empirical knowledge of the range of human 
cultural values to conclude that human nature is so 
flexible that, given the proper conditions ... almost 
any goals could be adopted on a widespread basis in a 
society (Carens, 1981, 104).
If successful, socialisation results in the emergence of norms 
of cooperation. Rational choice theorists are generally sceptical 
of the value of this approach. James Coleman (1990, 242) suggests 
that whilst
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norms may be taken as axiomatic by many sociologists 
. . . for others they constitute an unacceptable deus ex 
machina - a concept brought in at the macrosocial 
level to explain social behaviour, yet itself left 
unexplained.
If socialisation and norms are to be used to rescue MIS they must 
be given 'micro-foundations'. The most obvious route to take here 
and the one employed by Carens is to posit the maintenance of 
norms as being dependent on the application of sanctions. 
Sanctions are of two kinds: external and internal. Externally, 
individuals who defect will be chastised by colleagues and
friends. Here, the desire for social acceptance will be 
sufficient to secure cooperation. Internally, Carens suggests 
that individuals will eventually regulate their own behaviour and 
cooperate even in the absence of external sanctions. MIS will 
still have a different option set from capitalism in that it will 
still be possible for individuals to not work and be paid but if 
sanctions are sufficiently severe, this option will not be taken.
Carens (1981, 96-9) accepts that internal sanctions will only
emerge after external sanctions have proven effective. The 
feasibility of MIS therefore depends on the extent to which 
external sanctions can be used to regulate behaviour. Game theory 
can here be used as a tool of analysis, individuals being 
represented as participants in a prisoners dilemma. In the
absence of sanctions, each will prefer the reward (R) of
universal cooperation (work, paid) to the punishment (P) of
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universal defection (not work, not paid). Individuals have an 
incentive to act strategically, defecting in the hope that others 
will work and that they will receive income. The temptation (T) 
(not work, paid) to defect will be increased by the fear of being 
the sucker (S) , an isolated cooperator whose income will be 
divided amongst others (work, not paid). In a one-shot game and 
even though the outcome is not Pareto-optimal, the dominant 
strategy is one of defection. As Figure 5.3 shows, no matter what 
others do, defection will maximise utility. If others cooperate 
the individual will prefer to defect (T>R) and if others defect 
the individual will prefer to defect (P>S). As all will react in 
the same way, the outcome is the punishment of universal 
defection.
Figure 5.3. Moral Incentive Socialism and the 
Prisoners Dilemma
Others
Cooperation
Cooperation Defection
R, R S, T
Defection T,S P,P
Where P = punishment T = temptation
R = reward S = sucker
and T > R > P > S
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It may be objected that MIS will be characterised by repeated 
interaction. Individuals will have to make a series of (daily) 
choices about whether to cooperate or defect and cooperation in 
an iterated game is more likely than in the one-shot game because 
individuals may be able to monitor others behaviour and apply 
sanctions if they defect. Robert Axelrod (1984) shows, for 
example, that by playing a strategy of 'tit-for-tat' and making 
cooperation conditional on the behaviour of others, utility can 
be maximised. Carens's solution no longer appears utopian: 
sanctions will emerge naturally over a period of time.
Alan Carling (1991, 187-9) ridicules the belief that cooperation 
cannot be sustained in a iterated prisoners dilemma and it is 
worth pausing here to examine his argument. The two actors in a 
capitalist economy, entrepreneurs and consumers, have two 
resources under their respective control: goods and money.2 Both 
value the resource that they have but value the resource of the 
other more highly and this makes for the possibility of a 
mutually beneficial exchange. The entrepreneur is most satisfied 
with an outcome in which they keep their goods and gain the 
consumer's money and are least satisfied with an outcome in which 
they lose their goods and fail to gain money. Their second most 
preferred outcome is one in which they exchange goods for money 
and their third most preferred outcome is the absence of any 
exchange. The consumer most prefers an outcome in which they 
acquire the entrepreneur's goods and retain their money and they
2 Although the logic and presentation of the argument is 
identical, Carling speaks only of two actors, X and Y and two 
goods x and y which are owned by X and Y respectively.
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are least satisfied with an outcome in which they lose their 
money and fail to acquire any goods. Their second most preferred 
outcome is one in which they exchange money for goods and their 
third most preferred outcome is the absence of any exchange. 
Using (G) to denote goods, (M) money, ( + ) for having and (-) for 
not having resources, their respective preference orderings are 
shown in table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Preference Orderings Under Capitalism
Entrepreneur +G, +M V i O + > +G,-M > -G,-M
Consumer +G, +M > +G,-M V i 0 + K V 1 0 1 K
If both cooperate and exchange resources, each will receive the 
reward of their second most preferred option. If neither 
cooperates and exchange does not take place, each will receive 
the punishment of their third most preferred option. Cooperation 
is Pareto-superior to defection but each will be tempted by 
unilateral defection and fear being suckered into unilateral 
cooperation. The situation is that of the prisoners dilemma and 
if it is argued that cooperation in such circumstances is 
unlikely it must be concluded that
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beneficial exchange between beneficial owners of 
resources will not take place . . . non-cooperative game 
theory is the theory par excellence of liberal
individualism, yet the theory holds that free-market 
individuals can't get it together in a free-market 
relationships. Or, to choose a form of words which 
would ingratiate me among orthodox Marxists .... 
bourgeois persons don't behave in bourgeois fashion, 
according to bourgeois theory (Carling, 1991, 188-9).
The defence is complete. Cooperation is no less likely under 
socialism than it is under capitalism. The promise of
'spectacular prizes' (Schumpeter, 1943, 73) is not necessary to
motivate entrepreneurs and the feasibility of MIS does not depend 
upon the emergence of altruism.
5.3.2 Moral Incentives and the Conditions for Cooperation
Carling's argument is instructive in that it can be used to 
establish important differences between capitalism and MIS. That 
cooperation occurs in the former does not mean that it will occur 
in the latter. That sanctions are sometimes capable of sustaining 
cooperation does not mean that sanctions are always effective. 
As the 'Folk Theorem' establishes, there is no dominant
equilibrium in an iterated game: anything can happen (Heap and 
Varoufakis, 1995, 171).
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At one level, Carling's argument seems to rest on a 
misunderstanding of game theory. The actors in his model are 
engaged in an exchange relationship and are free to confront each 
other within the market. In Albert Tucker's initial formulation 
of the prisoners dilemma, individuals are placed in separate 
police cells, are not free to communicate and are not engaged in 
an exchange relationship. Furthermore, cooperation within 
capitalism is made possible by the immediately conditional nature 
of exchange. The consumer only parts with her money when the 
entrepreneur hands over the goods. Some capitalist transactions 
depend on trust. With a mail order firm, the consumer must send 
her money and wait for the goods to arrive but the number of such 
non-simultaneous exchanges is low. Within MIS, a greater burden 
is placed upon trust. Individuals must work now in the hope of 
drawing from a common pool of income later.
Second, cooperation is made possible within capitalism by the 
presence of third parties like the state (North, 1990) but also, 
on occasions, bodies like the Mafia (Gambetta, 1993) who can 
enforce promises of exchange when transactions are non- 
simultaneous. Cooperation within MIS is not legally enforceable. 
Carens suggests that individuals should cooperate but not that 
they must cooperate. Given the example of the Mafia it may be 
objected that what matters in securing cooperation is not legal 
status but the strength of the sanctions brought to bear on 
participants. As MIS utilises sanctions, it is no different from 
capitalist economies. This is to neglect Michael Taylor's (1987, 
22) and James Coleman's (1990, 273) argument that the the
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application of sanctions itself frequently depends on the 
resolution of a second-order collective action problem. The state 
enforces (legal) sanctions because in doing so it can justify 
collecting taxes. The mafia enforces (non-legal) sanctions to 
maintain its reputation for ruthlessness and because it profits 
from terror. It is not clear why individuals within MIS have an 
incentive to apply sanctions at a cost to themselves.
This is also to reveal a third important difference between MIS 
and capitalism. In a capitalist system, the severity of 
punishment administered to defectors is independent of the number 
of other defectors. In the case of non-legal sanctions this is 
not the case (Chong, 1991, 112). Consider a sanction that takes 
the form of withdrawing future cooperation from defectors. Those 
affected will still be able to interact with other defectors and 
if they form the vast majority of the population, the impact of 
the sanction will be negligible. Similarly, Russell Hardin (1982, 
214-6) suggests that defectors suffer from losing their 
reputation and that having witnessed their defection, other
potential partners will abandon them in favour of those with a 
reputation for fair play. If there are a large number of
cooperators, such action is more likely to be exercised. At the 
margin, if there are no cooperators there can be no punishment.
The significance of the difference is illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
On the assumption that individuals gain utility from both leisure 
and income and that production is a monotonic function of the
numbers working, the utility derived from either cooperation or
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defection depends upon the number of others cooperating. The 
value of cooperation is shown as a function of the number of 
others cooperating. The larger the number of cooperators, the 
larger the pool of income from which an individual can draw. The 
configuration of the defection curve reflects the operation of 
two conflicting pressures. On the one hand, utility from 
defection rises in proportion to the number of cooperators as the 
size of the income pool increases. When all defect, individuals 
receive utility only from leisure as there is no common pool of 
income from which to draw. When all others cooperate, the single 
defector receives utility from both leisure and from income. At 
the same time, the utility of defection falls as social sanctions 
become more effective. If cooperators send defectors 'to 
Coventry', it matters how many cooperators there are. Between 
points 0-N1, defection remains the utility maximising strategy.
Figure 5.4 Cooperation within Moral Incentive Socialism
Utility 
to a 
single 
individual
Cooperation
Defection
Proportion ofN10
others working
165
It may be objected that whilst in capitalist systems the actual 
punishment for defection is independent of others actions, this 
does not apply to the probability of detection and therefore the 
expected punishment of defection. But this is to suggest a fourth 
difference between capitalism and MIS. As Carling observes, 
whilst capitalist defection does occur, cooperation is the rule 
and it is easy to see in terms of Figure 5.4 how it is 
maintained. Comparisons between socialism and capitalism must be 
made with care as socialism has also to establish its capacity 
to induce as well as sustain cooperation.
The "Folk Theorem' and environmental differences between 
capitalism and MIS suggest that cooperation is not certain. This 
is not to argue that cooperation is impossible. Carling (1991, 
93) suggests that the possibility of cooperation depends upon the 
amount of fear and trust within a system and this argument is 
explicable in terms of previous analysis. Cooperation is more 
likely when (i) individuals fear punishment if they defect, and 
(ii) can trust in others to reciprocate their cooperation. The 
feasibility of MIS depends upon its capacity to generate fear and 
trust. Building on the work of Taylor (1987) and for any given 
sanction, six factors can be identified which will increase 
levels of trust and fear.
In the absence of selective incentives, cooperation is more 
likely in small groups (Olson, 1965, 48) . In the presence of 
selective incentives, the impact of size is more ambiguous 
(Dunleavy, 1991, 49-50) but size may still be related to other
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factors that induce cooperation. Second, cooperation is more 
likely amongst individuals who experience frequent interaction 
with each other. As already argued, iteration is important: if 
individuals meet only occasionally, fear and trust will erode. 
To return to earlier examples, withdrawal of social contact will 
matter less if social contact is already minimal and the 
entrepreneur will not fear the loss of their reputation if, for 
example, customers are only passing tourists (Hardin, 1982, 214).
Third, cooperation is more likely if networks of interaction are 
closed: if all individuals in a group interact with all others 
(Coleman, 1990) . This is related to but distinct from the 
frequency of interaction which may simply be bilateral. If 
networks are closed, the effect of punishment will be amplified 
for the same reason that repeated interaction with any one 
individual encourages cooperation. In Figure 5.5, three possible 
networks between three individuals are shown. In the first (A) 
there is no interaction, in the second (B) there is interaction 
between A2 and A1 and between Al and A3 but not between A2 and 
A3 and in the third (C) the network is closed. Cooperation is 
unlikely in (A) and is possible in (B) only on the condition that 
A3 and A2 can observe and learn from the other's interaction with 
Al and react to each other accordingly. All other things being 
equal, cooperation is most likely in (C).
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Figure 5.5. Sanctions and the Closure of Networks
Al AlAl
A3A2 A2 A3 A2 A3
(A) (C)
(Coleman, 1990 277)
Fourth, cooperation is more likely to be sustained in conditions 
where punishment and trust 'spill-over' into different spheres 
of life. If those with whom individuals interact are not just 
business colleagues but also, for example, close friends, 
punishment will affect not only working but social life. Here, 
sanctions are more likely to be effective in establishing trust 
and fear.
Finally and to emphasise one specific implication of the second 
condition, fear and with it the possibility of cooperation will 
be reduced in groups from which individuals can easily leave. 
Sanctions are a form of voice and the probability of voice being 
exercised is inversely related to the opportunity for exit 
(Hirschman, 1970). Additionally, the actual impact of voice on 
those punished will fall as the possibilities of exit increase. 
An individual who is ostracised by colleagues for defecting is 
more likely to alter their behaviour if they cannot simply walk 
away from the organisation.
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Groups where a large number of these conditions are present can 
be described as communities and the presence of a sense of 
community is the primary requirement for the success of MIS 
(Taylor, 1987, 105). Gerry Cohen (1996, 10) sees in community a 
value the pursuit of which distinguishes socialism from liberal 
egalitarianism and argues that socialists should pursue community 
as fervently as they pursue equality. In the case of MIS and 
given the more restricted definition of socialism in Chapter One, 
it can be concluded that community is not a goal to be pursued 
by but a prerequisite of a socialist society.
One final condition that returns us to a discussion of 
entrepreneurial action can also be identified as important in 
facilitating cooperation. Before being able to punish defectors, 
it is first necessary to know who has defected. If individuals 
are unable to monitor each others behaviour, cooperation will 
break down.
[cooperation] depends on reciprocation for the others 
action, inability to observe certain of the other 
side's activities makes it harder to achieve contract 
by convention (Hardin, 1982, 210).
Community encourages but does not always secure effective 
monitoring. Frequent interaction, small groups and closed 
networks are a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
cooperation. MIS raises particular difficulties for monitoring 
because producing less than others does not itself constitute
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defection and therefore grounds for sanctioning. Carens demands 
only that individuals continue to reach the same percentage of 
their maximum earning capacity as before, not that they work as 
hard as others. Furthermore, sanctioning in MIS demands not only 
that individuals know how much effort an individual is putting 
into their existing occupation but also how much their earning 
capacity is elsewhere. An individual who works twelve hours a day 
as an accountant but who could have earned far more in eight 
hours as a surveyor is as guilty of defection as an individual 
who refuses to work after lunch. Immediately after the transition 
to socialism, it will no doubt be possible to point to 
individuals who are suddenly working less hours but this 
reference point will gradually disappear.
Certain occupations are also likely to frustrate effective 
monitoring. Putting to one side the peculiarities of MIS, if it 
is possible to observe individual output - the amount actually 
produced - it may be possible to know whether an individual has 
defected. Equally, if it is possible to observe individual input 
- the effort put into work - it may also be possible to detect 
defection. Occupations in which its is possible to observe both 
input and output (production organisations) are more likely to 
sustain cooperation. Occupations in which it is impossible to 
observe either input or output (coping organisations) are less 
likely to sustain cooperation. Figure 5.6 illustrates the 
possibilities.
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Figure 5.6 Monitoring and Moral Incentives
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It may be difficult to determine how hard an entrepreneur has 
tried by observing their output. If entrepreneurship depends on 
luck (Schumpeter, 1943, 73-4), individuals may try but still
fail. It cannot be known whether an entrepreneur with an 
established record of successful ventures who suddenly loses 
large amounts of money is defecting or simply suffering from bad 
luck. The very concept of a maximum earning capacity for 
entrepreneurs is problematic. Much depends on the particular 
theory of capitalist entrepreneurship employed. Whilst Galbraith 
emphasises its predictable almost routine nature, Schumpeter 
stresses the vagaries of entrepreneurial life.
Entrepreneurship also resists the successful measuring of input. 
In other occupations, barriers are frequently physical. 
Journalism and forestry, for example, are necessarily solitary 
pursuits. The difficulties of monitoring entrepreneurial 
behaviour are cognitive rather than physical. It will be 
difficult to assess the alertness of a entrepreneur sitting at
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their desk pondering future possibilities. Entrepreneurial 
knowledge is frequently tacit, of a kind that is resistant to 
monitoring. For someone to judge that an entrepreneur has not 
tried hard enough they will need to be aware of 'obvious' 
opportunities overlooked. The only person who can monitor an 
entrepreneur is another entrepreneur and anyone who discovers an 
overlooked opportunity will in doing so raise their own maximum 
earning capacity. If they are not themselves to be vulnerable to 
accusations of defection, the monitor will have to do more than 
monitor.
To conclude, it cannot be said that cooperation within MIS is 
either intrinsically likely or unlikely. Whilst there are 
important environmental differences between capitalism and MIS, 
these differences do not in themselves make cooperation 
impossible. Much will depend upon the particular features of the 
environment within which interaction takes place. Against the 
charge that MIS is utopian, the next section will show how these 
conditions have been realised within an existing economic 
community.
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5.4 Equality, Cooperation and the Kibbutz
5.4.1 Moral Incentive Socialism and the Kibbutz
Martin Buber (1949, 2) describes the kibbutz as 'a utopia that 
did not fail' . Melford Spiro's (1972) work on kibbutzim is titled 
Kibbutz: A Venture in Utopia and Dan Leon (1969, 15) notes that 
the 'historical and spiritual sources which nourished the kibbutz 
movement in its early stages were not without certain traces of 
utopianism'. The first kibbutz, Degina, was formed in 1910. By 
1964, there were over 300 kibbutzim whose members constituted ten 
per cent of the Israeli population. From austere beginnings, 
kibbutz life has been transformed. Leon (1969, 11-12) speaks of 
development from a
tiny camp of tents, housing a handful of barefooted 
pioneers in a malaria-ridden and hostile environment, 
into the flourishing settlements with hundreds of 
members which we take for granted today.
Kibbutzim are, in many respects, an embodiment of MIS. Equality 
is the foundation of the distributive process within the kibbutz 
and members are provided with basic necessities like clothing and 
food upon demand. For purchases that reflect individual tastes, 
members are given an identical yearly allowance. Much consumption 
is collective. Housing is often communal, members are given the 
opportunity to eat together three times a day and games and 
television rooms are open to all. Where equality of income is
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abandoned, distribution is according to need rather than economic 
contribution (Rosenfield, 1983, 158).
Second, production is guided by the market. Each kibbutz is 
integrated into and competes with the rest of the Israeli 
economy. Kibbutzim do not strive for self-sufficiency. Products 
are sold in national and international markets and each kibbutz 
faces a hard budget constraint. Although all individual kibbutzim 
form part of a larger federation, few cross-subsidies occur and 
this creates a pressure to allocate resources efficiently. There 
is, for example, fierce competition between different branches 
of production for investment and skilled labour (Rayman, 1981, 
106) . In one final respect, kibbutzim appear more attractive than 
MIS in that all important decisions about the allocation of 
resources are made democratically in the General Assembly. This 
normally meets once a week and all members are entitled to speak 
and vote at it. Routine administration is undertaken by a 
Secretariat elected by members annually.
5.4.2 Selective Incentives and the Kibbutz
In Chapter Three it was argued that an important and necessary 
function of markets is to provide incentives for entrepreneurial 
discovery. The promise of spectacular prizes is necessary to 
ensure spectacular entrepreneurial success. The achievements of 
kibbutzim belie this conclusion. Cooperation is not sustained by 
formal sanctioning for poor performance (Schwarz, 1954) as the 
constitution of nearly all kibbutzim expressly forbid cutting an
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individual's allowance, of deviating from equality. Neither is 
cooperation due to the intrinsically satisfying nature of work 
on kibbutzim. If anything, the opposite applies. Most work is 
labour-intensive, manual and repetitive. General dissatisfaction 
is apparent in survey evidence which shows that only forty per 
cent of workers see their job as offering the opportunity to 
learn new skills and only forty three per cent as offering the 
opportunity to put new ideas into practise (Yuchtman, 1983, 184) . 
Finally, it is unlikely that cooperation is sustained because 
kibbutz members are moral angels, immune to the logic of rational 
choice and oblivious to the temptations of defection. Whilst 
members suggest that collective decision-making in the General 
Assembly symbolises the values of kibbutz life, one sociologist 
found that attendance at these meetings was usually less than a 
third (Bowes, 1989, 19) . Members fall victim to a collective
action problem here but not elsewhere. Why?
Members cooperate because of the presence of selective 
incentives. These are both negative and positive. Positively, 
individuals who are deemed to be good workers are rewarded with 
the promise of more interesting work. Although promotion is 
informal, all start work in the most menial of jobs and rise 
through an established hierarchy. Technically specialised posts 
are especially valued as they offer the prospect of extensive 
training - funded by the kibbutz - in one of Israel's major 
cities. A reputation as a good worker is also essential for those 
wishing to stand for an elected office in which they will enjoy 
greater authority and status (Rosenfield, 1951, Darin-Drabkin,
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1962). Negative sanctions are equally important. Indolence is 
seen as the worst kind of anti-social behaviour on the kibbutz 
and is ruthlessly punished. Poor workers are manoeuvred from one 
job to another and treated as social outcasts. Above all, any 
recalcitrant becomes the victim of kibbutz gossip, their sins 
exaggerated and extended to include all manner of social vices 
(Leon, 1969, 118, Rosenfield, 1983, 161, Bowes, 1989, 49-66).
The capacity of gossip to regulate individual behaviour and 
maintain social order has long been recognised by sociologists. 
Early accounts (Ross, 1901, Lumley, 1925) are crudely functional. 
Gossip is explained by reference to the positive effects that it 
has and it is implied that this is why it is undertaken. If 
nothing else, this explanation is unnecessarily complex. Jorg 
Bergmann (1993, 145-53) emphasises that as well as being an
effective deterrent, gossiping is itself enjoyable. It allows 
individuals to affirm their superiority over those gossiped about 
(Wikan, 1980), to disclose their access to privileged information 
and to take another person into their confidence. In the previous 
section it was briefly mentioned that cooperation frequently 
depends on the resolution of a second-order collective action 
problem: sanctions can sustain cooperation but individuals must 
also have an incentive to apply sanctions. Gossip is an effective 
sanction because it is enjoyable. There is no temptation to free 
ride and the concept can easily be given 'micro-foundations'.
Selective incentives in general and gossip in particular work 
because kibbutz life is characterised by the presence of the
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conditions identified at the end of the last section. First, 
kibbutzim are relatively small, having an average membership of 
only four hundred (Criden and Gelb (1974) . Second and largely as 
a result of their size, interaction between members is intense. 
Third, the kibbutz is a closed network. Job rotation and communal 
living ensure pervasive interdependency and although it occurs, 
interaction with individuals outside of the kibbutz is limited. 
Fourth, there is significant spill-over. Relationships are forged 
at work and sustained through friendship, marriage and communal 
living. Fifth, exit from the kibbutz although possible is costly. 
Because income - even contributions from relatives who are not 
members of the kibbutz - is shared, those leaving lack any means 
of financial support. Raised in an environment in which crime, 
isolation and unemployment are absent, exit, even for those who 
can afford it, is psychologically difficult.
All this is to say that the kibbutzim are characterised by a 
close sense of community. The word kibbutz itself is derived from 
the Hebrew word for group and the importance of a sense of 
collective identity is revealed in cultural traditions. Evenings 
often end with the 'Hora' : a circular dance in which each
participant is caught in a 'frenzied ... movement which becomes 
a sign of group unity, each dancer relying on the next for 
physical support' (Bowes, 1989, 23). Community provides the
foundation of gossip. People are interested in maligning others 
because they know who they are. By contrast,
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in the large community of the modern city, contacts in 
secondary groups tend to be impersonal, and escape 
into anonymity is possible. Under these circumstances, 
gossip and ridicule are less effective instruments 
(Ogbrun and Nimkoff, 1950, 141) .
Finally, the primarily agricultural nature of kibbutz work also 
facilitates monitoring and therefore effective sanctioning. In 
1968, eighty three per cent of kibbutz members worked in 
agriculture (Leon, 1969, 38). Inputs can be monitored as
individuals rarely work alone or in groups of more than ten. The 
harvesting of banana plantations, a staple of the kibbutz 
economy, demands that individuals work in groups of three without 
the use of any machinery (Rayman, 1981, 64) . Not only will
defection be easily spotted but it will have an immediate impact 
on the performance of the team.
Because work is predominantly un-skilled, it is also possible to 
monitor outputs. Success is not dependent upon luck. There is no 
reason why, over a day, one group should be able to pick more 
fruit than another. Work practises on the kibbutzim here deviate 
fron MIS. Individuals are sanctioned not for working at a lower 
percentage of their maximum earning capacity but for producing 
less than others. The difference is insignificant. The nature of 
the work is such that maximum earning capacities do not 
sigrificantly vary between individuals.
5.4.3 Efficiency and the Kibbutz
178
Kibbutzim show that cooperation can be sustained in the absence 
of financial incentives. Nevertheless, there are weaknesses 
inherent in the kibbutz experiment which are relevant to a 
discussion of the possibility of socialist entrepreneurship. 
Although not unimportant, three can be easily disposed of. First, 
for many individuals, close bonds of community come over time to 
be viewed as stifling. Members frequently cite a lack of privacy 
and sense of personal identity independent of the group as 
reasons for leaving the kibbutz. Gossip although enjoyed by most 
is disdained by all as divisive interference in the affairs of 
others.
Second, equality is limited to income. It should be repeated that 
status and job satisfaction are not only rationed but allocated 
by merit. Finally, economic democracy imposes economic costs. 
Individuals need to acquire permission before pursuing a 
particular project. If successful, this takes valuable time and 
if unsuccessful may result in the squandering of entrepreneurial 
talent, the efficiency implications of economic democracy will 
be more closely examined in Chapter Six.
Recognition of a more serious limitation of kibbutzim pushes us 
closer to the trade-off between efficiency and equality. The 
success of kibbutzim in the post-war years may be unsustainable. 
When first formed, kibbutzim lacked any financial resources and 
consumption was shared for practical as well as ideological
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reasons. The only way most could afford housing or television was 
to invest in communal television and housing. The successful 
application of selective incentives generated for many kibbutzim 
a significant growth in income. By the early 1960's, kibbutzim 
could afford to give each member a personal allowance, to build 
new houses in the place of communal dormitories and to purchase 
for each house a refrigerator and television (Rayman, 1981). 
Prosperity privatised consumption.
The decision to have refrigerators in each home [had] 
a major impact not only on eating patterns but on the 
community as a whole. It meant members could take out 
food from the central dining hall and keep it in their 
own units. As more and more units were built with full 
kitchenettes, including stoves, ovens and 
refrigerators, many members began eating their evening 
meals in their separate homes (Rayman, 1981, 126).
Affluence reduces contact between members, erodes the sense of 
community and reduces the efficacy of selective incentives. This 
is to suggest not that kibbutzim and by extension MIS cannot 
succeed, only that there are limits to their success. As Rayman 
(1981, 121) concludes,
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the overall process [of economic growth] is 
characterised by a significant movement away from the 
fulfilment of community-desired norms to the 
fulfilment of individually determined desires and 
needs.
At one level, kibbutzim show how the trade-off between efficiency 
and equality can be avoided through the use of non-financial 
selective incentives. But the solution here serves only to create 
a need to make trade-offs elsewhere. Whilst income is distributed 
equally within each kibbutz, income between different kibbutzim 
varies depending upon their economic success. Socialist equality 
is realised at one level but frustrated at another. It may be 
objected that inter-kibbutz as well as intra-kibbutz 
redistribution could be secured through financial subsidy and 
perhaps the judicious transfer of particularly skilled workers 
but this would risk undermining the selective incentives upon 
which efficiency depends. A constant influx of new workers would 
endanger the sense of community and subsidies would soften the 
budget constraint each kibbutz faces, encouraging defection.
The limitations of the kibbutzim are economic as well as 
political. Historically, the kibbutz economy has been 
predominantly agrarian and in the 1960's many recognised that 
profits from agriculture were limited by intense competition and 
vulnerability to crop failure. To sustain growth, a decision was 
made to develop high-technology, innovation-driven manufacturing 
industries and financial support was provided by a government
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itself set on economic 'modernization'. Many kibbutzim were 
awarded one third of their investment costs and given interest- 
free loans on the rest but in retrospect diversification was 
unsuccessful.
The main difficulty experienced was frequently that of size. 
Kibbutzim were simply too small to compete effectively on 
national let alone international markets. In documenting the 
difficulties experienced, Alison Bowes (1989, 57) comments that 
'optimum sizes, as it turned out, were larger than the kibbutz 
workforces could manage'. A report on the experience of one 
kibbutz concludes that whilst
the factory turned out high quality products ... [it 
did so] at a minimal profit. This was due, according 
to the present manager, to the fact that little 
attention was directed to the economies of production' 
(Rayman, 1981, 109).
The obvious solution in a capitalist firm, expansion, was 
inconceivable as recruitment of additional members risked 
jeopardising the sense of community and the efficacy of selective 
incentives. Instead, many kibbutzim employed workers, frequently 
Palestinian, from neighbouring towns for fixed and frequently 
derisory wages. The principle of distribution according to need 
was abandoned and equality sacrificed. Economic modernization 
entciled an 'ideological letting-go' (Rayman, 1981, 254).
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Additional problems were raised by the nature of industrial work. 
To be successful it was argued that modernization required a 
revision of work practises. Specialisation and hierarchy would 
have to be imposed and job rotation and egalitarianism 
sacrificed. But recognition of the importance of the 
entrepreneurial function cut against the need for kibbutz members 
to be able to constantly monitor each others behaviour. Kibbutz 
members were not unaware of the difficulties. Rayman (1981, 112) 
quotes one member, contemplating plant expansion, as stating that
the kibbutz veterans do not like industry. The think 
its something foreign coming and stealing from them 
their romanticism, their ideal .... they think that 
industry will change attitudes . . . the kibbutz with 
industry is not the kibbutz with agriculture.
The limits of kibbutzim and of MIS are economic and 
entrepreneurial as much as they are moral. The neo-pluralist 
model suggests that effective entrepreneurship is dependent upon 
economies of scale in organisation, finance and marketing. 
Kibbutzim cannot respond to this imperative. The new right model 
suggests that effective entrepreneurship is dependent upon a 
capacity to discover and exploit knowledge. Kibbutzim cannot 
seize opportunities that demand large-scale production without 
also undermining the foundations of their own success. Unable to 
exploit such opportunities, they will not remain alert to them. 
Ultimately, the tension between profit-seeking entrepreneurship 
and the ways of life pioneered on the kibbutzim cannot be evaded.
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It is significant that the conclusion to one study of kibbutz 
life suggests that
the idea of progress, with its emphasis on 
performance, rationality and objectivity conflicts 
with [the kibbutzim's] spirit of communality which 
rests on highly personal, intimate and fraternal modes 
of social relations (Yuchtman, 1983, 184).
5.5 Conclusion
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Many believe that it is the content of 'human nature' rather than 
the structure of social relations which determines the 
feasibility of socialism. It is argued that socialism will be 
characterised by and have as its prerequisite the emergence of 
new and morally enlightened people. Marxists look forward to the 
moment when capitalism will surmount economic scarcity and herald 
the dawn of a new and socialist era. Pessimists suggest that 
capitalism itself frustrates the very possibility of such a 
change. Peter Singer (1972, 314) argues that competitive markets 
'discourage altruism and fellow-feeling' whilst Michael Taylor 
(1987) argues that whilst many alternatives to capitalism require 
workers to engage in concerted collective action, the presence 
of the state has robbed workers of the ability to act in required 
ways.
As first presented, Carens' model of MIS conforms to this 
tradition. He too seems to see the feasibility of socialism as 
depending upon a change in human nature. It is the desire to 
acquire social duty rather than income satisfactions which 
transforms capitalism. Against such a view, this chapter has 
sought to affirm the importance of structure. Kibbutzim offer a 
environment which makes possible cooperation and the realisation 
of socialist equality. The difference is not human nature. 
Kibbutz members are not moral supermen marooned in a world of 
capitalist egoists. The difference is structure. But whilst 
kibbutzim demonstrate the importance of environment they do not
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thenselves provide an appropriate environment for socialist 
entrepreneurship. That which encourages cooperation also 
frustrates the emergence of entrepreneurship.
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6.1 Introduction
Labour Managed Firms (LMFs) have an impressive pedigree, having 
been championed by John Stuart Mill (1970), Alfred Marshall 
(1920) and George Cole (1944) . Once discarded in favour of 
central planning, LMFs are now, as Saul Estrin (1989, 165)
observes, 'very much the flavour of the month ... on the left' 
and market socialists like David Miller (1989) and Pranhab 
Bardhan and John Roemer (1993a) express particular faith in their 
capacities. The standard objection to LMFs is that they are 
economically inferior to capitalist firms: inefficient,
inflexible and unable to seize entrepreneurial opportunities. The 
failure of LMFs to displace their capitalist rivals is taken as 
further evidence of their deficiencies. Underlying these 
arguments is a belief that LMFs necessarily impair economic 
performance because they require restrictions upon the 
acquisition and transfer of ownership. Capitalist firms, it is 
implied, thrive because they place fewer 'restrictions on 
voluntary contracting by individuals' (Weisskopf, 1993, 123).
Part of this chapter is written as a defence of LMFs. It is 
argued that they offer a viable, albeit imperfect, form of 
socialist entrepreneurship. Objections to LMFs are compromised 
by their reluctance to acknowledge the limitations of capitalist 
organisation and their failure to account for the success of the 
Spanish Mondragon LMF. Having examined Mondragon's structure and 
performance, two very different explanations will be offered of 
its achievements. In the first and using the tools of new
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economic institutionalism, it is argued that it enjoys specific 
advantages over capitalist firms. Earlier eulogies to the 
market's invisible hand here give way to a discussion of the very 
'visible hand' (Chandler, 1977) of internal organisation and a 
critique of capitalism. As in the previous chapter, a qualified 
defence is followed by a discussion of the limitations of market 
socialism. Through a focus on entrepreneurial action it is argued 
that whilst Mondragon has prospered, it may have done so because 
of its position within an overwhelmingly capitalist economy.
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6.2 Political Credentials and Economic Objections
6.2.1 Distinguishing the Labour Managed Firm
The giant corporation analyzed by Galbraith and the publicly 
owned bureaucracy have very different entrepreneurial 
capabilities but have one feature in common: they are not
controlled by those who work for them. Corporations are owned by 
shareholders and public bureaucracies by the state. The LMF is 
owned by those individuals who work for it. At its simplest, a 
LMF is a firm in which 'labour hires capital rather than capital 
hiring labour (Estrin, 1983, 12). John Bonin and Louis Putterman 
(1987, 2) define such firms in the following way.
A productive enterprise the ultimate decision-making 
rights over which are held by member-workers on the 
basis of equality of those rights regardless of job, 
sill grade, or capital contribution.
Robert Oakeshott (1978, 13) draws attention to three particular 
features of LMFs. These are implicit in the above definition but 
are worth emphasising separately. First, residual profits belong 
to those who own the firm. Second, only those who work for the 
firm are entitled to ownership of it. Third, internal decision­
making within the firm is democratic. All three serve to 
distinguish the LMF from both the capitalist and publicly owned 
firm and all three imply restrictions on private ownership of 
resources.
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The democratic sovereignty of the LMF frustrates efforts at 
central planning. If LMFs are to be used, it must be within the 
context of a decentralised market economy: as a form of market 
socialism. Decisions about prices, investment and employment must 
be taken by individual firms. Each will compete to sell their 
.products and in doing so will confront a hard budget constraint. 
So as to facilitate analysis of the likely impact of replacing 
capitalist firms with LMFs, it will be assumed that the role of 
the state remains unchanged.
6.2.2 Socialism and the Labour Managed Firm
Critics accuse capitalism of democratic schizophrenia. Whilst 
political decision-making within the state is democratic, 
economic decision-making within the firm is authoritarian. 
Individuals as citizens choose representatives but as workers are 
disenfranchised. Robert Dahl (1985) argues that this is 
intolerable: that there are no substantive grounds on which
democracy can be championed in the political sphere but opposed 
in the economic one. Consequently, one reason socialists embrace 
LMFs is that they allow for - are indeed defined by - the 
extension of democracy. As Bonin and Putterman (1987, 6) argue, 
'the self-management concept embraces values of participation . . . 
that are almost universal in modern socio-political rhetoric'. 
In this respect, LMFs offer a more radical programme than MIS 
which is zealous in its pursuit of equality but in other respects 
relatively conservative.
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The capacity of LMFs to realise a second socialist value, 
equality, appears more limited. There is nothing intrinsic to the 
definition of LMFs which prevents inequalities emerging both 
between and within firms. The integration of LMFs into the market 
will ensure that successful firms prosper and unsuccessful ones 
fail and democratic decision-making allows workers to vote for 
unequal pay. Market competition may even necessitate such a 
strategy. Whilst LMFs are in this respect less 'socialist' than 
MIS this is not, for two reasons, to suggest that they will 
simply replicate the inequalities of capitalism. First, democracy 
also allows individuals to vote for greater equality. At the very 
least, it enables workers to force their superiors to justify 
preferential treatment. Second, diffusion of ownership eliminates 
an important source of capitalist inequality, unequal ownership. 
Dahl (1989, 139) suggests that LMFs significantly increase levels 
of equality.
The important point is that major inequalities in 
wealth and income in countries like the United States 
do not flow from interfirm or interindustry 
differentials. They are caused primarily by two other 
factors: a highly concentrated ownership of property 
and very large payments to top corporate executives 
whose decisions are, for all practical purposes, 
independent of all effective external controls.
Finally, as LMFs are firmly embedded within the market, they 
protect liberty. Individuals as owners are free to decide what
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to produce and who to employ; individuals as consumers are free 
to decide what to purchase and individuals as workers are free 
to decide which firm to join. One qualification should be noted. 
It is unclear from this account whether a market socialist 
economy will be one in which individuals are also free to 
establish privately owned capitalist firms and as will be seen 
presently this raises a number of difficult issues.
6.2.3 Economic Objections (1): The 'Micro' Case Against
Whether owners are scattered shareholders or individual 
entrepreneurs, capitalist firms seek to maximise profit. The 
prospect of personal gain encourages the discovery of knowledge 
and the price mechanism its subsequent communication and 
coordination. Bureaucratic inefficiency can be traced back to the 
incentive to maximise budgets rather than profits and the most 
frequently cited objection to LMFs takes a similar form. Benjamin 
Ward (1958) argues that members of LMFs will find it in their 
interest to maximise the average income of each member. As 
workers are owners and therefore derive income from profit, the 
difference, at first, may seem unimportant but Ward demonstrates 
that it is not. Because all members are entitled to an equal 
share of profit, employment decisions will be based upon not the 
marginal benefits and costs of production but upon the overall 
impact on member's income. Miller (1989, 85) offers a concise
summary of the argument.
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The capitalist ... will hire whenever marginal return 
exceeds marginal costs. If the employee can be hired 
for $50 and makes $51 profit for the enterprise he 
will be taken on. In the case of the co-operative ... 
since the new hand can only be taken on as a full 
member ... the hiring decision depends on whether the 
. profit he can create raises or lowers the existing 
schedule. Suppose for simplicity's sake ... that the 
rate currently paid is $55, then the extra worker will 
not be hired, since to do so will lower incomes all 
around.
For the same reason, it can be shown that LMFs will respond to 
a price increase not, as the competitive capitalist firm will, 
by expanding production but by laying off workers and will favour 
capital over labour intensive production (Milanovic, 1982, Bonin, 
1983) . The LMF will have a relatively inelastic supply curve 
(Putterman, 193, 133) and whilst firms may discover new
opportunities for innovation and coordination they may have no 
incentive to act upon them. Entrepreneurial discovery may be 
followed by stagnation rather than expansion.
The 'micro' case against LMFs has been vigorously challenged. 
First, Joan Robinson (1967), Jaroslav Vanek (1969) and James 
Meade (1975) argue that members are unlikely to vote to shed 
labour as by doing so they may be endangering their own jobs. 
Against this it may be noted that if firms operate a 'last-in- 
first-out policy' redundancies may still occur. Alternatively,
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the employment constraint may be realised through a reluctance 
to hire new members when older ones have retired. Second, it is 
argued that Ward's analysis holds only in the short-term, during 
a period in which only one factor of production, labour, is
variable. In the long-term and assuming freedom of entry into the 
market, the inefficiencies of any one firm will be compensated 
for by the creation of others (Vanek, 1970, Estrin, 1989, 177). 
The vision of the LMF economy becomes one of a large number of 
small firms (Meade, 1975) . This itself may represent an
additional source of inefficiency if Galbraith is right to argue 
that some smaller firms must develop into giant corporations if 
entrepreneurial potential is to be fully realised. Furthermore, 
it will be argued that it is the assumption of unfettered entry 
into the market which raises acute problems for LMFs.
6.2.4 Economic Objections (2): The 'Macro' Case Against
A second and now well worn argument against LMFs is constructed
not at the 'micro' level of the individual firm but at the 
'macro' level of the entire economy. The logic of the argument - 
which is not only compatible with but can be taken as a 
vindication of the micro analysis - is deceptively simple. 
Capitalism does not prevent individuals from starting a LMF. If 
they are either a viable or desirable organisational form it can 
be assumed that a preference for LMFs will have been revealed and 
the hegemony of capitalist firms challenged. That this has not 
happened demonstrates LMFs inferiority (Nozick, 1974, 250-3,
Jensen and Meckling, 1979, Williamson, 1980, Alchian and Demsetz,
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1986).
Proponents defend themselves from this inference in one of two 
ways. First, they deny the neutrality of capitalist competition 
and claim that either through business law (Carnoy and Shearer, 
1980), employment law (Thomas and Logan, 1982) or general
competitive practises (Hovart, 1975, 343) LMFs are discriminated 
against. Second, while conceding formal neutrality they question 
the extrapolation from the performance of individual LMFs in a 
predominantly capitalist environment to their likely performance 
in an economy where capitalist firms are the exception. It is 
argued that for market socialism to work, capitalist firms have 
to be prohibited and transformed into LMFs. This is the
'maximalist' strategy adhered to by, for example, Miller (1989, 
92-3) .
What creates difficulties for co-operatives is not 
producing for a market itself, but producing in
competition with capitalist enterprises ... co­
operatives operating in a capitalist environment may 
be 'unsuccessful' but a market economy made up
entirely of co-operatives can be stable and efficient.
The maximalists agree that LMFs do not compete on a level playing 
field but add that LMFs generate positive externalities from 
which the broader economy but not the individual firm benefits. 
LMFs may not survive in a capitalist economy but are a more 
'socially' efficient form of organisation. In this way, Peter Jay
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(1980, 20) argues that LMFs are to be favoured as they forestall 
industrial conflict but that 'there is no private advantage from 
behaving in the jungle as if the rule of law applied' . Dahl 
(1985, 95) argues that participation within the LMF will
encourage more responsible and intelligent citizenship but that 
the benefits will be imperceptible when LMFs are in a minority 
and David Levine (1993) claims that the very inflexibility of 
LMFs - documented by Ward - will have the positive effect of 
stabilising demand within the macro economy.
Two reservations can be expressed about the maximalist's case. 
First, it demands that voters take a major risk when voting for 
a socialist party committed to the extension of LMFs. It may well 
be true that difficulties will disappear when there are no 
capitalist firms against which LMFs have to (unfairly) compete 
but this argument will have to contend against evidence of the 
repeated failure of LMFs within the capitalist economy. Second, 
the argument discounts the possibility - pursued presently - that 
LMFs actually benefit from their co-existence with capitalist 
firms.
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6.3 Mondragon
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6.3.1 The Significance of Mondragon
The arguments of the previous section are levelled against all 
LMFs. None will succeed because all are subject to allocative 
inefficiencies. An alternative position is that LMFs have failed 
not because of their inherent defects but because of the 
inappropriate design of individual firms (Estrin, 1989, 172). If 
correct, the argument can be used to sustain a strategy of 
'minimalism'; the gradual displacement of capitalist firms by 
LMFs (Oakeshott, 1980, 46) . This overcomes one of the primary 
objections to the maximalist position. The key requirement of 
this strategy, as Oakeshott (1980, 47) recognises, is that 'we 
should be able to point to a ... class of actual, and robustly 
prospering, co-operatives'. For some time, this is as far as the 
minimalists could proceed. They had identified the problem but 
not a solution: an organisational form which could vindicate
their hopes. Eventually and to a chorus of academic approval, the 
answer was found in Spain's Mondragon group. The esteem with 
which this project is held is obvious in the following extracts 
from, respectively, the introduction and conclusion to one study.
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A fascinating example of success in a form of 
organization for which failure is the general rule.
The story of Mondragon is the most impressive 
refutation of the widely held belief that worker 
cooperatives have little capacity for economic growth 
and long-term survival (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 3)
The striking economic success of Mondragon has 
conveyed worldwide the message that a worker 
cooperative need no longer be considered simply a 
utopian ideal (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 282).
For the same reasons that the failure of LMFs was taken as 
confirming their inherent inferiority, the success of Mondragon 
throws into doubt the analysis of critics like Ward. Mondragon 
allows socialists to refute claims that LMFs are simply utopian, 
'the pious dream of ... impractical other-worldly philosophers' 
(Zirakzadeh, 1980, 117).
6.3.2 Mondragon: Economic and Social Structure
Mondragon is the name of a small town in the Basque. The first 
Mondragon LMF, ULGOR, was formed in 1956 and the Mondragon group 
is now composed of over one hundred firms which, in 1990, 
employed over 19,000 members (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 3). Within 
both the group and the academic literature on it, a distinction 
is normally drawn between 'first level' firms engaged in the 
actual production of goods and 'second level' firms that provide
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a series of support services, including housing projects, hotels, 
technical schools, a supermarket chain and a bank.
All those who work for a Mondragon firm are members of it and 
membership is restricted to those who work for a firm.1 When 
accepted, new members have to make a capital contribution to the 
firm equivalent to around a years wage. Members are paid a 
regular wage but as all are owners, the capacity of the firm to 
do so depends upon the capture of profit. Any remaining profits 
minus interest payments and depreciation costs are allocated to 
two collective and one individual account. The first collective 
account, the Social Fund, is used to promote local development 
and by Spanish law must amount to at least ten per cent of total 
profit. The second collective account, the Reserve Fund, is used 
as an economic bulwark against recession and now claims fifty per 
cent of total profit. Remaining funds are placed in member's 
individual accounts where they accrue interest. Since 1966, 
individual accounts are redeemed upon a member's retirement and 
are not used as a wage bonus (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 42) . Any 
losses sustained by the firm which cannot be covered through 
borrowing or the reserve fund are deducted from member's 
individual accounts.
1 Two qualifications must be noted. First, Mondragon rules 
have recently been changed to allow for the temporary employment 
of contract workers if no existing member has the necessary 
skills for a particular project. No more than ten per cent of a 
firm's workforce can be employed on such terms and in practise, 
few employ more than a handful (Whyte & Whyte, 1991, 225) .
Second, the ownership of second level firms is normally divided 
between actual employees and representatives from selected first 
level firms. It remains the case that ownership cannot be 
dispersed among individuals who do not work for Mondragon.
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Mondragon embodies many of the advantages of LMFs identified 
earlier. The sovereign decision-making body within each firm is 
the General Assembly which meets at least once a year and at 
which all members are expected to attend and vote on the basis 
of one member one vote. The General Assembly elects individual 
members to serve on the Junta Rectora. This is equivalent to a 
board of directors and authorises day-to-day decision-making; 
appointing and monitoring the LMFs managerial team. Finally, each 
firm elects members to a Social Council which represents the 
interest's of individuals as workers to the Junta Rectora and 
which has a right to be consulted on any matter directly 
affecting worker's welfare.
One of the key values of Mondragon is equality between workers 
(Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 273) . Equality is promoted in three ways. 
First, residual profits are distributed equally between 
individual accounts. Second, each firm has imposed a pay policy 
such that the most highly paid worker cannot be paid six times 
more than the lowest paid one. Until 1987, the ratio was even 
stricter at three to one. Finally, there is considerable 
redistribution between firms within the Mondragon group. ULGOR, 
still the largest single firm, pools all of its profits, most 
around sixty per cent.
%
6.3.3 Mondracron: Economic Performance
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The most obvious proof of Mondragon's success is its survival. 
In their survey, Keith Bradley and Alan Gelb (1983, 2) go further 
and argue that 'from virtually every perspective, it [Mondragon] 
appears to have outperformed the local capitalist environment'. 
Just two criteria will be considered to illustrate their claim. 
First, profitability. Gross value added (GVA) profits for the 
first level firms in the first years of the group were buoyant. 
Since then and as the world has slipped into recession, profits 
have fallen but as Figure 6.1 shows have remained well above 
those of capitalist firms in related industries located in the 
same administrative area (Guipuzcoan).
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Figure 6.1 Mondragon Industrial Profit
perccn tages
68 69 77
— Pure surplus/GVA in cooperatives
— Pure surplus/sales in cooperatives
— Pure surplus/G VA  in Guipu7.coan industry  
Pure surplus/sales in Guipuzcoan industry
Source: Thomas and Logan (1982), 111
Second and despite Ward's expectations, profit has facilitated 
employment expansion. Detailed figures are given in Table 6.1 for 
the period between 1960 and 1978. Since then, standards have been 
maintained, between 197 6-86, Mondragon created an additional 
4,2 00 jobs at a time when unemployment in the Basque as a whole 
rose by over 150,000 (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 204) .
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Table 6.1 Mondragon's Employment Creation in First 
Level Firms
Year Total
Employment
Total Number 
of Firms
1960 395 8
1962 807 16
1964 2620 27
1966 4202 31
1968 6418 38
1970 8570 40
1972 10329 44
1974 1263 46
1976 13493 57
1978 14676 66
Source: Thomas and Logan (1982), 46-7)
The conclusion that Mondragon has performed well and that this 
gives some hope for the minimalist's cause requires little 
further justification. The interesting question rarely pursued 
in any detail by the various studies of Mondragon is why it has 
performed so well. Minimalists argue that Mondragon has 
'discovered' the right structure but it is not clear what makes 
the structure right. Alongside a more detailed examination of the 
mechanics of the Mondragon group, the next section offers a 
theoretical explanation of its success.
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6.4 Mondragon: A Transactions Costs Approach
6.4.1 New Economic Institutionalism
In Chapter Three it was argued that decentralised competitive 
markets offer a suitable environment for entrepreneurial action. 
But within capitalist systems, many economic actions are governed 
by and take place within hierarchical firms. The difference 
between the two is emphasised by Ronald Coase (1986, 73) .
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, 
which is coordinated through a series of exchange 
transactions on the market, within a firm, these 
market transactions are eliminated.
Markets are characterised by the voluntary exchange of resources. 
Hierarchies exist when one individual is given the authority to 
direct the actions of another (Kreps, 1990, 113, Miller, 1992, 
16) . Although it has already been argued that hierarchical 
organisations still operate within a market environment, it 
nonetheless appear that the capitalist entrepreneurship which 
socialism must seek to emulate is characterised by both the 
'nomos' of the market and the 'taxis' of organisation.
The emergence of hierarchy can be explained in a number of ways. 
Harry Braverman (1974) and Stephen Marglin (1976) emphasise the 
capacity of hierarchy to secure for the capitalist entrepreneur 
a stream of profit. Galbraith suggests the importance of
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economies of scale. Giant corporations are more able to 
manipulate government policy, to sustain losses and to finance 
investment from internal profits. However the transaction costs 
of economic activity are also important. Transaction costs, which 
Kenneth Arrow (quoted in Williamson, 1985, 18) describes as the 
'economic equivalent of friction in a physical system', are 
pervasive and include
the costs of deciding, planning, arranging, and 
negotiating the actions to be taken and the terms of 
exchange when two or more parties do business; the 
costs of changing plans, renegotiating terms, and 
resolving disputes as changing circumstances require; 
and the costs of ensuring that parties perform as 
agreed. Transaction costs also include any losses 
resulting from inefficient group decisions, plans, 
arrangements or agreements; inefficient responses to 
changing circumstances; and imperfect enforcement of 
agreements (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 60-1) .
The language of transaction cost economics is unfamiliar but 
compatible with earlier analysis. The struggle for cooperation 
within MIS can, for example, be viewed in these terms. As a 
kibbutz grows, the (transaction) costs of enforcing selective 
incentives and monitoring behaviour increase and efficiency is 
reduced. As Keith Dowding (1994b) argues, new institutionalism - 
and certainly its economic rather than sociological variant - is 
compatible with rational choice. The actors in transaction costs
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models are still individuals and are assumed to be the bearer of 
preferences which they seek to realise. These are the 'core' 
assumptions of rational choice. In addition, the claim of 
opportunistic motivation which Oliver Williamson (1985, 47)
defines as 'self-interest with guile' poses no difficulties for 
the more general assumption of egoism. The additional assumptions 
of bounded rationality and radical uncertainty distinguish new 
economic institutionalism from neo-classical economics but this 
represents no sacrifice as the value of neo-classical economics 
to the study of entrepreneurship has already been challenged.
In particular circumstances, markets exacerbate and hierarchies 
minimise transaction costs. When this occurs, efficiency is 
maximised when economic activity occurs within the latter. Three 
examples throw into doubt Hayek's earlier defence of the market. 
First, precisely because exchange is voluntaristic, markets may 
encourage individuals to exploit each other. A standard example 
is that of the relationship between General Motors and a smaller 
firm, Fisher Body (Miller, 1992, 52-55). Dependent upon the
supply of automobile shells, General Motor offered Fisher body 
the opportunity to specialise in production for them and over 
time both became unduly dependent on the actions of the other. 
If General Motors threatened to change supplier, Fisher Body 
would have been bankrupted. If Fisher Body threatened to raise 
prices, General Motors would have had little choice but to 
acquiesce if production were not to be halted. Each experienced 
the dangers of asset specificity. In these circumstances, markets 
will be unstable and the fear of exploitation might lead to
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entrepreneurial discoveries being shunned. The solution here was 
to integrate Fisher Body into General Motors, giving them shared 
rather than conflicting interests; replacing market with 
hierarchy.
Second, the information which markets most readily expose 
entrepreneurs to is price. In circumstances where, for example, 
the quality of a product is certain, price may provide a 
sufficient foundation for successful exchange and subsequent 
entrepreneurial coordination. On other occasions, prices may not 
'qualify as sufficient statistics' (Williamson, 1975, 5). In
itself, for example, price may not indicate the commitment of one 
party to remain responsible for the long-term servicing of a 
product. More generally, prices do not always capture and reflect 
tacit entrepreneurial knowledge. Again, this deficiency may 
expose individuals to exploitation and threaten exchanges which 
enhance efficiency. Hierarchy is superior to markets because it 
allows a manger to force an employee to reveal detailed - and 
perhaps, for the employee undesirable - knowledge. Hierarchy also 
reduces incentives for opportunism. An employee can't always 
benefit from deceiving their employer in the same way that 
entrepreneurs can gain from misleading consumers or rivals. 
Whilst within a hierarchy profits are shared and interests 
converge, in a market profits are divided and interests diverge.
Third, entrepreneurs in a market have an incentive to bargain 
over price. Having (i) abandoned the assumptions of neo-classical 
economics, and (ii) defined entrepreneurship partly in terms of
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the coordination of prices, it cannot be assumed that 
entrepreneurs are simply price-takers. Bargaining requires the 
expenditure of time and resources as entrepreneurs endeavour to 
discover other's preferences and establish reputations for 
toughness. Possible gains from trade may be dissipated. Within 
a hierarchy, such costs can be foregone. One individual can 
either set the price at which exchange will take place or simply 
demand the transfer of resources. Austrian accounts of market 
behaviour simply discount the existence of such costs and 
consequently exaggerate the efficacy of markets.
If one implication of new institutional economics is that 
hierarchies may displace markets, another is that firms whose 
internal structures are better able to minimise transaction costs 
will be more efficient. The comparisons encouraged by new 
economic institutionalism are not just between markets and 
hierarchies but between different kinds of hierarchies.
[J]ust as market structure matters in assessing the 
efficacy of trades in the marketplace, so likewise 
does internal structure matter in assessing internal 
organization (Williamson, 1975, 9).
In the rest of this section, a transaction cost comparison will 
be undertaken between capitalist firms and LMFs. It will be 
argued that in several respects, LMFs are better able to reduce 
transaction costs.
6.4.2 Monitoring and the Labour Managed Firm
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An individual entrepreneur who bears the entire risk of their 
action has every reason to maximise effort in an attempt to 
maximise profit. For the technocratic entrepreneurs identified 
by Galbraith and the ordinary employees of a firm, the 
relationship between effort and reward is less clear. Workers may 
have an incentive to shirk in the same way as individuals have 
under MIS. Firms attempt to control shirking through mechanisms 
of vertical control imposed on employees by employers. Behaviour 
is monitored and selective incentives whether positive - bonus 
payments and promotion - or negative - dismissal - applied.2
Vertical control is imperfect. For three reasons capitalist firms 
can reduce but not eliminate transaction costs. First, resources 
devoted to monitoring are themselves a cost. Second, the cost of 
monitoring also makes it unlikely that entrepreneurs will attempt 
to completely eliminate shirking as it will only make economic 
sense to devote resources to vertical control up to the point 
where the marginal benefit of doing so is equal to the marginal 
cost (Ben-Ner, 1987). Third, to deter shirking the entrepreneur 
may find it necessary to pay 'efficiency wages' set above market 
rates (Van Parijs, 1995, 89-132). Again, there is an
entrepreneurial opportunity cost. Money spent on higher wages 
cannot be spent on research and development into new products.
2 Alchian and Demsetz (1972) define the entrepreneurial 
function precisely in these terms.
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It is frequently claimed that one advantage of LMFs is their 
capacity to reduce, if not eliminate, shirking and therefore to 
preserve resources (Marshall, 1920, 225, Vanek, 1970, 233-54,
Oakeshott, 1978, 5, Ireland and Law, 1982, 121, Bradley and Gelb, 
1983, 47, Bowles and Gintis, 1993, 28). LMFs can employ the same 
vertical control mechanisms as capitalist firms. Within 
Mondragon, discipline is maintained through written warnings, 
fines, deductions from individual capital accounts and, 
eventually, expulsion (Bradley and Gelb, 1983, 18-19). Within the 
LMF vertical control may be more effective as the capitalist firm 
does not have the same range of punishments open to it precisely 
because workers are not owners and therefore can lose only their 
wage.
In addition, LMFs allow for the emergence of 'horizontal 
control' . Because the profits of each depend upon the performance 
of all, members have an incentive to themselves discipline 
shirkers. No foreman has to be employed and transaction costs are 
reduced. The efficacy of horizontal control will depend upon the 
resolution of a second-order collective action problem. Workers 
have an interest in applying selective incentives but may prefer 
another worker to do it. In Chapter Five it was argued that small 
size will facilitate sanctioning and this may offer a partial 
explanation of why Mondragon firms are rarely allowed to grow 
beyond 500 members before being fragmented into separate firms 
(Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 277). For now, it can be noted that the 
available evidence is that monitoring is effective within the 
Mondragon group. Absenteeism, for example, is only half the rate
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of that in comparable capitalist firms (Thomas and Logan, 1982, 
51). As well as being more efficient than capitalist firms, LMFs 
are superior to MIS. Whilst within the kibbutz 'horizontal 
control' is exercised, 'vertical control' is limited as income 
must be distributed equally. This need not mean that LMFs will 
be more unequal than Kibbutzim as the very possibility of 
exercising vertical control may deter shirking.
6.4.3 Human Capital and the Labour Managed Firm
The problems posed by asset specificity apply not only to 
relationships between firms but also to those between 
individuals. Transaction costs exist within hierarchies as well 
as within markets. If a firm hires an individual and over a 
period of time and at considerable cost trains them to perform 
a specific function they will acquire 'non-trivial information 
advantages' (Williamson, 1975, 34). The specific assets that
employees acquire may encourage them to either demand wage 
increases or defect to a rival. Fearing exploitation, employers 
may have either to reduce their investment in training or prevent 
the initial emergence of asset specificity by training several 
individuals to perform the same function. Each strategy has 
efficiency implications.
Within Mondragon, such costs are minimised as exit from the firm 
carries a higher cost for the individual. It has been noted that 
since 1966 individual accounts are only paid out upon retirement. 
If the member leaves before then, the firm is not legally obliged
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to transfer the assets. In cases where an individual leaves 
because of family commitments or sickness, the Junta Rectora will 
countenance payment but if an individual simply leaves to join 
or create a capitalist firm it will not. In the Kibbutz, the 
barrier to exit which preserves membership and efficiency is 
psychological; the fear of the unknown. Within the LMF, the 
barrier is financial. Firms have more incentive to invest in 
human capital and less reason to pay efficiency wages which do 
not reflect the productivity of a member. Asset specificity 
remains but poses less of a problem.
6.4.4 Labour Conflict and the Labour Managed Firm
Recognition of the importance of asset specificity has been used 
to demonstrate employers vulnerability to employees but employees 
are also vulnerable to employers. Employees acquire skills which 
may be of little value to other companies and face owners whose 
interests may be to maximise their own income by minimising 
wages. Historically, workers have protected themselves through 
trade unions and an insistence upon collective bargaining. This 
development altered the balance of power between employees and 
employers but did not eliminate the conflict of interest.
Adam Przeworski (1985, 132-69) offers a more positive
interpretation. In certain circumstances, workers will maximise 
utility by eschewing wage militancy; protecting profits and 
facilitating investment upon which future profit and wage levels 
depend. As Przeworski (1985, 139) concludes, the 'current
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realization of material interests of capitalists is a necessary 
condition for the future realization of material interests of any 
group under capitalism'. Workers have an interest in bread today 
so as to be able to eat jam tomorrow. The relationship is 
potentially positive rather than zero sum. As Przeworski (1985, 
164) observes, 'crises of capitalism are in no one's interest'. 
The solution remains imperfect as parties will have to waste 
resources bargaining over the precise division of profits whilst 
eventual agreement will be hindered by uncertainty about future 
profit and by a fear that employers will renege upon any deal. 
Rapid turnover in either the workforce or management may mean 
that future gains are heavily discounted. These all represent 
considerable transaction costs. Furthermore and at great economic 
cost, cooperation does break down in many capitalist firms and 
productive efficiency is impaired not only by strikes but by 
employers attempts to protect themselves from the impact of 
strikes by increasing the use of capital.
Relative to capitalist firms, LMFs are able to minimise these 
costs (Jay, 1980) . In one sense, the possibility of conflict 
between employees and employers is simply erased as all are 
simultaneously both members and owners. Members together decide 
upon pay and investment levels. There is no need for parties to 
build a reputation for tough bargaining, to fear exploitation or 
to be tempted by the prospect of exploiting another. Within 
Mondragon, strikes are not allowed as they are considered by 
members to be 'in contradiction with the cooperative 
arrangements' (Oakeshott, 1978, 196).
6.4.5 Investment, Support and the Labour Managed Firm
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Inadequate access to capital is frequently cited as a serious 
limitation of LMFs (Estrin, 1989, 179-82). There are three 
strands to the standard argument. First, LMFs are held to expose 
workers to excessive risks. Saving is enforced through individual 
capital contributions and instead of being diversified is 
concentrated in only one enterprise (Neuberger and James, 1973, 
262, Meade, 1975, 420) . Because the costs of saving are higher 
there will be a reluctance to save and a preference among members 
for consumption. If LMFs depend upon internal finance, their 
structure has the effect of starving them of necessary resources.
Second, it is claimed that this failing will be exacerbated by 
the reluctance of older members within the LMF to use profits for 
investment as they will know that profits may not be realised 
until after their retirement and consequently not be reflected 
in their capital account. Older members will find it in their 
interest to vote against ambitious investment plans. The conflict 
within LMFs, it is implied, is not between employees and 
employers but between younger and older members (Furbuton, 1976, 
Meade, 1980, 92, Miller, 1989, 84-7). The capitalist entrepreneur 
will face a different set of incentives as the value of any 
investment (whether yet realised or not) is reflected in the 
price they will be able to sell their enterprise for.
For these reasons it is suggested that LMFs will have to rely 
upon external finance. The third criticism is that the nature of
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their borrowing requirements will further impede efficiency. 
Money raised by the LMF will have to be debt rather than equity 
as only workers are allowed to own the firm. This has two costs. 
First, lenders may be more reluctant to commit funds over which 
they will be unable to exercise any control. LMFs will be able 
to borrow but will have to pay a higher rate of interest and the 
opportunity cost of this will be investment in entrepreneurial 
coordination and innovation. Second, debt finance precludes 
takeovers from occurring. Henry Manne (1986), Eugene Farma (1986) 
and Michael Jensen (1989) argue that this mechanism ensures the 
efficiency of the capitalist firm as it allows managerial 
performance to monitored by other firms. Consider the likely 
response to a decline in the performance of a capitalist firm 
reflected in its share price. Because exit is easy for disparate 
shareholders, it is unlikely that voice will be used to 
discipline managers (Hirschman, 1970) but this lack of commitment 
encourages takeover bids. If a rival entrepreneur concludes that 
a falling share price reflects avoidable inefficiency they may 
calculate that by buying at the lower price they will be able to 
capture a profit through subsequent recovery. Takeovers are a 
form of entrepreneurial coordination through which the price of 
a product - in this case the firm - is brought into line with its 
'proper' value. By preventing takeovers, the ownership structure 
of the LMF offers no protection against inefficient management.
There are three problems with this account. As the alleged 
capital efficiency of capitalist firms is important not only to 
the comparison with LMFs specifically but to the comparison
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between capitalism and socialism generally they will be examined 
in some detail. First, proponents exaggerate the efficacy of the 
takeover mechanism and consequently the defects of LMFs. As 
Thrainn Eggertsson (1990, 13 8) recognises, takeovers entail
considerable transaction costs. Entrepreneurial resources have 
to be employed to manage the takeover, lawyers and management 
consultants fees have to be paid and hostile takeover bids will 
frequently fail.
Second and as Williamson (1975, 142) argues, uncertainty will
further complicate the process. Firms considering a takeover will 
lack detailed knowledge about their rival. Changes in share price 
will impart some information but the firm will not know and the 
takeover target will be reluctant to reveal the detailed 
information necessary to judge whether decline is reversible. 
Problems of adverse selection again demonstrate the limited 
capacity of markets to communicate detailed let alone tacit 
knowledge when interests conflict.
Third, takeovers will be complicated by the existence of a 
collective action problem among shareholders. Each will hope that 
others sell their shares to a superior management team and that 
the price of their own shares will therefore appreciate. Because 
each will be tempted to free ride, inefficiency may be preserved 
(Gorfman and Hart, 1980). Finally, inefficient management teams 
can easily protect themselves from takeovers through the use of 
supermajority amendments (Williamson, 1975, 160-1).
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It has been found that the average rise in stock price following 
a takeover is between eight and thirty per cent (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983). Can we conclude from this that takeovers work? 
Without knowing whether and to what extent the prices of other 
firms would appreciate if taken over we cannot. The costs and 
difficulties of takeovers may be such that the market has no 
choice but to tolerate inefficiencies of less than eight per 
cent.
Second, even if the takeover mechanism works, it does not follow 
that entrepreneurial efficiency is necessarily enhanced. Whether 
they are individuals or institutional groups, shareholders 
heavily discount the value of future streams of income (Miles, 
1993). To appease shareholders and deter takeovers, it is 
necessary for firms to zealously pursue short-term profit 
(Hutton, 1996). The more effectively the takeover mechanism 
works, the less likely it is that firms will be able to engage 
in long-term investment: to finance the development of innovative 
but risky products. To retain shareholder support, firms may have 
to eschew uncertain investments and ignore entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Furthermore, precisely because exit is easy and 
ownership diluted through the diversification of risk, few 
shareholders have any substantive commitment to the health of a 
firm. If share price declines following the failure of a 
particular project, a firm may become trapped in a vicious circle 
in which price continues to decline, denying to the firm the 
resources necessary to initiate reform. Finally, the desire to 
minimise risk will encourage investment in firms with established
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reputations for success. New firms about which little will be 
known by the market will have to pay premium interest rates and 
the process of creative destruction will be retarded. All this 
is to suggest that the high levels of entrepreneurial failure 
associated with capitalism may be due not simply to the inherent 
risks of entrepreneurial activity but to the inadequacies of the 
financial system which supports entrepreneurial firms.
The third problem with this account of the efficacy of takeovers 
is that it does not reflect the experience of Mondragon. The 
profitability and growth of these firms suggests that they cannot 
have been starved of investment. Henk Thomas and Chris Logan 
(1982, 104) report that a comparison of gross investment with
comparable private firms in the area shows that Mondragon 
invests, on average, four times as much. Individual capital 
contributions, sustained profitability and a climate of 
industrial relations which encourages long-term planning can be 
used to explain this success but studies often emphasise the role 
of the Caja Laboural Popular (CLP): Mondragon's own bank. This 
is a second level firm, owned jointly by its own members and by 
the members of other firms, which lends money exclusively to 
other Mondragon firms and receives money from (i) interest on 
these loans, (ii) interest on the reserve funds which firms have 
to deposit with the bank, (iii) commissions on banking 
transactions, and (iv) savings accounts held by individual 
members.
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The champions of capitalism will argue that the CLP's structure 
and operations threaten the efficiency of Mondragon firms. First, 
joint ownership appears to encourage a conflict of interest. 
Firms may look to soften a hard budget-constraint through 
borrowing from a firm which because they own it cannot refuse 
their applications. Second, by lending exclusively to the still 
limited number of Mondragon firms, the CLP seems to be exposing 
itself to excessive risks. But it is precisely these 
'deficiencies' that enhance performance.
First, joint ownership and the impossibility of takeovers 
encourages long-term investment. Second, joint ownership means 
that Mondragon firms have reason to be more open in their 
dealings with the bank. There will be less reason to guard and 
distort information for fear of a bank demanding repayment of any 
debts. Hierarchy is more efficient than markets. Within 
Mondragon, the communication of tacit knowledge is encouraged by 
the regular exchange of personnel. CLP executives are likely to 
have worked in the firm they are responsible for lending to and 
will be more aware of its position. The dangers of imprudent 
borrowing are also reduced by joint ownership as an investment 
proposal by any one firm will have to be authorised not only by 
the CLP's own directors but by other firms represented on the 
board of control. They will be unlikely to tolerate borrowing 
which will place their own resources in jeopardy.
The concentrated risk embraced by the CLP also facilitates 
entrepreneurial action. As the bank cannot afford a large number
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of first level firms to fail, it has an incentive to do more than 
a capitalist bank to ensure their success. Only one Mondragon 
firm, a fishing cooperative, COPESCA, has ever been bankrupted 
and
the record of starting over one hundred firms, 
including some of the largest producers in Spain, in 
the last 25 years with only one failure must be seen 
as a quantum leap over the quality and type of 
entrepreneurship represented in America where 80 to 90 
percent of all new small businesses fail within five 
years (quoted Dahl, 1985, 158).
Support is provided by the CLP's Entrepreneurial Division. When 
either the CLP perceives or a Mondragon firm first reports 
financial difficulties, it is obliged by its charter of contract 
with the bank to draw up a detailed recovery programme. If 
necessary, the CLP, acting upon the Entrepreneurial Division's 
advice, will suspend interest payments, offer new credit and 
occasionally engineer a change in management personnel. Because 
the bank is jointly owned and because risks are concentrated, the 
option of exit is never exercised. In one case, when no other 
viable solution could be found, the CLP even provided the finance 
to build a new production line for a entirely different product 
(Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 75).
When a new firm is established, the Entrepreneurial Division will 
appoint an experienced 'godfather' to work with within the firm
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until such time as it begins to record a profit. The wages of the 
founding members will be paid for by the bank for eighteen 
months, training programmes provided and interest payments 
waived. The CLP's commitment to new firms is such that in 1979 
per capita investment in Mondragon's smallest firms was three 
times the size of that in established ones (Thomas and Logan, 
1982, 120) . The intention of the CLP, articulated here by a
senior bank official, is to
back up the first and necessarily difficult steps of 
the setting up of new industrial co-operatives . . . 
money buys time, corrects defects and mistakes and, in 
difficult circumstances helps survival, just as in 
favourable ones it aids development (Campbell, Keen 
and Oakeshott, 1978, 7-8).
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6.5 The Limits of Growth
6.5.1 Minimalism, Maximalism and Mondragon
The success of the Mondragon group is sufficient to cast doubt 
upon some of the more bellicose objections to LMFs. But 
minimalists claim that Mondragon is more than an exception to a 
general rule of failure and that Mondragon offers a method of 
organization which can be easily exported.
Mondragon spans a unique divide in that it is able to 
suggest solutions to pressing problems in both 
industrialized and developing countries (Bradley and 
Gelb, 1983, 82).
The approach adopted in the last section was designed to further 
the minimalist's cause. Transaction costs are a pervasive feature 
of economic life and capitalist firms - all capitalist firms - 
are in some respects less able to minimise transaction costs. 
Here, the minimalist argument takes on the universal claims 
previously associated with only critics of LMFs and maximalist 
advocates.
A weak link in the argument remains. If LMFs like Mondragon are 
so efficient why have they not already displaced capitalist 
firms? Williamson (1975, 132-5) may be right to argue that
organisational innovations like the multi-divisional structure 
diffuse slowly but it is now nearly forty years since ULGOR was
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founded and despite academic propagation, there is no evidence 
that LMFs are threatening the position of the capitalist firm. 
Maximalist's argue that LMFs (despite their innate superiority) 
are not allowed to compete fairly with capitalist firms but if 
so, Mondragon's own success must then be explained.
This section offers a very different account of Mondragon's 
record, one which throws doubts upon the strength of both the 
maximalist's and minimalist's arguments. Mondragon's performance 
can be explained by its particular and parochial advantages 
rather than the universal superiority of LMFs and this suggests 
that Mondragon cannot easily be exported. First, unique features 
of Mondragon's environment sustains its success and, second, 
Mondragon benefits from its location within a predominantly 
capitalist economy. The maximalist argument is turned upon its 
head. It is not possible to extrapolate from the performance of 
one LMF in a predominantly capitalist environment the likely 
performance of LMFs in a economy in which capitalist firms are 
the exception rather than the rule.
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6.5.2 Political Entrepreneurship: Employment, Pay and Inception
if a regional planner had been asked at the end of the 
Civil War to select the future site of the most 
important industrial complex in the Basque country, 
Mondragon would have seemed like one of the most 
unlikely choices (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 25).
Such claims are gist to the minimalist's mill. If an industrial 
LMF could work here, we are invited to conclude, they can work 
anywhere. But in many ways, Mondragon offers distinct advantages 
for the creation of an LMF. First, the area generally and the 
town of Mondragon particularly, has a long history of industrial 
production and a highly skilled workforce (Thomas and Logan, 
1982, 21). Second, Mondragon has an established tradition of
cooperative ventures stretching back to the Basque guilds of the 
sixteenth century. A consumer cooperative was established in 
Mondragon in 1884 and before the Civil War, political parties and 
the Catholic Church all offered financial support to other 
projects (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 18). Mondragon's founders were 
able to apply knowledge generated by these experiments. Third and 
most significantly, Mondragon has a long history of nationalist 
fervour and political activism. Mondragon was the first town in 
the Basque to volunteer soldiers to fight in the Civil War 
(Oakeshott, 1978, 78) and the Basque language, Euskera, which is 
spoken by only twenty five per cent of the population in the 
Basque is spoken by over fifty six per cent in Mondragon.
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This culture, history and political tradition was threatened by
Franco in the years after the Civil War. Trade unions were
banned, political representation repressed and the speaking of 
Euskera banned. The creation of a LMF was one of the few ways of 
displaying political autonomy and of protecting an egalitarian 
culture. A prominent minimalist, Oakeshott (1978, 172-3),
concedes that
it would be hard to deny that the peculiar and
particularly repressive conditions which prevailed in 
Mondragon after the Civil War contributed to the
possibility of this outcome ... if Franco's
authorities had allowed popular opinion to express
itself in more normal ways .. there would have been no 
ULGOR, no Caja Laboural Popular, and no group of
prosperous and dynamic cooperative enterprises (1978, 
172-3) .
Mondragon is as much a political enterprise as it is a economic 
one. It is sustained by a existing belief among members in 
equality and democracy and it is this ideology which allows 
Mondragon to prosper despite the inadequacies of LMFs.
Marshall (1925, 305) and Mill (1970, 792-3) argue that LMFs fail 
because they are unable to recognise and adequately reward
entrepreneurial and managerial talent. This is a specific 
application of a general argument introduced in Chapter Three: 
markets are necessary not only to coordinate resource allocation
but to provide incentives. Within Mondragon, strict pay 
differentials mean that unskilled members are paid more than they 
would be in capitalist firms and skilled workers and managers 
less. One study in 1986 found that most senior grades would be 
able to secure between eighteen and forty per cent pay increases 
if they defected to a capitalist firm (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 
217) . The Chief Executive of FAGOR, one of the largest firms 
within the Mondragon group, is paid less than half of the wage 
of a comparable capitalist manager. But Mondragon has experienced 
few problems in recruiting and retaining talented individuals and 
it may be that this is because income is not the primary 
motivation. In their survey of member attitudes, Bradley and Gelb 
(1983, 69) found that if offered a fifty per cent rise in a
capitalist firm, only a quarter of workers in Mondragon firms 
would even consider moving.3 Members may simply be trading-off 
wages against job security but for accomplished senior managers, 
unemployment is unlikely. The possibility that members are 
trading-off wages against their political preferences for working 
in a LMF in which pay is more egalitarian and decision-making 
democratic has to be considered. As a organisational form, 
Mondragon does not have to eliminate the trade-off between 
efficiency and equality: members already possess the values which 
models of socialist entrepreneurship are trying to realise.
Political beliefs may also sustain the programme of employment 
expansion. This 'open door' policy has been described as 'one of
3 Among capitalist firms, the figure was just over half. It 
was made clear to respondents that in moving they would also be 
compensated for any loss in their individual accounts.
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the few major ideological commitments of the Mondragon group' 
(Oakeshott, 1978, 194). As expansion is not always in members
narrow self-interest (6.2.3), the 'open door' policy may show 
that members are not egoists. Robinson (1967), Vanek (1969) and 
Meade (1975) certainly argue that employment will be sustained 
because members pursue 'collective' goals. But it is upon the 
assumption of egoism that any viable model of socialist 
entrepreneurship must depend.
Political beliefs can account for the success of Mondragon and 
the more general failure of LMFs but does this mean that LMFs are 
necessarily doomed? Mondragon survives because its members 
already possess socialist political values. Most individuals in 
most parts of the world do not share these values and so LMFs do 
not displace capitalist firms. But the prerequisite for the 
implementation of schemes of socialist entrepreneurship is the 
election of a socialist government which will presumably only 
happen when a majority of the population have come to believe in 
socialism. LMFs are cherished because they allow for the 
expression of socialist values and not because they will realise 
socialism in the absence of any commitment to socialism. One 
further example can be used to cast doubt upon this defence.
A entrepreneur who starts a capitalist firm is personally liable 
for its performance whether good or bad. A entrepreneur who 
starts a LMF will also be personally liable for its failure but 
if the firm succeeds, the entrepreneur must share future profits 
with other members. LMFs create an asymmetry in the costs and
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benefits of entrepreneurial action and this violates a 
requirement of socialist entrepreneurship identified in Chapter 
Two. LMFs are inferior to capitalist firms not because they will 
not grow but because they are less likely to be started.
Recognising this problem, Dahl (1985, 151) proposes that
entrepreneurs be allowed to start capitalist firms and have to 
convert them to LMF status only when they develop beyond a 
certain point. Until then entrepreneurs should be allowed to 
monopolise both profits and losses. The solution raises a number 
of problems. First, it represents an uncomfortable 
acknowledgement of the limitations of socialist entrepreneurship. 
Second, it discourages success. Having discovered a new 
opportunity, entrepreneurs will have no incentive to fully 
exploit it as sustained investment and expansion may take them 
beyond the critical threshold set by government. Finally, the 
solution still discourages the initial creation of a firm as the 
spectacular prizes an entrepreneur can acquire when a firm has 
developed are the necessary (ex poste) rewards for having 
committed personal resources.
Again, Mondragon appears to offer succour. Here, new firms are 
regularly created. In part, this is because of the role played 
by the CLP. By offering entrepreneurial support, risks are 
minimised and less spectacular prizes required to motivate 
individuals. The costs and benefits of entrepreneurial action are 
more closely aligned. But it is still necessary to account for 
the initial creation of the first firms whose profits later made
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possible the establishment of the CLP. Here, attention is usually 
focused upon one individual. 'Historically, the Mondragon group 
owes an incalculable debt to one man ... a Basque priest, Father 
Jose Maria Arizmendi' (Campbell, Keen and Oakeshott, 1978, 23).
Arizmendi arrived in Mondragon in the aftermath of the Civil War, 
having narrowly escaped execution for his part in the production 
of a Republican magazine. He never held a formal position of 
authority within any Mondragon firm but pressed for the creation 
of ULGOR, the CLP and subsequent expansion. He was active in all 
aspects of decision-making and his judgement was trusted by all 
involved. But if Arizmendi was an entrepreneur, his motivation 
was political and spiritual rather than narrowly economic. He 
never profited from Mondragon's success and considered it a
social monstrosity that a system of social 
organisation in which some can take advantage of the 
work of others for their exclusive personal profit 
(quoted Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 2 54).
Mondragon's reliance upon such a figure is not unusual. The 
history of the cooperative movement is littered with such 
examples. Robert Owen founded 'New Harmony' for the purpose of 
political propaganda. In the 1970's and for largely similar 
reasons, the then Secretary-of-State for Trade and Industry, Tony 
Benn, committed millions of pounds of taxpayers money to three 
LMF's all of which subsequently failed: the Scottish Daily News, 
Meridan Motorcycles and Kirby Engineering. The Industrial Common
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Ownership Movement in which one minimalist, Oakeshott, is 
personally involved is inspired, like the Rochdale cooperative 
movement, by Quaker philosophy. The initial finance came not, as 
in Mondragon, from collections among residents but from the 
legacy of a wealthy capitalist, Ernest Bader (Campbell, Keen and 
Oakeshott, 1978, 11).
The creation of LMFs depends on the presence of individuals whose 
commitment to equality is such that not only are they willing to 
forego future income but risk their own resources through the 
creation of a firm. This is to demand a great deal of individuals 
and it is unlikely that even if a majority of the population are 
converted to socialism that many will accept this level of 
commitment. Altruism and political entrepreneurship will always 
ensure the creation of some LMFs but socialism should not have 
to rely upon such individuals. Capitalist firms have the 
advantage of 'economising on virtue' (Brennan and Hamlin, 1995) .
6.5.3 Free Riding and the Labour Managed Firm
When recruiting new members, Mondragon is attentive not only to 
applicants skills but to their values. An emphasis is placed upon 
recruiting those who exhibit a preference for cooperation over 
competition and such attitudes are reinforced by intensive 
training schemes (Bradley and Gelb, 1983, 19) and ultimately
enforced by the right of the firm to expel a member after their 
first six months. Within Mondragon, such a strategy is viable for 
two reasons. First and as already seen, the town of Mondragon has
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a long history of political radicalism. Second, Mondragon is an 
isolated LMF in a nation of capitalist enterprises. Mondragon 
does not have to compete against other LMFs for the attentions 
of a finite pool of the politically committed and can afford to 
exclude those whose motivation is more narrowly egoistic. If all 
firms were to become LMFs this would no longer be possible and 
performance would be likely to suffer.
In this way, Mondragon benefits from its isolation in a 
capitalist economy. In one further respect it does so more 
directly, deriving a positive externality from the existence of 
capitalist firms. To see why it is necessary to return to 
transaction cost analysis.
In terms of political values, the democratic structure of LMFs 
is appealing but substituting authority for democracy is also 
costly. First, providing the time and information necessary for 
democratic decision-making is itself expensive. Preparation for 
ULGOR's General Assembly in 1986 cost the firm over fifty dollars 
for each member (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 227). Capitalist firms 
are not so encumbered as shareholders who have no substantial 
interest in their firm can rely upon share price to provide 
sufficient information. Second, democracy retards decision­
making. Successful entrepreneurial action frequently requires 
immediate action. To place this in the context of Israel 
Kirzner's account, it is not enough that the entrepreneur is 
alert to new opportunities, they must also be ready to 
immediately act upon them before the opportunity disappears.
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Within Mondragon, important decisions that cannot be taken by the 
Junta Rectora alone must be referred to the Social Council and 
ultimately the General Assembly.
Changes require an extended and complex process of 
discussion and negotiation . . . major changes cannot be 
accomplished quickly (Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 100) .
It has been repeatedly emphasised that entrepreneurial activity 
entails the acceptance of risk. Given the difficulties involved 
in ascertaining, for example, future demand for a product it can 
be argued that collective decision-making within the LMF is 
preferable to individual fiat within the capitalist firm. The 
Condorcet jury theorem demonstrates that so long as any one 
individual's chances of making the right decision are greater 
than 0.5, the larger the group the higher the probability that 
it will make the right decision (Gorfman and Held 1988) . But 
rational choice more generally emphasises the difficulties of 
collective decision-making. Arrow's theorem (1963) shows that in 
the absence of a dictator, decision-making is vulnerable to 
instabilities, intransitivities, indecisiveness and manipulation. 
As Gary Miller (1992, 64) concludes,
firms that seek to realise the efficiency potentials 
in specialized, interdependent team production 
processes not only must create authoritative group 
decision structures, but must also centralize power 
(1992, 64) .
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Rational choice also suggests that in particular circumstances - 
principally when there exists a single issue dimension - 
decisions made by an electorate will converge upon the position 
of the median voter (Mueller, 1989, 65-7). Democracy will
marginalise minority preferences and enshrine majority ones. This 
is significant as the elite model of entrepreneurship suggests 
that the best (ex poste) decisions are frequently those which (ex 
ante) are most likely to challenge received wisdom.
To act with confidence beyond the familiar range of 
beacons . . . requires aptitudes that are present in 
only a small fraction of the population (Schumpeter,
1943, 132) .
The comforting conclusions of the Condorcet jury theorem do not 
hold in the case of elite entrepreneurship as the chances of any 
one individual having the right answer are less than 0.5. LMFs 
constrain entrepreneurial action. Consider the position of an 
individual who has discovered the possibility of making a 
existing product in a new, untested and seemingly improbable way. 
In a capitalist system, if the individual is the owner of a firm 
they will be able to pursue their project whatever the doubts of 
employees.4 Within a LMF, the entrepreneur will first have to 
convince other members of the merits of their idea. Even if they 
succeed, considerable effort will have to be devoted to changing 
others preferences. It is more likely that such efforts will fail
4 They may have to convince investment companies to support 
their project and it has been argued that capitalism starves 
innovative firms of necessary resources.
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and that opportunities although discovered will be neglected. The 
radical entrepreneur will be shackled by their colleagues and 
this conservatism is manifested in Mondragon's record of
industrial production.
The first Mondragon firm, ULGOR, manufactured paraffin lamps. 
There was no need for innovation as those involved simply bought 
a French lamp, dismantled it and without regard to patent laws 
simply copied it (Thomas and Logan, 1982, 20). As the group
developed, firms came increasingly to specialise in the
production of consumer electrical items, acquiring licences to 
produce the products of German companies behind Spain's tariff 
barriers. Today, the technology remains limited and borrowed. As 
Oakeshott (1978, 166) accepts, 'there are no computer
manufacturers in the Mondragon group, nor any builders of nuclear 
power stations'. The development of IKERAN, Mondragon's own 
research centre, has improved but not revolutionised production.
The industrial cooperatives do a certain amount of 
research, but most innovations as far as technology 
and new products are concerned have been introduced 
after obtaining licences and patents from elsewhere 
(Thomas and Logan, 1982, 59).
Far from being discriminated against, it appears that Mondragon 
has benefited from the presence of capitalist firms. It has been 
able to free ride on the innovative activities of others. 
Mondragon firms do not so much produce as reproduce, exploiting
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the comparative advantages which their organisational structure 
gives them in terms of static efficiency. Does this strategy 
simply reflect the unique circumstances of Mondragon's 
development? The inability of LMFs to cope with the demands of 
elite entrepreneurship suggest that it may not. Mondragon may not 
only be unwilling but also unable to pioneer new products. Two 
further arguments can be used to support the conclusion. First, 
elite entrepreneurship is particularly risky. Entrepreneurs will 
require greater incentives to start firms engaged in the process 
of creative destruction and it has already been argued that LMFs 
are unable to offer these incentives. Second and for the same 
reason, such projects will be less appealing to the CLP and other 
members of the group who will have to partly fund investment and 
who cannot afford a large number of failures. That Mondragon has 
restricted itself to the production of tried and tested goods for 
which a proven market exists suggests a very different 
explanation of the groups high success rate.
6.6 Conclusion: Stakeholder Socialism
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The basic actor in a market economy is the firm. It 
brings material, money and labour together to produce 
goods and services (Hutton, 1996, 111).
One important conclusion of this chapter is that markets are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for successful 
entrepreneurial action. To understand the achievements of 
capitalist entrepreneurship and the requirements of socialist 
entrepreneurship it is necessary to look inside the 'black box' 
of organisational design. Both neo-classical and Austrian 
economics are limited by their failure to do so. A second 
conclusion is that the precise form of organisation matters. The 
New Right's assumption that choice can be left to the 
evolutionary mechanism of the market is erroneous. Will Hutton 
(1996) argues that this policy has led to a lack of trust, a lack 
of investment and the squandering of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. He offers in its place a model of 'stakeholder 
capitalism' which has obvious parallels with Mondragon. Like John 
Roemer (1994, 41), Hutton looks to emulate the Japanese Keiretsu 
system which ties banks into a long-term development relationship 
with firms similar to that experienced between the CLP and first 
level firms. But whilst Hutton challenges particular forms of 
private ownership, he does not challenge private ownership 
itself. Stakeholder capitalism is not New Right capitalism but 
it is capitalism nonetheless. Mondragon is more radical in that 
it offers workers more than co-determination or employee share
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ownership. Workers are made the exclusive owners of a firm and 
'Individual accounts represent evidence to members that they are 
stakeholders' (Thomas and Logan, 1982, 184). By making exit more 
difficult and by eliminating the distinction between employers 
and employees, Mondragon ensures a 'positive collusion to 
maximise joint wealth' (Fitzroy and Cable, 1980, 120).
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The last two chapters have taken us some way toward a theory of 
feasible socialist entrepreneurship but neither MIS or LMFs 
satisfy the requirement, introduced in Chapter Two, that 
socialism be capable of generating neo-pluralist, elitist and new 
right entrepreneurship. The use of decentralised markets ensures 
that both are capable of stimulating new right entrepreneurship 
but MIS is unable to sustain neo-pluralist and LMFs elite 
entrepreneurship. In the pursuit of an alternative, the next 
three chapters turn from an appraisal of established models of 
market socialism to the construction of a new one: bureaucratic 
entrepreneurial socialism (BES). Chapter Eight offers a detailed 
account of the structure and mechanics of bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship. In this chapter, attention is focused more 
narrowly on the specific issue of incentives for entrepreneurial 
action.
Capitalist markets animated by private ownership provide both a 
framework within which innovation and coordination can take place 
and incentives for the discovery of entrepreneurial knowledge. 
The prospect of acquiring spectacular prizes and the fear of 
personal bankruptcy ensures that entrepreneurs remain alert to 
new opportunities. Socialists cannot rely on capitalist 
incentives as they generate excessive inequality. If only 
capitalist markets offer sufficient incentives for 
entrepreneurial action then it would appear that there is a 
necessary trade-off between efficiency and equality. Although the
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terms lack precision, subsequent analysis will benefit from a 
distinction between 'sensitive' and 'insensitive' incentive 
schemes.
When remuneration is closely tied to performance, incentives are 
sensitive. When remuneration is only loosely correlated with 
performance incentives are insensitive. Capitalist incentives are 
relatively sensitive and can be contrasted with those found in, 
for example, MIS where successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs 
receive the same reward. Sensitive incentives secure 
entrepreneurial motivation but threaten equality whilst 
insensitive incentives secure equality but threaten 
entrepreneurial motivation. Socialists do not have to choose 
between these polar extremes and can devise any number of 
incentive schemes which are more sensitive than those found in. 
MIS but less sensitive than those found in capitalism but it 
appears that in doing so, a trade-off between efficiency and 
equality cannot be avoided. Socialists can manage the terms of 
the trade-off but cannot eliminate it.
One problem with this simplistic account is that it fails to 
recognise the impact of environmental structure on incentives. 
It is, for example, the organisational structure of bureaucracy 
that William Niskanen (1971) claims creates incentives for 
bureaucrats to budget-maximise. The structure of LMFs discourage 
shirking and reduce the transaction costs of economic activity 
whilst small organisations which encourage frequent interaction 
between workers and from which exit is costly reduce shirking
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within MIS. Incentives are not simply a function of the 
sensitivity of payment. Organisation matters and can reduce the 
extent of the trade-off between efficiency and equality.
In this chapter and having presented incentive problems in terms 
of principal-agent analysis, various other organisational devices 
for managing and reducing the trade-off between efficiency and 
equality are considered. Discussion of the necessary sensitivity 
of payments is postponed in favour of looking inside the black 
box of organisational design. A number of obvious candidates for 
cultivating entrepreneurial incentives are rejected on either 
political or technical grounds and a specific proposal which can 
provide a vehicle for efficient socialist entrepreneurship is 
introduced.
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7.2 Bureaucracy, Principals and Agents
Building on seminal articles by Stephen Ross (1973) and Armen 
Alchian and Joel Demsetz (1972), principal-agent analysis (PAA) 
is now firmly embedded within several strands of the social 
science literature. Although in many respects an extremely useful 
tool, recent contributions have tended to be highly abstract, 
focusing upon specific mathematical problems of little relevance 
for policy debates (Arrow, 1984, 48, Moe, 1984, 773) . One purpose 
of this chapter is to show the ways in which PAA can be used to 
illuminate issues raised in earlier chapters.
According to John Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser (1984, 2),
'whenever one individual depends on the action of another, an 
agency relationship arises. The individual taking the action is 
called the agent. The affected party is the principal'. This 
definition is extremely broad, placing all individuals in a 
market economy in an agency relationship with each other. 
Principal-agent relationships (PARs) can only be described as 
posing a principal-agent problem (PAP) - with which this chapter 
is more particularly concerned - when two further conditions are 
satisfied. First, the principal and the agent must perceive 
themselves as having conflicting interests. In James Coleman's 
(1990, 74) terms, the relationship between principal and agent 
must be 'disjoint' rather than 'cojoint'. Second, there must be 
some initial uncertainty on the part of either the principal or 
agent as to whether the other has or will act in intended ways 
(Levinthal, 1988, 156).
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It may be briefly noted that the use of PAA sits comfortably 
alongside earlier assumptions and arguments. First and on the 
assumption that it will subsequently prove useful, PAA casts 
further doubt upon the efficacy of neo-classical economics. The 
importance of uncertainty and subsequent recognition of the need 
to look inside the black box of organisational design are largely 
discounted by neo-classical economics. Second and for the same 
reason, PAA can easily embrace the use of new economic 
institutionalism. PAPs and the costs of any subsequent resolution 
of them can be classified as a transaction cost; one which 
frequently complicates the processes of coordination and 
innovation. Third, the assumption of a conflict of interest 
within PAPs seems to imply either the presence of egoistic or, 
as Williamson prefers, opportunistic motivation. Conflicting 
interests matter and threaten entrepreneurial efficiency because 
individuals can be expected to act upon these interests: the
'core7 assumption of rational action.
PARs and PAPs are pervasive features of life and are to be found 
between many different categories of economic actor (Arrow, 1984, 
37). It is important to note that PARs can take many different 
forms and that individuals can simultaneously be both principals 
and agents. A number of PARs have already been encountered in 
earlier chapters. The PAR between junior employees (agent) and 
managers (principal) is mediated in capitalist firms by 
mechanisms of vertical control, in MIS by horizontal control and 
in LMFs by both vertical and horizontal control. In some 
capitalist firms, additional PARs are found between directors
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(agent) and shareholders (principal) and here interests are 
(supposedly) reconciled through capital markets and takeovers. 
Within the LMF, the board of directors (agent) - in the case of 
Mondragon, the Junta Rectora - is ultimately responsible to its 
owners who are also its workers (principal) . The owners of a 
public bureaucracy are government. In Chapter Nine, the PAR 
between government (agent) and the electorate (principal) is 
considered. In this chapter, attention is focused on the PAR 
between government (principal) and entrepreneurs (agent).
Before proceeding to a discussion of the various ways in which 
this relationship can be managed, it first needs to be 
established whether this PAR also constitutes a PAP. First and 
given the definition of entrepreneurship employed, it is 
reasonable to assume that the relationship between government and 
bureaucracy will at least initially be characterised by some 
uncertainty. Second, it is assumed that sole interest of the 
government is to maximise the volume of efficient entrepreneurial 
action. In Chapter Nine the validity of this assumption is 
challenged but for now it can be justified as a necessary feature 
of feasible socialist entrepreneurship. Given the division 
between government ownership and entrepreneurial control of 
resources, it cannot necessarily be assumed that entrepreneurs 
will share this interest. Within much of the principal-agent 
literature, the agent is assumed to have a preference for 
'shirking' (Bendor, 1990, 390). This may simply manifest itself 
in reduced effort or it may imply the maximisation of budgets 
(Niskanen, 1971), discretionary resources (Williamson, 1964,
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Niskanen, 1991), or total sales (Baumol, 1959). As none of these 
will necessarily realise the government's interests, the 
relationship can be assumed to be disjoint.1
George Stiglitz (1975, 966) argues that the solution to any PAP 
is to 'design a compensation scheme which motivates the agent . . . 
to act in the principal's interests'. The responsibility and 
challenge for government is to design a incentive scheme that can 
motivate entrepreneurial action and discourage shirking or 
budget-maximising. Stiglitz's suggestion is valuable because it 
emphasises the hierarchical nature of PARs. Principals are 
frustrated by a lack of information about agent's actions but can 
compensate for this with their greater power. By using their 
authority to manipulate the terms of the contract offered to 
entrepreneurs, government can hope to 'achieve an outcome 
different from that which would have occurred in the absence of 
[its] intervention' (Barry, 1983, 341). Through a combination of 
threats and offers, government can deny to entrepreneurs the 
opportunity to realise those parts of their preference schedule 
which conflict with the government's interests.
The government's success in transforming a disjoint into a 
cojoint relationship offers the most obvious criterion by which 
the merits of any incentive scheme can be assessed. In addition, 
it is possible to identify four further conditions which must be
| met if any proposal is to be deemed viable. First, solutions
I 1 It is said 'necessarily' because and as argued in Chapter
| Three, budget-maximising can lead to efficient volumes of 
entrepreneurial innovation in particular circumstances.
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should not exacerbate problems of adverse selection or, more 
generally, have the effect of reducing the quality of new 
entrepreneurs. Second, solutions should not be prohibitively 
expensive to implement. Third, solutions should not impede the 
realisation of socialist values. A scheme which induces 
entrepreneurial efficiency but which threatens either equality, 
democracy or liberty is not desirable. Finally and given the 
reservations expressed about the Mondragon scheme, any solution 
should be capable of implementation at a global as well as a 
local level.
Theorists have identified a number of ways in which the interests 
of principals and agents can be reconciled (see Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992 for a general survey). In the next section it will 
be argued that two of the more common, monitoring and buy-outs, 
are of little value for socialist entrepreneurship. A third, 
risk-sharing, is preferable but raises particular technical 
difficulties.
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7.3 False Starts
7.3.1 Principals, Agents and Monitoring
Monitoring by a principal of an agent's actions is perhaps the 
most frequently practised solution to PAPs; its general nature 
having already been encountered within both the capitalist firm 
and MIS. In this case, government agrees to pay a bureaucratic 
entrepreneur a fixed wage but withholds some proportion if 
monitoring reveals entrepreneurial shirking. Knowing the 
penalties, entrepreneurs will adopt the government's goals and 
maximise effort. If a 'forcing contract' (Miller, 1992, 104) can 
be devised which ensures that the entrepreneur is paid just 
enough to secure maximum effort, the solution can be used to 
secure not only efficiency but greater equality. Entrepreneurs 
will not have to be paid spectacular prizes and profits from 
successful entrepreneurial action can be redistributed by the 
state. Barry Weingest (1983) has argued - contrary to Niskanen's 
claims - that monitoring can effectively regulate the 
relationship between government and bureaucracy but 
entrepreneurial activity raises particular difficulties for 
monitoring. Drawing upon the analysis in Chapter Five, a 
distinction can be drawn between (i) the monitoring of outputs, 
and (ii) the monitoring of inputs.
(i) The Monitoring of Output
Monitoring is most effective and entails only minimal
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implementation costs when there is a predictable relationship 
between entrepreneurial input and output. In such circumstances, 
government can simply extrapolate from their performance an 
entrepreneur's effort and reward or punish her accordingly. In 
these circumstances it is not even clear whether the PAR 
constitutes a PAP as uncertainty has been eliminated. Such a 
solution is not viable here. Entrepreneurship, as Joseph 
Schumpeter (1943, 73-4) suggests, is an activity in which luck 
partly determines outcomes, in which 'failure ... threatens or 
actually overtakes many an able man'. Government will struggle 
to discern any clear relationship between entrepreneurial effort 
and outcome and risks rewarding shirkers whilst punishing those 
who have been unfortunate.
Bengt Holmstrom (1979) and Roy Radner (1981) argue that these 
difficulties can be surmounted through the long-term monitoring 
of performance. If output - most obviously profit - is observed 
over a indefinitely long period, the principal can be relatively 
sure that moments of good luck will have compensated for bad 
luck, leaving for each entrepreneur a precise relationship 
between input and output. However, if entrepreneurs heavily 
discount the value of future income, shirking may remain the 
optimal strategy and monitoring in the long-term may simply 
encourage entrepreneurs to shirk in the meantime. Second, 
monitoring in the long-term also means that individuals who lack 
the ability to be successful entrepreneurs are sheltered from the 
consequences of their actions in the short-term. In the case of 
entrepreneurial activity this is important because the costs of
*
*
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failure are likely to be high. Government may be able to bear the 
costs of employing a large number of poor typists but will be 
crippled by employing large numbers of poor entrepreneurs for 
whose losses they are responsible.
(ii) The Monitoring of Input
In situations where there is no predictable relationship between 
outputs and inputs, the obvious alternative is for the government 
to monitor inputs directly. Such a strategy is, for example, used 
within the kibbutz to regulate behaviour. In many respects, the 
method is inferior. First, it creates additional transaction 
costs as the principal will normally have to hire another 
individual to undertake the monitoring. Second, this creates an 
additional PAR which government may have to monitor. Finally and 
as suggested by Anthony Downs' 'Law of Counter-Control' (1967, 
147) , monitoring may encourage entrepreneurs to invest resources 
in attempts to mislead the monitor.
In the case of entrepreneurship, further problems can be 
identified. First, if entrepreneurs are budget-maximising rather 
than shirking, simple forms of input monitoring will be 
ineffective. Descending on the enterprise, a monitor may well 
find a hive of activity but will be in danger of drawing the 
wrong conclusion from it. Second, monitoring will be frustrated 
by the particular nature of entrepreneurial activity which is 
frequently cognitive rather than mechanical and dependent upon 
the application of tacit knowledge and the occasional flash of
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genius. Confronted by new circumstances and ideas, the monitor 
will struggle (ex ante) to judge the worth of a particular 
project. Monitoring may well reveal the entrepreneur sat at their 
desk contemplating new innovations but the monitor will not, for 
example, know whether every option has been explored because this 
will require an entrepreneurial judgement, the accuracy of which 
can only be revealed ex poste.
In emphasising the difficulties of monitoring, discussion has 
been pulled toward the elite theory of entrepreneurship. Within 
the modern corporation, entrepreneurial • activity may be more 
predictable, allowing, as Schumpeter (1943, 132) envisages,
'things [to be] strictly calculated that had of old to be 
visualised in a flash' . As has already been argued in Chapter 
Two, the problems of socialist entrepreneurship are not general 
but depend upon the particular form of entrepreneurial activity 
under consideration. As with the LMF, the suggestion here is that 
effective monitoring may be possible for neo-pluralist but not 
elite entrepreneurship. Monitoring, it can be concluded,
represents at best only a partial solution to the PAP between 
government and bureaucracy.
7.3.2 Principals, Agents and Buy-Outs
A second possibility is to place the risk of any venture with the 
agent, to allow the entrepreneur to 'buy-out' government
ownership. Steven Shavell (1979) argues that in conditions of 
pervasive uncertainty, the optimal course of action is frequently
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for the agent to give the principal a fee in return for the claim 
to any residual profit- Being both owner and manager, the agent 
will then bear the full costs of their actions and have no more 
incentive to shirk or budget-maximise than the capitalist 
entrepreneur. Whereas monitoring institutionalises the PAR and 
emphasises the presence of hierarchy, buy-outs dissolve the PAR 
and eliminate hierarchy.
Objections to buy-outs, already rehearsed, are political. By 
placing the burden of risk upon the entrepreneur, buy-outs 
generate inequality. Entrepreneurs who are both talented and 
lucky will receive considerable rewards. Buy-outs, it should be 
noted, will not simply replicate capitalist inequality and are 
for this reason preferable. The fees paid by the entrepreneur for 
the right to use public assets and claim residual income from 
them will be a source of income which can be redistributed by 
government. But considerable inequality will remain. Buy-outs are 
not a method to be employed by a socialist bureaucracy but are 
an alternative to it.
7.3.3 Principals, Agents and Risk-Sharing
Given the difficulties involved in monitoring entrepreneurial 
action, it nonetheless appears desirable that bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs bear some of the risk of any venture: that their 
remuneration be tied to performance in some direct way. Figure
7.1 illustrates two possible ways in which this can be done; 
through quotas and piece rates. Here, the horizontal axis depicts
t
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profits made for the government by an entrepreneur and the 
vertical axis payments made by the government to the 
entrepreneur. In a quota system, the government dictates some 
minimum level of performance, X, which the entrepreneur must 
satisfy, paying individuals Y if they fail to reach this level 
and a fixed amount, Z, if they reach or exceed it. Piece rates 
allow the government to gear pay to performance more subtly. 
Wages can be made proportionate to profit at some specified rate. 
One obvious possibility is that entrepreneurs be made to bear a 
certain proportion of profits or losses, for example ten percent. 
Both quotas and piece rates can be easily distinguished from 
monitoring and buy-outs. In the latter there is an exactly equal 
relationship between pay and profit. In the former and subject 
only to a favourable monitor's report there is no relationship 
between pay and performance. It is this and not the absolute 
level of payment which distinguishes piece rates and quotas.
Figure 7.1. Gearing Pay to Performance
Pay Buy-Outs
Piece Rates
■Monitoring
QuotasZ
Y
Profits0 X
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The use of quotas or piece rates as a way of linking pay to 
performance does raise a number of largely technical 
difficulties. First and with respect to quotas, there is an 
obvious danger that the entrepreneur having satisfied the minimum 
requirement, X, will begin to shirk. By imposing a number of 
different quota levels each of which carries a different payment, 
such problems can be alleviated. But unless the number of payment 
levels is exactly the same as the number of possible profit 
levels - transforming a quota system into a piece rate one - 
opportunities for shirking remain. Second, in the case of both 
quotas and piece rates, obvious disputes will arise over the 
appropriate level at which the quota or proportionate rate should 
be set. Entrepreneurs will attempt to convince the government 
that the quota should be set at a low level and the piece rate 
at a high one. Given the uncertainty that surrounds 
entrepreneurial action and the impossibility of judging (ex ante) 
the likely (ex poste) result of a course of action, it will be 
unlikely that either party will discover a 'right' answer and 
time and effort devoted to bargaining constitutes a considerable 
transaction cost.
Even having agreed upon a rate, disputes may continue. 
Entrepreneurs will fear that if they maximise their effort and 
return significant profits government will respond by raising the 
necessary quotas and lowering the piece rate. Knowing this, 
agents might find it rational to continue shirking in the 
expectation that by doing so they can convince the government of 
the difficulty of entrepreneurial action and secure a lower quota
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and higher piece rate. This strategic behaviour is likely to 
retard efficient entrepreneurial action and plagued incentive 
systems adopted in the Soviet Union (Ekern, 1979).
At the same time and as Gary Miller (1992) argues, many private 
sector firms appear to have resolved such difficulties. To see 
why, the relationship between principal and agent should be seen 
in terms of commitment, trust and honesty. In Figure 7.2 it is 
assumed both parties are considering the introduction of a 
specific piece rate or quota. The agent has the choice of either 
trusting or not trusting the principal. If she does not trust the 
principal she will continue to shirk, perhaps in the expectation 
of subsequently altering the terms of the agreement. If the agent 
trusts the principal she will work to the best of her ability 
within the terms of the agreement. If the agent trusts the 
principal, the principal in turn faces the choice of whether to 
honour or violate that trust. If he honours the trust he will 
retain the agreement even if the agent performs well and 
significantly exceeds the minimum quota requirement. If he 
violates the trust he will alter the terms of the agreement if 
the agent performs well, setting far tougher standards of 
performance. There are three possible outcomes (A-C). The agent 
most prefers an outcome in which she trusts the principal and the 
principal subsequently honours that trust (A). Here, the agent 
is rewarded for her effort. The agent will least prefer an 
outcome in which she trusts the principal and the principal 
subsequent violates that trust (B). Here, the agent is punished 
for their initial effort. Cooperation is uncertain because this
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is precisely the outcome which will maximise the principal's 
profits. Having used the initial agreement to see how agents are 
capable of performing, he can subsequently impose a forcing 
contract. Fearing that if they bestow trust upon the principal 
that the principal will have every reason to abuse that trust, 
the agent may find it necessary to withdraw trust from the start 
(C) . This outcome is pareto-inferior (B > A) and will reduce the 
volume of entrepreneurial action.
Figure 7.2. Trust, Commitment and Efficiency
Honour Trust
Principal
Trust
Violate Trus
Agent
Mistrust
Agents - { A > C > B }  
Principal - { B > A > C}
(adapted from Miller, 1992, 114
Within the private sector, two mechanisms exist to facilitate 
cooperation. First, courts may be used to enforce agreements made 
between principals and agents. If the principal can be made to 
bind himself to a particular agreement, the agent will have a 
reason to bestow trust. The value of external parties who can act 
as a 'leviathan' has already been noted with respect to
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capitalist exchange relationships. Second and as Miller (1992) 
emphasises, competitive forces can be used to secure cooperation. 
If a principal violates the agent's trust, it is likely that 
cooperation will subsequently be withdrawn and performance 
deteriorate. Knowing this the principal may have no choice but 
to honour trust if he is to stay in business. In an interesting 
twist to the discussion of markets and hierarchies in Chapter 
Six, market forces here play the role of the leviathan. Success 
is not certain. At any one time, competitive pressures may be so 
intense as to force the principal to renege upon a agreement and 
risk the consequences of doing so but the logic of Miller's 
argument is clear and similar to that employed during the 
discussion of iterated game theory in Chapter Five.2
These mechanisms are not open to participants in the PAR between 
government and bureaucracy and for this reason Miller's argument 
does not hold in the case of socialist entrepreneurship. Because 
in this case the principal is a sovereign power, it may choose 
but does not have to submit to the authority of the court. 
Retrospective legislation can always be used to secure legal 
immunity and knowing this, the agent may be wary of entering into 
any agreement. Second and again because of its unique political 
position, the government is insulated from the pressures of 
competition. Unless emigration is assumed to be costless, agents
2 Half a solution is better than no solution but Miller 
ignores the position of the agent. Why will they not shirk when 
they know that the principal will honour an agreement? Outcome 
A is assured only if it is assumed that in the event of 
(consequent) bankruptcy the agent will struggle to find another 
job.
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will not be able to choose between rival governments to work for 
and the budget-constraint deterring capitalist defection is 
softened by government's power to raise additional taxes. It 
should not be assumed that separation of ownership and control 
between government and bureaucratic entrepreneurs is equivalent 
to the separation of ownership and control within capitalist 
organisations.
One final problem with the use of quotas and piece rates can be 
identified. Risk-sharing cushions the impact of bad luck on 
entrepreneurs but does little to reduce its general salience. In 
times of economic boom, quotas and piece rates - set, perhaps, 
years before - are unlikely to prove demanding. Even 
entrepreneurs of below average ability will find that they are 
able to satisfy minimum quota levels without having to exert 
themselves. Conversely, in times of recession even the most able 
and hardest working of entrepreneurs will struggle. Knowing that 
they are doomed to fail regardless of their efforts, 
entrepreneurs may simply prefer to shirk.
4
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7.4 Tournaments and Bureaucratic Competition
7.4.1 Ordinal Tournaments: Characteristics and Advantages
The incentive schemes considered so far have two attributes in 
common. First, they judge performance absolutely in that pay is 
tied to individual achievement independently of the achievement 
of others. Second, performance is judged relative to some 
externally imposed standard: a particular quota or piece rate. 
These characteristics contribute to the inefficiencies documented 
in the last section. An alternative is to judge performance 
relative only to the achievement of others and on the basis of 
an internal standard of reference. Such incentive schemes are 
called tournaments. Here, the entrepreneur who returns the 
highest level of profit will receive the highest payment. 
Conversely, the entrepreneur who returns the lowest profit or the 
highest losses will receive the lowest remuneration or highest 
penalties. Between these extremes, all other entrepreneurs are 
ranked ordinally in terms of their relative performance.
With reference to the earlier discussion, several advantages of 
tournaments can be distinguished. First, they entail minimal 
policing costs. Government has to do no more than measure, 
compare and rank performance at the end of competition. Second 
and unless a particular entrepreneur is convinced that they are 
certain to win a particular tournament, there is no incentive to 
shirk once a certain performance level has been reached. Third, 
tournaments will ease problems of adverse selection. If an
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entrepreneur fears that they will do badly in a tournament they 
will have no incentive to enter it. Fourth and as recognised by 
Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), Bengt Holmstrom (1982), 
and Barry Nalebuff and George Stiglitz (1983), tournaments work 
whatever the degree of uncertainty faced by agents. It does not 
matter if (ex ante) the principal has little information about 
likely (ex poste) performance. Fifth, tournaments can partly 
compensate for the impact of luck. If all entrepreneurs are 
hampered by a severe recession, relative performance will remain 
unaffected: all compete on a level playing field. As the same 
will apply during periods of economic boom, entrepreneurs are 
given no reason to shirk as a result of particular economic 
circumstances.
7.4.2 Ordinal Tournaments: Problems and Solutions
A number of potential problems with the use of tournaments can 
be identified. First, government must decide the reference group 
against which individual firms are to be judged. One possibility 
is for government to place entrepreneurs in competition against 
other enterprises created at the same time. But whilst all 
participants in a tournament will face the same general economic 
conditions of boom and bust they may face different specific 
circumstances. It is entirely possible that the light engineering 
industry enters a recession at precisely the moment that software 
design enters a period of rapid growth. In this case, luck still 
partly determines outcomes and distorts incentives.
Alternatively, entrepreneurs can be placed in competition against 
others engaged in the same kind of functional activity, software 
programmers competing against other software programmers. Here, 
one problem is solved only for a whole series of others to 
emerge. First, in certain industries there will simply not be 
enough entrepreneurs for meaningful comparison to be possible. 
The more innovative bureaucratic entrepreneurs are - the greater 
the number of new industries that emerge - the greater the 
problem becomes. Second, precise classification of some 
industries will prove difficult and generate conflict between 
entrepreneurs and the government. One of the primary advantages 
of tournaments - that they allow government to withdraw from the 
competitive fray - is sacrificed. Finally, such a system 
encourages inefficiency. Companies producing products for which 
there is little consumer demand will find themselves able to 
enjoy the same rewards as others producing in a profitable but 
crowded market. There is little incentive for firms to coordinate 
demand and supply by moving from one industry to another. In such 
cases, government can intervene by denying entry to new firms in 
certain areas or ordering others to relocate but this will 
require them to make entrepreneurial decisions which they are not 
necessarily well equipped to take.
The default solution, then, is to place all entrepreneurs in one 
giant and inclusive ordinal tournament. There are two possible 
(and related) problems. First, will inclusive tournaments 
discriminate against small firms employing only a handful of 
people who could never hope to make the same kind of profits as
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a larger organisation? Second, will inclusive tournaments 
discriminate against newly formed firms whose products and 
techniques of production are not yet fully established?
The first argument is unconvincing as discrimination against 
certain kinds of firms - those that make lower profits - is the 
very intention of tournaments. If only large firms are able to 
make large profits then it is a desirable feature of inclusive 
tournaments that they will eliminate smaller firms. Furthermore, 
the assumption that smaller firms will be more likely to be 
eliminated can also be challenged. Precisely because their 
revenue is larger, large firms have a capacity to make greater 
losses as well as greater profits. If smaller firms are likely 
to be clustered around the centre of the ordinal rankings and 
therefore unlikely to be eliminated will this soften their 
budget-constraint? Uncertainty about their final position should 
reduce this possibility but there will still be incentives to 
remain alert as relative position determines remuneration as well 
as elimination.
The argument that inclusive tournaments will discriminate against 
newly formed firms and that this will retard eventual efficiency 
is more persuasive. It was argued in Chapter Six that capitalism 
also discriminates against new firms but this offers only a 
limited defence for socialism. One possibility here would be to 
run separate tournaments for newly created firms of all kinds. 
Alternatively, a subsidy could be offered to new firms in their
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first few years.3 Whilst government will then have to specify 
the relevant time period over which this subsidy will be offered, 
it will otherwise not have to become engaged in entrepreneurial 
decision-making.
A second problem with tournaments - emphasised by Paul Milgrom 
and John Roberts (1992, 404) - is that they appear vulnerable to 
strategic manipulation. If all entrepreneurs agree to shirk at 
the start of a tournament, the relative position of each will 
remain unaffected. Entrepreneurs can receive the same reward for 
both good and deliberately poor performance. In some respects, 
the argument is similar to that already levelled against quotas 
and piece rates; through coordinated action, entrepreneurs can 
deceive government. Agents face a collective action problem the 
circumstances of which can be manipulated by government to reduce 
the probability of deception. In the case of quotas or piece 
rates, agents have to shirk in order to convince the principal 
of the severity of the existing system. In the case of 
tournaments, agents have to shirk for all to secure an unchanged 
reward. But each agent in a tournament will be tempted by the 
prospect of unilateral defection and the hope that they can push 
themselves to the top of ordinal rankings. Universal cooperation 
(shirking) is Pareto-optimal for the entrepreneurs but will not 
necessarily be attained as the structure of interaction is that 
of a prisoners dilemma. As in the case of MIS, cooperation is 
possible in certain conditions but government can make
3 In Chapter Two it was seen that the Conservative Party 
adopted a similar strategy in the 1980's.
*
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cooperation less likely by favouring tournaments across different 
industries in which the number of participants is large, 
interaction infrequent and networks relatively open.
Third, there is a danger that in particular circumstances, 
tournaments encourage decision-making inconsistent with the 
requirements of entrepreneurial efficiency. Most obviously, 
entrepreneurs who are ahead and believe that they will remain so 
may have an incentive to shirk. Alternatively, individuals in 
this position may come to simply adopt more conservative 
entrepreneurial strategies. Conversely, entrepreneurs who are 
nearing the end of a tournament and who have suffered a series 
of failures may decide that they have little to lose and take 
excessive risks.
Care has to be taken before condemning such behaviour. The elite 
theory of entrepreneurship may be taken to suggest that seemingly 
excessive (ex ante) risks are precisely those that sometimes 
bring the greatest rewards and LMFs have been criticised for 
their aversion to risk. Tournaments should not be condemned 
simply because entrepreneurs will take risks they would not take 
under capitalism as capitalist competition is not optimal and 
cannot serve as a benchmark for judging efficiency. Capitalism 
may indeed experience a similar problem. In Chapter Five it was 
noted that because income is subject to diminishing marginal 
returns, entrepreneurs who acquire spectacular prizes may eschew 
further risks. The advantage of tournaments is that all will 
start from an equal position at the start of each tournament. The
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problem with tournaments is that it is precisely the individuals 
whose past records suggest that they are least equipped to deal 
with risks who are the most likely to take them.
Again, the solution lies in the size of the tournament. The 
argument that entrepreneurs will take poor decisions rests upon 
the assumption that they will be aware of how well they are 
currently performing and in large tournaments it will be 
difficult for entrepreneurs to accurately assess performance. 
They may suspect that they are doing poorly but will not know how 
precarious a position they are in until the tournament ends and 
results are revealed. The deterrent to excessive risk-taking is 
the fear that it might make an already poor performance worse. 
In this respect, tournaments are superior to capitalist 
competition where entrepreneurs are more likely to be aware of 
the immanent approach of bankruptcy as profits turn to losses.
Fourth, it is uncertain over what time period a tournament is 
best run. Over a relatively short period, for example three 
years, the problem, again, is that results will be contaminated 
by luck. Alternatively, if performance is judged over a longer 
period, individuals not suited to entrepreneurial activity will 
be left to squander public resources. It has already been noted 
that monitoring experiences the same problems. Compromise and the 
acceptance of a trade-off appear necessary. But it should not be 
assumed that in this respect tournaments are inferior to 
capitalist competition. Most new capitalist enterprises fail and 
the chances of failure are increased by deficiencies in capital
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markets: new businesses are starved of resources and otherwise 
viable enterprises are frequently bankrupted. The advantage of 
tournaments is that all entrepreneurs are given a sufficient 
period in which to establish their credentials.
A related problem surrounds the possibility that entrepreneurs 
will be unduly influenced in their decision-making by the period 
of time left in the tournament. With, for example, only one year 
remaining to the end of a tournament a entrepreneur might be 
tempted to forego an extremely profitable investment opportunity 
with a pay-back period of five years in favour of a more modest 
one which will show a more immediate return. Again, capitalist 
competition is not immune to such difficulties. The more 
efficient the monitoring of performance undertaken by capital 
markets is, the less likely a firm will be to make long-term 
investments. In the case of tournaments, such difficulties can 
be minimised through the use of roll-over accounts. Instead of 
starting each tournament from an equal position, profits and 
liabilities stemming from decisions taken in previous tournaments 
can simply be included in new tournaments.
One final deficiency of tournaments should be noted. Holmstrom 
(1982) demands of any incentive scheme that it be 'budget 
balancing' . This can be interpreted to mean that no scheme should 
leave the principal having to pay out to agents more than agents 
earn for the principal. Buy-outs satisfy this requirement. Having 
paid a certain fee, the agent bears the entire risk of any 
subsequent profits or losses. So long as the fee is positive,
*
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government will benefit from the exchange. None of the other 
incentive schemes considered satisfy this requirement. In the 
case of piece rates where the entrepreneur receives a certain 
proportion of earnings, the budget will be balanced so long as 
profits are positive. This remains the case if the entrepreneur 
is made to bear the entire cost of any failure. But such a 
condition results in an asymmetry between the costs and benefits 
of entrepreneurial action and will frustrate efficient 
entrepreneurial action. If relaxed, government may be left to 
carry the responsibility for a large part of any entrepreneurial 
loss.
With quotas the same difficulty arises. If all fail to satisfy 
minimal requirements then no wages need be paid to entrepreneurs. 
If the quota is set at a level of positive profit and if all fall 
just short of satisfying its requirements then a surplus may be 
generated for the government. But whilst if losses are sustained 
wages will not have to paid, there is no guarantee government 
will not lose on any venture. The same logic applies to 
tournament competition. Depending upon entrepreneurial 
performance, tournaments can generate profits or losses for 
government. For this reason, tournaments require the government 
itself to become an entrepreneur: carrying the risk of the action 
of others.
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7.5 Efficiency and Equality: Return of a Trade-Off
In outlining the advantages of tournament competition, the issue 
postponed until now has been that of the appropriate gearing 
between pay and performance. Bureaucratic entrepreneurs will be 
paid wages and the level of their wages will depend upon their 
relative performance. Whether the winners of a tournament will 
be paid millions or thousands of pounds and how much money, if
any, losers of a tournament will have to pay to government has
not been discussed. It is here the trade-off between efficiency 
and equality most obviously bites. Sensitive tournaments in which 
successful entrepreneurs are rewarded with spectacular prizes are 
likely to elicit maximum effort but result in greater inequality. 
Insensitive tournaments in which successful entrepreneurs are 
rewarded with only slightly more than the average wage will 
secure greater equality but are less likely to motivate 
entrepreneurs.
How sensitive must a scheme be before it can induce maximum
effort? This is an empirical question and one which rational
choice theory is poorly equipped to answer. At certain times and 
for certain individuals, relatively insensitive payments may 
suffice. Much will depend on cultural and individual attributes. 
No definitive answer such as 'X is required to motivate 
entrepreneurs' can be given. But this does not mean that nothing 
can be said about the nature and severity of the trade-off 
between efficiency and equality.
Insensitive tournaments make it more likely that entrepreneurs 
will shirk and as shirking reduces the volume of entrepreneurial 
action, insensitive payments threaten efficiency. On the 
assumption that the relationship between the two is linear, the 
trade-off is illustrated in quadrant C, Figure 7.3. With 
reference to the rest of this diagram, it can also be seen that 
entrepreneurs will have to bear more risk in sensitive 
tournaments. Tournaments reduce but do not eliminate the salience 
of luck and entrepreneurs will continue to endure significant 
variations in their income. For individual entrepreneurs, 
uncertainty is costly. Government is more able to cope with risk 
as it is able to draw on reserve funds and compensate for the bad 
luck of some entrepreneurs with the good luck of others but 
individuals are unable to do this and are likely to demand a risk 
premium of higher wages. Entrepreneurs are unlikely to be 
excessively risk-adverse individuals but a premium will still be 
required and the resulting trade-off is shown in quadrant B.
The relationship between sensitivity and uncertainty can be 
extended to an additional variable, equality. The more sensitive 
a scheme, the greater will be the levels of inequality both 
between entrepreneurs and between entrepreneurs and other groups 
in society. The latter is due to the effects of the risk premium 
entrepreneurs will demand and the former to the sensitivity of 
payment combined with the effects of luck and differential 
ability. Unless and as in MIS, payments are exactly equal, 
untalented and unlucky entrepreneurs will always receive a lower 
income than talented and lucky ones. Sensitive tournaments will
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emphasise such differences, the trade-off being illustrated in 
quadrant A.
On the assumption that any system must remain in or return to 
equilibrium, it is possible to extrapolate from these 
relationships a fourth trade-off between efficiency and equality. 
This is mediated through the others and depicted with a dotted 
line in quadrant D. Tournaments reduce but cannot eliminate this 
trade-off, the existence of which can be discerned independently 
of any assumptions about the specific levels of pay that will be 
necessary to motivate action.
Figure 7.3. Efficiency and Equality in Tournaments
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7.6 Conclusion
Theorists are frequently drawn to the conclusion that there is 
no perfect solution to PAPs, that it is 'impossible for managers 
to creative incentives that completely realign individual self- 
interest and organizational efficiency' (Miller, 1992, 136).
Given the foundations upon which PAA is built, this is not 
surprising. The initial assumptions of conflicting interests and 
uncertainty mean that all solutions are likely to be 'second 
best'. The argument of this chapter has been that the nature of 
entrepreneurial activity is such as to recommend the use of 
tournaments and that through careful design the problems 
associated with their use can be minimised.
In his discussion of the PAR between bureaucracy and government, 
Terry Moe (1984) identifies two structural weaknesses in 
government's position. First, he argues that government will be 
unable to offer incentives that directly reward entrepreneurs for 
good performance because 'in public bureaucracies ... there is 
no residual in the ordinary sense of the term' (Moe, 1984, 763) . 
Second, he suggests that PARs between government and bureaucracy 
are characterised and complicated by the presence of multiple 
principals. The implication is that the public sector will be 
less able to deal with PAPs than the private sector. Neither of 
these conditions have been assumed to apply in this discussion. 
Agents are made responsible to only one principal and more 
radically, bureaucracy has been pictured as engaging in profit- 
making activity. This has taken us far from the picture offered
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by Niskanen in his critique of bureaucratic entrepreneurship. 
Having outlined the contours of a viable incentive scheme, it is 
now necessary to discuss the ways in which bureaucracy can be 
made to seek profits, the more general relationship between 
bureaucracy and the market and the specific ways in which 
tournaments can be used to animate both.
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8.1 Introduction
Bureaucracy is a term of 'strong emotive overtones and elusive 
connotations' (Albrow, 1970, 13). Portraits of public sector
bureaucrats are frequently unflattering. Those who attempt to 
define this breed with reference to their behavioral 
characteristics point to their lack of initiative (Schumpeter, 
1943, 207), conservatism (Downs, 1967, 96) and hatred of
enterprise (Mises, 1944, 9) . In a summary of such criticisms,
Owen Hughes (1994, 44) concludes that whilst
formal bureaucracy may have had its advantages it is 
also argued to breed timeservers not innovators, it 
encourages administrators to be risk-adverse rather 
than risk-taking and to waste resources rather than 
use them efficiently.
Discussion in Chapter Three sought to confirm these prejudices. 
Bureaucrats will only innovate if innovation increases budget 
size and bureaucrats have no incentive to efficiently coordinate 
resource use. Market socialists seem largely to accept this 
argument. Public bureaucracy is associated with the failings of 
'classical' socialism and alternative ownership arrangements are 
sought.
This chapter defends public bureaucracy. Market socialists should 
embrace and not eschew public bureaucracy. Much depends on the 
perceived relationship between publicly owned bureaucracy and the
market and section 8.2 argues that this relationship has 
frequently been misunderstood. Drawing upon competing theories 
of public administration and with specific reference to recent 
reforms in the British civil service, it is argued that 
bureaucracy can be reconciled with markets. This conclusion 
establishes the possibility of bureaucratic entrepreneurship. 
Section 8.3 pulls together the threads of previous analysis and 
introduces a specific model of bureaucratic entrepreneurship that 
makes use of ordinal tournaments between bureaucrats. 
Difficulties encountered in the construction of this model are 
identified and resolved. Finally, the advantages, both economic 
and political, of bureaucratic entrepreneurial socialism over MIS 
and the LMF are emphasised. The discussion is relatively 
uncritical. The limitations of bureaucratic entrepreneurship are 
examined in Chapter Nine.
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8.2 Bureaucracy and Markets
8.2.1 Bureaucracy and Markets: Opposites and Alternatives
It has been repeatedly argued that markets are a necessary 
condition for entrepreneurial efficiency and budget-maximising 
has been seen as the inevitable consequence of abandoning market 
disciplines. Having relinquished the Weberian definition of 
bureaucracy when confronted with the activities of public 
entrepreneurs like Hyman Rickover, this argument can be used to 
provide the foundation of an alternative definition of public 
bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is a form of governance characterised 
by suppression of the market. The definition is not exhaustive. 
Relationships within families and between friends are not 
governed by market principles but cannot reasonably be described 
as bureaucratic. The definition is valuable in this particular 
context to the extent that it (i) contains within it the basis 
for a critique of bureaucracy, and (ii) echoes more general 
beliefs about the relationship between markets and bureaucracy. 
Hughes (1994, 20) writes that 'provision by markets is the main 
avenue pursued as an alternative to bureaucracy'. Similarly, 
Ludwig von Mises asserts that
there are only two methods for the conduct of human 
affairs within the frame of human society, that is 
peaceful cooperation among individuals. One is 
bureaucratic management, the other is profit 
management (quoted Lane, 1993, 16).
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Going beyond the limited definition of markets offered in Chapter 
Two, the claim that markets are incompatible with bureaucracy can 
be substantiated with reference to six specific facets of 
markets: competition, voluntary exchange, private ownership,
profit-maximising, hard budget constraints and decentralisation.
(i) Competition Markets are competitive and competition promotes 
efficiency, provides a mechanism for the communication of 
entrepreneurial knowledge and incentives for its discovery. The 
presence of competition underpins Israel Kirzner's account of 
capitalist entrepreneurship. Bureaucracy is monopolistic 
(Niskanen, 1971, 30) and retards efficiency. It may be objected 
that for Joseph Schumpeter monopoly is inexorably linked to 
innovation but monopolies in his account are only a temporary 
phenomenon: a by-product of the moment of creative destruction. 
Public bureaucracy is given a legal and therefore 'non­
contestable' monopoly (Baumol, 1982, Spence, 1983). Rickover 
faced no rivals once given the authority to proceed with the 
construction of the Nautilus. Bureaucratic monopolies, it can be 
expected, sap incentives for entrepreneurial discovery and deny 
entrepreneurs the chance to learn from the mistakes and triumphs 
of others.
(ii) Voluntary Exchange The exchange of resources within a 
market is voluntary. This requirement ensures that all market 
transactions are Pareto improvements and secures consumer 
sovereignty. Public bureaucracy is coercive. As Christopher 
Pollitt (1993, 126) emphasises, public bureaucracies are
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frequently called upon to provide services - prisons, education, 
mental health care - to unwilling consumers. The Nautilus was 
paid for by compulsory taxation. The use of coercion may 
occasionally be necessary to secure efficiency; facilitating, for 
example, the provision of non-excludable public goods like 
defence. At the same time, coercion allows public bureaucracy to 
discount consumer preferences and to pursue unpopular and 
unprofitable ventures.
(iii) Private Ownership The presence of private ownership and 
markets define capitalism and the further claim that efficient 
markets require private ownership is a salient part of the 
critique of socialist entrepreneurship. That individuals own 
resources and can exclude others from using them creates both the 
possibility of non-coercive exchange and gives entrepreneurs the 
incentive to remain alert to perviously unrecognised and mutually 
beneficial trades. Public bureaucracy means state ownership. It- 
was, in some sense, the people of the United States and not Hyman 
Rickover who owned the Nautilus. Three immediate consequences of 
denying private ownership can be identified.
(iv) Profit-maximising Private ownership allows entrepreneurs 
to claim the residual difference between the costs and revenues 
of any entrepreneurial venture: profit (Alchian and Demsetz,
1972) . Entrepreneurs have an incentive to maximise profit and 
profit assists coordination by sending signals to other 
entrepreneurs about the efficacy of particular courses of action. 
Within a public bureaucracy, no such incentives exist.
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Entrepreneurs cannot appropriate profits as they do not have any 
rights of ownership. Instead, bureaucrats will find it in their 
interests to maximise budget size.
(v) Hard Budget-Constraint Private ownership requires that 
entrepreneurs be responsible for the losses as well as the 
profits of any venture. If losses are sufficiently high, 
enterprises fail. Other firms or individuals may choose to 
finance loses but are under no obligation to do so. Capitalist 
entrepreneurs face a 'hard budget-constraint' (Kornai, 1986) and 
this motivates entrepreneurial discovery and encourages the 
communication of entrepreneurial knowledge because bankruptcy 
sends a powerful message to others in the market. As ownership 
of a public bureaucracy resides with the government rather than 
individual bureaucrats, budget-constraints are softer. Whilst 
government can be bankrupted, its coercive powers to raise 
taxation and print money allow it to sustain unprofitable 
ventures almost indefinitely.
(vi) Decentralisation Private property facilitates the 
decentralisation of decision-making. The entrepreneur who owns 
an enterprise has sovereign decision-making powers within it. If 
an entrepreneur chooses to make product X, no one can make them 
produce product Y. Private property when combined with 
competition ensures entrepreneurial pluralism. Entrepreneurs are 
not only free but are likely to pursue conflicting 
entrepreneurial projects. Failures are likely but success 
possible as entrepreneurial eggs are not placed in one basket.
*
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Bureaucracy, as Weber emphasises, is subservient. Decision-making 
power within the bureaucracy is centralised and external to it. 
This was precisely the feature of bureaucracy which recommended 
its use within Oskar Lange's and Friedrich Taylor's models of 
socialism but it is also the feature which frustrates 
entrepreneurial efficiency.
There is little new in this account. The intention has been to 
both clarify and develop the argument of Chapter Three by more 
completely specifying the characteristics of the market and 
emphasising the tensions between market and bureaucracy. To 
establish the efficiency of bureaucracy it is necessary either 
to challenge the assumption of market efficiency or to reassert 
the compatibility of markets and bureaucracy. The former has been 
rejected and the second will be pursued in this chapter. In 
defence of the economics of socialism it is possible to call in 
assistance the politics of the New Right.
8.2.2 Bureaucracy, Markets and New Public Management
Until recently, the dominant tradition within public bureaucracy 
has been that of 'progressive public administration' (PPA) 
(Ostrom, 1974, Hood, 1994, 125-41, Hughes, 1994, 23-57). These 
practises which emphasise the values of monopoly and permanence 
of position provide a 'soft' target for critics like Ludwig von 
Mises and William Niskanen. The criticisms levelled against 
public bureaucracy are criticisms of PPA. Since then and, in 
part, as a result of their arguments (Hood, 1994, 134, Hughes,
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1994, 74) an alternative method of governance within public
bureaucracy has emerged and gradually displaced PPA (Aucoin, 
1990): new public management (NPM). Although, like bureaucracy, 
a precise definition of NPM has proven elusive, general 
characteristics can be discerned. Rod Rhodes (1991, 1-2)
describes NPM in the following terms.
A focus on management, not policy, and on performance 
appraisal and efficiency; the disaggregation of public 
bureaucracies into agencies which deal with each other 
on a user-pay basis; the use of quasi-markets and 
contracting out to foster competition; cost-cutting; 
a style of management which emphasises, amongst other 
things, output targets, limited-term contracts, 
monetary incentives and freedom to manage.
NPM is a broad philosophy with many different components the most 
important of which is perhaps the desire to use markets to 
enhance the efficiency of public bureaucracy. So pervasive is 
this association that some commentators have discarded the phrase 
new public management in favour of 'market-based public 
administration' (Lan and Rosenbloom, 1992) : encouraging critics 
to speak of 'government by the market' (Self, 1993) . Three 
particular elements of the NPM reform package are important in 
this context, their implementation and impact illustrated with 
reference to recent reforms in the British Civil Service.
First, NPM requires the development within public bureaucracy of
competition (Dunleavy, 1994, 38, Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, 9,
Hood, 1991, Hood, 1994, 131, Hood, 1995, 5). In Britain, the
'Next Steps' and 'Competing for Quality' initiatives seek to 
promote competition both between public bureaucracies and between 
public bureaucracies and private firms. One of the first Next 
Steps agencies, the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, whose 
remit is to 'provide secure conference facilities for national 
and international government and private sector use' (Cabinet 
Office, 1995, 31) competes with a large number of other venues 
in central London. Under the 'Competing for Quality' programme, 
government activities are costed and through tendering offered 
to other private or public service bodies to provide. The 
intention, as expressed in the original White Paper, is to 'open 
up to competition ... areas close to the heart of government' 
(quoted Fry, 1995, 121).
Second, NPM discourages coercion and encourages the development 
of user-chargers (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, 12). Although
perhaps practised more frequently now, there is nothing 
revolutionary in this. Public Bureaucracy does not always rely 
upon coercion. Her Majesty's Stationary Office (HMSO), 
(re) launched as an agency in 1988, has for many years sold copies 
of government reports and parliamentary debates to members of a 
general public none of whom are forced to purchase material. 
Finally and as part of these reforms, NPM seeks to encourage 
profit rather than budget-maximising. Various government agencies 
HMSO, the Patent Office, the Royal Mint and Vehicle 
Inspectorate - have been given 'trading fund' status and required
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to operate independently of Treasury constraints and to show a 
positive return on investment.
In assessing the impact of reforms not only in Britain but in 
America, Australia and New Zealand, commentators argue that NPM 
has led to the 'bankruptcy of bureaucracy' , (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992) and to the emergence of a 'post-bureaucratic paradigm' 
(Barzelay, 1992, 116). If bureaucracy is to be defined by its
deficiencies the claim has some appeal but in other respects it 
is simply rhetorical. Our response to inconsistencies between the 
Weberian definition of bureaucracy and the actions of Hyman 
Rickover was to not to deny Rickover bureaucratic status but to 
abandon the definition of bureaucracy. The individuals who work 
for HMSO are still employed and paid by the state. They continue 
to perform the same functions. Any definition of bureaucracy 
which refuses to acknowledge the possibility of a change in the 
ways that these functions are undertaken is inadequate. In 
recommending the use of competition to prevent budget-maximising, 
Niskanen (1971, 195) was seeking the reform not the replacement 
of public bureaucracy.
8.2.3 Bureaucracy and Markets: Institutions and Organisations
Douglass North (1990, 3) defines institutions as 'the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction [and which] . . . 
structure incentives in human exchange'. The market is an 
institution. Competition, hard budget-constraints and private 
ownership create incentives for entrepreneurs to maximise profits
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and these characteristics are artificial and humanly devised. 
Markets depend on laws of contract, free trade and bankruptcy. 
Voluntary exchange, for example, demands the presence of a 
'leviathan' to enforce agreements. North (1990, 5) defines an
organisation as 'a group of individuals bound by some common 
purpose to achieve objectives'. Bureaucracy is a form of 
organisation (Perrow, 1972, 3, Jackson, 1982, 5). In the
terminology employed by Friedrich Hayek, markets are 'nomos' and 
bureaucracy is 'taxis'.
Bureaucracy and markets are not, as Hughes and Mises suggest, 
alternatives to each other because they are not, in this sense, 
comparable. Kinship, voting, bidding, bargaining, custom and 
lotteries are institutional alternatives to the market (Shubik, 
1970) as are moral incentives, economic democracy and ordinal 
tournaments. Pressure groups, capitalist enterprises, kibbutzim 
and the labour-managed firm are organisational alternatives to 
bureaucracy. As Figure 8.1 suggests, choice is not between an 
institution (the market) and an organisation (bureaucracy) but 
between types of institution and types of organisation. Markets 
cannot be operated independently of organisations or more 
precisely, efficient markets cannot be run independently of 
organisations. If economies of scale are to be realised or 
transaction costs minimised, individuals must join together to 
pursue joint ventures. Public bureaucracy can, as with the case 
of PPA, co-exist with the use of non-market institutions (II). 
Alternatively and as with NPM, markets can be used with public 
bureaucracy (I) . Finally, non-bureaucratic organisations
3
(families) can be used with non-market institutions (reciprocity) 
(IV), whilst non-bureaucratic organisations (LMFs) can be used 
with market institutions (III) . The claim that markets and public 
bureaucracy are incompatible is inconsistent with actual 
bureaucratic practise and confuses two very different theoretical 
issues.
Figure 8.1. Bureaucracy and Markets
Institution
Organisation
Market Non-Market
Bureaucratic I II
Non-Bureaucratic III IV
8.2.4 Bureaucracy: External and Internal Markets
Once consequence of asserting the compatibility of markets and 
public bureaucracy is the need to offer an alternative definition 
of public bureaucracy. In this case, the particular requirement 
is for a definition that can distinguish public bureaucracy from 
other organisational forms. From the wreckage of earlier 
attempts, one characteristic emerges unscathed. As Weber 
emphasises, bureaucracy is an organisational form which is 
created to pursue externally determined objectives. As Vincent 
Ostrom (1974, 3) comments, bureaucracy is marked by a
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reliance upon hierarchy where subordinates are 
required to defer to the commands of superiors in the 
selection of appropriate action and are subject to 
sanctions or discipline for failure to do so.
Iconoclastic in many respects, Hyman Rickover nonetheless 
remained formally accountable to the government of the United 
States. The construction of a nuclear powered submarine may have 
been Rickover's own idea but to pursue it he had to receive the 
permission of first bureaucratic and ultimately political 
superiors. Bureaucrats are subservient because they are not 
owners. Subject to the 'prohibition of harmful use' (Honore, 
1961, 113), the capitalist entrepreneur is free to use the
resources of her firm in any way they want. Unlike the 
bureaucratic entrepreneur, she has sovereign decision-making 
powers. Public bureaucracy is that organisational form in which 
ownership resides with the state. The technocratic entrepreneurs 
who work within the giant corporation are bureaucrats but because 
ownership is dispersed among large number of individual 
shareholders, they are not public bureaucrats.
This feature of public bureaucracy has implications for 
entrepreneurial efficiency. Because it has coercive taxation 
powers, government can, if it desires, eliminate bureaucratic 
budget-constraints. Equally, government can - as in the 
mathematical model - deny public bureaucrats any discretion and 
centralize decision-making. Alternatively, government can 
decentralize decision-making but encourage bureaucrats to
4
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maximise budgets. Finally and in the absence of a private sector, 
government can eliminate competition by giving to one 
bureaucratic organisation responsibility for the production of 
all goods and services. In short, government can run public 
bureaucracy so as to retard entrepreneurial efficiency.
It may be objected that the sovereignty of ownership gives 
capitalist entrepreneurs a similar choice. Shareholders, like 
government, can order the managers of capitalist firms to 
maximise sales, employment or budgets rather than profits. There 
remain important differences between the two environments which 
suggest both that (i) private firms are less likely to undertake 
such action, and (ii) that such choices are unlikely to subvert 
efficiency to the same extent. First, it is unlikely that private 
owners will have any incentive to encourage such behaviour but 
the same cannot be assumed of politicians (9.2.1). Second, if a 
private firm adopted such practises it would go out of business. 
Public bureaucracy can resist such pressures because of the 
owner's unique position within the economy. Finally and perhaps 
most importantly, whilst shareholders or managers can adopt 
practises that will stifle efficiency within their firm they 
cannot affect the choices of other firms. They can ignore but 
cannot eliminate the market. Competition will remain even if the 
private firm chooses not to compete and even if all the firms in 
an economy adopt inefficient practises they will remain 
vulnerable to the entry of new firms. Again because of its 
legislative and coercive monopoly, the state can simply suppress 
all competition.
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Public bureaucracy offers an uncertain platform for attaining 
entrepreneurial efficiency. The market can but need not be 
reconciled with public bureaucracy. Bureaucratic efficiency is 
threatened not by the nature of bureaucrats but by the nature of 
bureaucratic ownership. It has already been argued that the 
successful separation of ownership and control within the private 
sector cannot be assumed to imply the possibility of successfully 
separating ownership and control in the public sector. To this 
can now be added the additional - and in many respects equivalent 
- conclusion that the successful use of bureaucracy within the 
private sector cannot necessarily be assumed to imply the 
possibility of successfully using bureaucracy within the public 
sector.
To assert that public bureaucracies can be inefficient is not to 
claim that they necessarily will be. As owners, politicians, have 
a choice and their likely response to this choice will be 
examined in Chapter Nine. In this chapter it is assumed that 
efficiency is prized.
It should not be assumed that once this choice is made, 
differences between the public and private sector evaporate. 
Private sector firms inherit a market structure but government 
must create it. NPM should be seen as more than a programme of 
'external' reform through which bureaucratic organisations are 
integrated into the market by increasing competition, reliance 
on user-charges and profit-maximisation. It is also a set of 
'internal' reforms designed to create a market.
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First, decision-making within the bureaucracy must be 
decentralised. The government must resist the temptation to 
intervene in the decision-making process once the goal of the 
organisation has been determined. Within the British Civil 
Service, framework agreements between parent departments and 
agencies have been used to separate 'operational' from 'policy' 
decision-making. The Fraser Report although critical of progress, 
reaffirmed the goal of moving
to a position where agency Framework Documents 
establish that, within the overall disciplines of the 
cash limits and targets set, managers are free to make 
their own decisions on the management of staff and 
resources (quoted in Greer, 1994, 47) .
Second, NPM seeks to create conditions where competition becomes 
possible through the disaggregation of bureaucratic structures. 
Monolithic organisations are separated into a number of smaller 
units.
The aim is to divide the public sector into separately 
managed or 'corporatized' units with their own 
designer logos and corporate identity, operating with 
'one-line' budgets, mission statements, business plans 
and managerial autonomy. The new disaggregated 
structure replaces the PPA style of providing public 
services . . . within a single aggregated unit (Hood,
1994, 129) .
Finally, NPM attempts to foster- efficiency through providing 
stronger incentives (Dunleavy, 1994, 38, Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, 
9). Agency chief executives are selected following intense and 
open competition (Fry, 1995, 114) and are subsequently encouraged 
to renounce tenure in return for the opportunity to receive 
bonuses for exceptional performance.1 The market mechanism which 
ties reward to performance for the capitalist owner is here
reproduced in the public sector. The use of incentives is not, 
as Christopher Hood and Michael Jackson (1991) claim more 
generally for NPM itself, a new phenomenon. Within the ancient 
Chinese bureaucracy, official's rewards were determined by the 
accuracy of their budget forecasts and capacity to control
expenditure (Kamenka, 1989, 30) and in Britain, the use of
performance related pay was recommended by the Fulton Committee 
in the 1960's (Fry, 1995, 78). What has changed has is not the 
nature of public bureaucracy or even the tasks it is called upon 
to perform but the political will to implement particular
strategies.
There are other elements of continuity between PPA and NPM. 
Public bureaucracy continues to be bound by rules. Within the 
Weberian bureaucracy these are used to specify, potentially in
1 This at least is the theory. In practise, appointments are 
often political. In April 1993, for example, the then Home 
Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, appointed Derek Lewis of the Granada 
group as Chief Executive of the Prisons Service in preference to 
Joe Billing, the Home Office civil servant who had been running 
the prisons for two years and who had been the selection panels 
first choice. William Plowden (1994, 94) concludes that the 
appointment was a political one but simply because appointments 
are now frequently political does not mean that appointments have 
to be political.
great detail, the ways in which particular tasks are to be 
performed. Within a NPM bureaucracy, rules are instead used to 
set goals and to provide the parameters within which the market 
is employed. The result is a hybrid mixture of hierarchy and 
markets. Within the capitalist firm, it has been suggested, 
efficiency is often promoted and transaction costs minimised 
through suspending markets and promoting hierarchy. Within a 
public bureaucracy, the hierarchical powers of politicians are 
used to create and then impose upon bureaucrats a market 
framework.
291
8.3 Bureaucracy and Markets: The Practise
8.3.1 Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial Socialism: A Model
There are three principal economic actors within BES: government, 
consumers and agencies. The functions and powers of each are 
specified. In addition, there are three general principles of 
organisation which determine the relationships between the 
actors: state ownership, markets and tournaments.
All productive assets within BES are owned by government. Because 
the government owns resources and is ultimately responsible for 
the residual between revenues and costs, it is, in the sense of 
the term employed by Armen Alchian and Joel Demsetz (1972), an 
entrepreneur. But for BES to function efficiently, government 
must eschew entrepreneurial activity and resist the temptation 
to engage in detailed decision-making about innovation and 
coordination. Government's role is not simply one of benign 
neglect. First, it must specify the goal - profit-maximisation - 
subservient bureaucrats pursue. Second, it must devise and 
enforce a set of rules to govern interaction between bureaucrats 
and between bureaucracy and consumers. A socialist government 
does not have to play a qualitatively different role from 
capitalist governments which must also devise and enforce legal 
rules to sustain markets. The difference with BES is quantitative 
as rules are more numerous and complex.
The role of consumers within BES is unchanged. Exchange is
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voluntary and consumer preferences are sovereign. No restrictions 
are placed upon the kind or volume of products that can be 
purchased. Responsibility for the production and provision of 
goods and services is given to bureaucratic agencies managed by 
a designated individual or set of individuals: the bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs. Agencies will be autonomous and bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs given extensive decision-making powers. Each will 
be left to decide what products to produce and how to produce and 
market them. Each will be left to determine the optimal size for 
their organisation and subject to legally enforceable standards 
on, for example, health and safety and minimum wages each will 
be responsible for internal management. Agencies will be free to 
centralise or decentralise decision-making and to decide what 
use, if any, is to be made of mechanisms of 'vertical control' 
within the organisation.
Entrepreneurial efficiency is secured through the use of the 
market. The relationship between BES and the market can be 
clarified with reference to the six characteristics of the market 
identified in the previous section.
First, relationships between consumers and agencies are ones of 
voluntary exchange. Additionally, the relationship between 
agencies and government is non-coercive in that no individual is 
under an obligation to become a bureaucratic entrepreneur. 
Second, the autonomy granted to each agency encourages 
decentralized decision-making. Markets are a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for entrepreneurial efficiency and the
t
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I autonomy given to agencies gives bureaucratic entrepreneurs the
!
opportunity to suspend the use of markets within their
i
organisation when this will enhance efficiency. One further 
implication of decentralization is that bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs, like their capitalist counterparts, are free to 
pursue conflicting projects. Third, decentralization and consumer 
sovereignty creates the possibility of competition.
Relationships within BES are mediated by a second institutional 
mechanism, ordinal tournaments, the terms of which are determined 
by government. Performance within tournaments is assessed by 
profit. Bureaucratic entrepreneurs' remuneration is determined 
by their position within tournaments and at the end of each 
| tournament, a number of the lowest placed agencies are 
eliminated. If decentralisation and consumer sovereignty create
i
the possibility of competition, tournaments give bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs an incentive to compete. Elimination from future 
tournaments imposes a hard budqet-constraint. The difference 
between BES and capitalism is that the budget-constraint is not 
absolute but relative, depending not upon the size of any one 
agency's losses but the size of those losses relative to others. 
Finally, tournaments give entrepreneurs an incentive to profit- 
maximise.
It is part of the capitalist case not only that markets are a 
necessary framework for efficiency but that markets require 
private ownership if their potential efficiency is to be 
realised. Tournaments are an institutional mechanism imposing
i
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upon entrepreneurs incentives to remain alert in the absence of 
private ownership.
8.3.2 Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial Socialism: Specific Issues
Much in this description has been left unspecified. The 
sensitivity and length of tournaments and the numbers to be 
eliminated from each tournament can be left to government to 
determine through a process of trial and error.2 It is not the 
intention of this chapter to give a detailed blueprint of BES. 
In terms of organisational design, three features require 
explication and discussion as all raise difficult technical and 
political problems. These are, first, the capacity of BES to 
operate alongside a capitalist sector; second, the precise 
mechanism for the entry of new agencies and, third, the financing 
of agencies.
8.3.2.1 Public and Private Sectors
The advantages of co-existence between a socialist and capitalist 
sector have already been addressed in Chapter Six. LMFs like 
Mondragon benefit from co-existence because they are unable to 
generate sufficient innovation. On the assumption that BES is 
better able to generate such activity, a case can be made for the
2 In assessing the competitive solution, Hayek's (1935c, 
214) principle objection to the trial-and-error method is that 
the number of variables involved is too large and that a mistake 
in the calculation of one will necessitate 'changes of hundreds 
of other prices' . Within BES, no attempt is being made to use the 
trail-and-error method to fix prices and the number of variables 
involved is far smaller.
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elimination of capitalist firms. Nonetheless, reasons for 
retaining, at least initially, a capitalist sector can be found.
First and even assuming the goodwill of capitalist owners, it is 
likely that the transformation of capitalist firms into 
bureaucratic organisations will entail substantial transition 
costs. Entrepreneurs used to judging performance in terms of 
absolute profit and loss will have to adapt to the requirements 
of ordinal competition. The implementation of BES will be marked 
by a 'valley of transition' (Przeworski, 1985, 177). By only
gradually introducing BES and allowing a socialist and capitalist 
sector to initially co-exist, these costs will be minimised and 
diffused over a longer period of time.
Second, if economic costs do not prove transitory - if BES is 
shown in practise to be inferior to capitalist entrepreneurship - 
damage will be proportionate to the economy's dependence upon 
BES. Third and for this reason, the electorate is less likely to 
endorse a party committed to the immediate and total suppression 
of capitalism. Electoral pragmatism, it will be recalled, formed 
an important part of the minimalist's case in Chapter Six. 
Fourth, the economic performance of BES may be improved by its 
having to co-exist with a capitalist sector. As competition 
between agencies improves individual agency performance, 
competition between different forms of organisation can be 
expected to be equally beneficial. Government has a choice of 
whether or not to run BES efficiently. Anticipating the arguments 
of Chapter Nine, government has a choice of whether to abide by
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its own rules. In part, government's capacity to tolerate 
inefficiency is due to its monopoly of ownership. If BES competes 
with a capitalist sector, the inefficiencies of BES will be 
exposed to the higher profits of capitalism. Competition imposes 
upon government a hard budget-constraint and this makes it less
likely that government will initially choose to run BES
inefficiently.
Finally, a more principled objection to the elimination of a 
capitalist sector can be made. One of the political objectives 
of socialism is liberty and elimination of the capitalist sector 
is a coercive act that reduces the range of individual choice. 
Milton Friedman (1962, 15) argues that the elimination of a 
capitalist sector threatens political freedom as the existence 
of a capitalist sector limits government's capacity to 
discriminate against individuals whose political or moral views 
it does not approve of.
Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a 
man by his fellow men. The fundamental threat to 
freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of a 
monarch, a dictator, an oligarchy, or a momentary 
majority. The preservation of freedom requires the 
elimination of such concentration of power to the 
fullest possible extent ... by removing the 
organization of economic activity from the control of 
political authority, the [capitalist] market
eliminates this source of coercive power.
Will competition with a capitalist sector fatally undermine BES? 
If so, the pragmatic argument for co-existence appears weaker. 
In Figure 8.2, the financial performance of two entrepreneurs is 
shown over a period of time (T0-T2) equivalent to the length of 
a tournament. One entrepreneur, A, is either consistently lucky 
or consistently alert and secures high profits. The second, B, 
is either consistently unlucky or inert and records repeated 
losses. Consider the likely impact of allowing A and B the choice 
of being either bureaucratic or capitalist entrepreneurs. On the 
assumption that she knows her performance will be impressive, A 
will be a capitalist entrepreneur as this will allow her to 
secure the spectacular prizes of capitalist success. On the 
assumption that he knows that his performance will be inferior, 
B will be a bureaucratic entrepreneur as this will allow him to 
avoid the spectacular losses of capitalist failure. Capitalist 
performance will be artificially inflated, bureaucratic 
performance artificially deflated and the survival of BES 
threatened by the exercise of choice. Whilst it appears that one 
system is performing better than the other, the elimination of 
either will leave performance unchanged. An electorate can be 
given the choice between which system it prefers but individual 
entrepreneurs cannot be given the opportunity to choose between 
two actually existing systems without undermining the possibility 
of that choice being made in the future.
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Figure 8.2. Entrepreneurs and the Mixed Economy
Profits
Time
TO T2T1
The obvious objection to this argument is that it rests upon 
erroneous assumptions about entrepreneur's knowledge of the 
future. The uncertainty of entrepreneurial action is such that 
individuals will not know whether they are likely to be 
entrepreneur A or B and therefore have no incentive to defect. 
The complaint is exaggerated, requiring qualification rather than 
surrender. At time TO entrepreneurs may be genuinely uncertain 
about their future performance. Once a tournament has started 
(Tl) , some of this uncertainty will have been eliminated. 
Entrepreneur A will be aware that her performance might 
deteriorate but will have been exposed to information upon which 
some judgement about future performance can be made. She may, for 
example, know whether her good results were due to outrageous 
good fortune. The difficulty in controlling entrepreneurial 
performance is for any monitor to know this. For this reason, BES
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should be seen as an alternative to and not a complement for 
capitalist entrepreneurship.
8. 3. 2. 2 Entrepreneurial Entry and Exit
Designing mechanisms which generate efficient entry and exit of 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs provides BES with its most significant 
challenge. At the end of a tournament, a particular number of 
entrepreneurs will be eliminated and replaced by new ones. At one 
level, the difficulty for government is specifying the correct 
number to eliminate. Efficiency is threatened if either too many 
or too few are eliminated. Suppose a tournament consists of one 
hundred agencies. If only one is to be eliminated, large numbers 
of potentially successful entrepreneurs will be excluded and the 
incentives for bureaucratic entrepreneurs to remain alert 
reduced. If ninety nine entrepreneurs are to be eliminated, a 
different set of problems emerge. The danger then is of excluding 
too many entrepreneurs and of replacing them with less talented 
ones. Again, the incentives for entrepreneurs to perform 
efficiently are reduced as all might calculate at the start of 
the tournament that no matter how alert they remain elimination 
will be almost certain.
It appears that government must search, perhaps through a process 
of trial and error, for an optimal solution. Its capacity to do 
so in rapidly changing economic circumstances can be doubted as 
optimal solutions in one tournament may soon become obsolete. 
In one sense, the problem does not appear so different from that
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faced by government in trying to determine the appropriate length 
of tournaments and the sensitivity of entrepreneurial reward but 
this is to underestimate the difficulties BES will face.
The fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism is 
the centralization of decision-making within the former. This is 
revealed in the search within socialism for a definite answer, 
for a particular number of agencies to eliminate. Within 
capitalism, decision-making about entry is decentralized. 
Individuals decide whether to enter the market and there are no 
formal restrictions upon the numbers that can decide to do so. 
Limitations on entry may mean that potentially successful 
entrepreneurial ventures will never be given the chance to prove, 
themselves in the market. An additional complication arises for 
BES. If the number of applicants to become entrepreneurs is 
greater than the number of places available, government must 
choose between candidates. Government cannot remain above the 
process of entrepreneurial decision-making but will have to make 
important economic judgements. Given the (ex ante) difficulty of 
judging an entrepreneur's likely (ex poste) performance, it is 
difficult to see that any efficient selection mechanism can be 
devised. Rigidly specifying the number of agencies that will be 
eliminated also creates problems of exit. If average profit is 
high, agencies which record substantial profits might still be 
eliminated whilst if average profit is negative, tournaments 
might ensure the survival of entrepreneurs who would be 
bankrupted in a capitalist system.
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A defence of BES can be constructed out of criticisms of 
capitalist entrepreneurship. First, restrictions upon entry might 
enhance efficiency. Capitalist competition leads to the almost 
immediate closure of many new firms. In part this reflects the 
inherent difficulty of entrepreneurial action and the failure of 
capital markets but many entrepreneurs fail because they are 
simply inadequate and lack sufficient entrepreneurial judgement. 
That capitalism places no restrictions on the entry of such 
individuals is not a source of strength. Trying to judge likely 
performance is difficult but will exclude many who obviously lack 
the ability to become entrepreneurs.
Second, whilst in theory capitalism allows for unlimited freedom 
of entry, in practise this negative right is not translated into 
a positive freedom. Most capitalist entrepreneurs cannot afford 
to finance their own entry and must borrow money from banks or 
venture capitalists. As funds for lending are limited, 
entrepreneurs compete for limited resources. Third, capitalism 
can be condemned for sustaining firms that make only negligible 
profits as the capture of profit does not itself suggest an 
optimal allocation of resources. What matters is whether 
resources currently consumed by firms can be redeployed more 
effectively elsewhere. Precisely because it eliminates agencies 
on the margins of survival, BES enhances entrepreneurial 
efficiency. Finally, whilst survival within BES is arbitrary and 
dependent on the profits of others, capitalism is also 
capricious. Viable firms can be driven into bankruptcy by the 
whims of capital markets and by temporary recessions.
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Alternatively, a defence of BES can be constructed around the 
claim that criticisms of it are exaggerated. BES places a limit 
upon the creation of new agencies not on the entry of 
entrepreneurs. Any individual who fails to be selected to manage 
an agency will still be able to approach existing agencies with 
their ideas. If an agency believes the individual capable of 
being a successful entrepreneur, they can employ them within 
their organisation and grant them, if appropriate, considerable 
discretion. Equally, a recently eliminated entrepreneur whose 
profit record is generally satisfactory can approach an existing 
agency. Decision-making is in this way decentralised; there is 
no single moment when entrepreneurial entry is determined and no 
limit upon the number of entrepreneurs within the system.
Finally, it is possible to design BES in ways that further 
decentralise decision-making. Two possibilities are considered. 
First, faced with an excessive number of applicants wanting to 
form agencies, government can encourage each to bid for the 
limited number of places. With, for example, ten places 
available, the ten entrepreneurs who bid the largest sums can be 
allowed to enter. This is undesirable in so far as it 
discriminates in favour of those with greater initial assets. 
Alternatively and having been informed of the existing 
sensitivity of payments, entrepreneurs can say what additional 
'tax' they will be prepared to pay on profits. If, to use another 
example, bureaucratic entrepreneurs are rewarded with five per 
cent of all profits, individuals can bid to receive only three 
per cent. Three distinct advantages of such a scheme can be
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identified. First, it frees government from part of its decision­
making burden. Government's role can be restricted to the 
collection and collation of information. Second, it increases 
equality. With a smaller proportion of profits given to 
entrepreneurs, more becomes available for the purposes of 
redistribution. Finally, it ameliorates problems of adverse 
selection. Those individuals who believe they have excellent 
entrepreneurial judgement and who therefore expect to make the 
most profit have an incentive to put in the lowest bids.
Second and more radically, government can resolve many 
difficulties by simply lifting any restrictions upon the volume 
of entry. Here, government announces that ten per cent of all 
agencies will be eliminated and that those eliminated will have 
to pay a forfeit of, for example, €2 000. Subject to their being 
able to offer collateral on this amount, any individual is then 
allowed to form an agency at the start of a tournament. The total 
number of agencies will vary according to individual's assessment 
of market conditions. Decision-making is decentralised and 
barriers to entry removed. The difficulty with this proposal is 
that it exposes government to large risks. As was noted in 
Chapter Seven, ordinal tournaments are not budget-balancing. It 
is unlikely that £2000 will cover the losses of the least 
successful entrepreneurs and whilst this sum can be increased, 
to do so reduces the ability of entrepreneurs to enter the 
market.
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8. 3. 2. 3 Capital and Finance
No mention of how investment capital is to be allocated between 
agencies has so far been made. One obvious possibility here is 
to make use of ordinal tournaments and give to the most 
profitable agencies the most capital, others receiving an amount 
proportionate to their ranking. Intuitively, such a system is 
both simple and appealing and is certainly preferable to a 
mechanism that allocates the most money to agencies that record 
the lowest profits. Critics might accept that ordinal tournaments 
can be used to provide sufficient incentives for bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs to remain alert but still object that the same 
system allocates investment capital inefficiently. Three problems 
can be identified.
First, it leads, once again, to the centralisation of decision­
making. Government will have to decide how much to allocate to 
the agency that performs best, how to divide up the rest and, by 
extension, the total amount of capital to be allocated. Second, 
ordinal tournaments will not allocate capital in absolute 
proportion to profit and this might be thought to lead to 
perverse results. Imagine a tournament between four agencies in 
which one is to be eliminated. The first agency makes £1001 
profit, the second £1000, the third £10 and the fourth no profit. 
If there is some relationship between the profit agencies make 
in current and future tournaments, ordinal allocation appears to 
give too little to the second and too much to the third agency. 
In a tournament between a large number of agencies such
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difficulties will be reduced but, third, the assumption that 
capital allocation should be made proportionate to profit can 
itself be challenged. Consider the position of a modestly placed 
entrepreneur who at the very end of a tournament discovers a 
revolutionary means of producing an existing product for far less 
money. Tests confirm the potential of the scheme but 
implementation requires large initial amounts of capital 
investment. Tournaments will starve the entrepreneur of the 
necessary finance. Equally, the capture of large profits by an 
entrepreneur in one tournament need not mean that they can make 
the best use of additional resources.
Again and because capitalism is also unable to allocate 
investment funds efficiently, one form of defence for BES is 
attack. Alternatively, it may be objected that an entrepreneur 
will be able to approach another agency with their ideas. 
Finally, it is possible to devise alternative methods of finance 
in which decision-making is also decentralised. Rather than 
allocate capital ordinally, government can do so cardinally. At 
the end of a tournament, government can award to each agency some 
proportion - perhaps exceeding unity - of profit for future 
investment. This resolves two of the problems of ordinal finance 
as government not need become actively involved in investment 
decisions and allocation is made proportional to profit. 
Bureaucratic entrepreneurs can then be told that whilst they are 
free to spend the amount allocated to them, they are under no 
obligation to do so. Imagine that a bureaucratic entrepreneur 
calculates that from a infusion of, for example, £100 they can
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derive an eventual return of £300. They will then have an 
incentive to lend the money to any entrepreneur who offers a 
return of more than £200. Entrepreneurs who lack initial capital 
but who are certain of their capacity to secure high returns have 
an additional source of funding. Through a series of 
decentralized side payments, capital can be allocated 
efficiently.
The transaction costs of this solution are likely to be high. 
Entrepreneurs will have to discover others with capital 
available, bargaining will have to take place and difficulties 
will arise over the terms on which security can be offered. As 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs do not own their agencies, they cannot 
offer existing capital as collateral. One solution to the 
existence of transaction costs is hierarchy. The autonomy given 
to agencies includes the right of merger and this can be used to 
minimise transaction costs. Alternatively, a market solution may 
be found in which bureaucratic organisations dealing exclusively 
in the allocation of capital in return for either a fee or a 
share of subsequent profits emerge. These agencies will compete 
in tournaments alongside others and be subject to competition 
from new entrants.
1
307
8.4 The Virtues of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial Socialism
The trade-off between entrepreneurial efficiency and equality 
cannot be eliminated. But relative to both capitalism and other 
forms of market socialism, BES is more able to reduce the 
salience and extent of this trade-off.
8.4.1 The Politics of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial Socialism
Socialism has been characterised as requiring the pursuit of 
equality, democracy and liberty. The closer these goals come to 
being realised, the more socialist a system can be described as 
being. The level of equality within BES will depend upon the 
sensitivity of the tournaments used to judge entrepreneurial 
performance and to this extent it cannot be said how equal BES 
will be. Because risk is shared and a risk premium paid, BES, 
unlike MIS, is incapable of attaining absolute equality but for 
two reasons, BES will be capable of sustaining a greater degree 
of equality than capitalism.
First and as an institutional device, ordinal tournaments 
minimise the necessary trade-off between equality and efficiency. 
For any given level of efficiency, BES sustains a greater level 
of equality than capitalism. First and when compared to the 
undiluted profit incentives offered by capitalism, tournaments 
are relatively insensitive. Entrepreneurs are not rewarded with 
spectacular prizes and are not punished with spectacular losses. 
Tournaments also reduce the salience of certain forms of luck,
further reducing inequality between entrepreneurs.
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Second, state ownership also promotes equality. Entrepreneurs are 
only rewarded for their judgement and unavoidably and to some 
reduced extent, their luck. Capital is not rewarded as a separate 
asset as individuals own no capital. Bureaucratic entrepreneurs 
will be able to borrow capital but no residual can be earned from 
the simple ownership of capital. The profit generated by 
bureaucratic agencies can be used for the purposes of 
redistribution or reinvestment. In this respect, BES is superior 
to the LMF. Here, ownership although diffused is still exclusive. 
Mondragon's profits are distributed among their workers and 
owners and not the broader Spanish population.
Can BES secure greater democracy? At the 'micro' level of the 
individual agency, bureaucratic entrepreneurs are free to 
implement systems of economic democracy and in agencies engaged 
in non-elite entrepreneurial activity this may result in greater 
efficiency. But because agencies are not owned by the individuals 
who work in them, economic democracy cannot be embedded in the 
same way it can in the LMF. BES does allow for the extension of 
democracy at the 'macro' or system level. Although much decision­
making is decentralized within BES, government must still 
determine the sensitivity and length of tournaments, the level 
of subsidy to be given to new agencies and the amount of profit 
to be used to finance investment. Many of these choices involve 
making a trade-off between efficiency and equality. By voting for 
particular parties, the electorate can influence the decisions
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eventually made, expressing their preference for either greater 
efficiency or equality. Does capitalism give voters the same 
control? Adam Przeworski (1985) and Charles Lindblom (1977, 172- 
84) argue that it does not. Whilst governments can theoretically 
respond to electoral preferences for greater equality by raising 
taxes on capitalist firms, the fear of disinvestment and capital 
flight will prevent them from doing so. Capitalists are 
systematically lucky (Dowding, 1991, 137-8). State ownership
prevents capital flight and disinvestment and allows for greater 
collective control.
8.4.2 The Economics of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial Socialism
Markets are a necessary condition for entrepreneurial efficiency 
and the use of markets ensures that BES will be more efficient 
than those forms of socialism which rely upon the suppression of 
markets and the centralization of decision-making. It has also 
been argued that markets are an insufficient condition for 
entrepreneurial efficiency and that the replacement of markets 
by hierarchy can sometimes reduce transaction costs. The autonomy 
given to bureaucratic entrepreneurs allows them to suspend the 
market within their agency.
BES is more efficient than capitalism. First, tournaments reduce 
the salience of luck and the chances of otherwise viable agencies 
being eliminated by temporary recessions. Second, tournaments 
increase entrepreneur's uncertainty about their performance. None 
will be able to eschew risks in the belief that survival is
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assured through the capture of only a small profit. Third, 
tournaments guarantee entrepreneurial survival over the length 
of one tournament, giving new agencies a chance to establish 
themselves. In Chapter Two it was argued that capitalist markets 
systematically under-supply entrepreneurial activity and in 
Chapter Six it was suggested that this deficiency is exacerbated 
by the instability, short-termism and risk-aversion of capital 
markets. State control over investment decisions and the removal 
of all barriers to entry allows BES to take account of the 
positive externalities of entrepreneurial action when determining 
investment levels.
BES is also more efficient than either of the other forms of 
market socialism considered. If the behaviour of individuals 
under MIS remains unchanged, positive externalities will continue 
to be ignored.3 LMFs are compromised for the same reason. Whilst 
ownership is extended to workers in individual firms, ownership 
is still exclusive and for this reason is inefficient. Second and 
unlike its rivals, BES is able to sustain diverse forms of 
entrepreneurial activity. MIS struggles to deal with the 
requirements of neo-pluralist entrepreneurship. Because BES does 
not depend on reciprocal monitoring of performance and, for 
example, the presence of small groups with rigidly knit patterns 
of social interaction, this limitation does not apply. If 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs discover a profitable opportunity for 
expansion they will have an incentive to take it. Finance for
3 It will be recalled that the value of this (Carens') 
assumption was challenged in section 5.2.2.
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expansion is adequately provided for through (i) capital 
allowances from government at the end of a tournament, (ii) 
borrowing from other agencies capital allowances, and (iii) 
merger with other agencies. Unlike LMFs, the structure of BES 
does not discourage entrepreneurs from pursuing more innovative 
or hazardous (elite) projects. Whether bureaucratic entrepreneurs 
will choose to do so depends on their aversion to risk but there 
is no organisational or institutional impediment to the exercise 
of such a choice.
8.5 Conclusion
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The major changes in the present character of 
bureaucracy that are suggested .. involve changes in 
the structure of bureaucracy and changes in the 
incentives of bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1971, 195)
Niskanen argues that traditional bureaucracy is inefficient and 
in the concluding chapter of Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government recommends a number of policy reforms. Competition 
within bureaucracy should be increased (Niskanen, 1971, 195) and 
older bureaus be 'permitted to expire gracefully' (Niskanen, 
1971, 200). Despite recognising the 'inherent' difficulties of 
'defining, contracting for, and monitoring the output of a public 
service' (Niskanen, 1971, 199) he also recommends the increased 
use of centralised oversight. More powers should be given to the 
executive office (Niskanen, 1971, 196), whilst the legislative 
control process should be reformed so as to ensure more 
representative committee membership (Niskanen, 1971, 219). It is 
also considered necessary to alter bureaucratic incentives more 
directly. Bureaucrats are to be rewarded for reducing the size 
of their budgets; rewards taking the form of either promotion 
(Niskanen, 1971, 202), bonus payments upon retirement (Niskanen, 
1971, 204) or additional resources for 'perks' like research and 
development (Niskanen, 1971, 205).
BES also advocates changes in the structure of bureaucracy and 
the incentives given to bureaucrats. The proposals though are far
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more radical than those offered by Niskanen. Tournaments are used 
to structure competition and agencies that perform inadequately 
will be eliminated. Decision-making will be decentralized, 
allowing government to be absolved of the responsibility for 
closely monitoring entrepreneurial action. In its place, 
bureaucrats are given incentives to profit-maximise and to remain 
alert to the possibilities of entrepreneurial discovery.
In many respects, BES is a development of and represents a 
logical conclusion to current NPM reforms within public 
bureaucracies. Whilst the most vigorous NPM reforms have been 
undertaken by New Right governments in America and Britain 
(Pollitt, 1993), the intention of this chapter has been to show 
that the philosophy of management embedded in NPM is of more 
general value. Through the retention of public ownership, BES can 
be used to promote the political values of socialism. Like 
rational choice theory, NPM is a tool: one which has been
employed by the New Right but from which socialist's can and 
should learn.
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Public choice theory has been the avenue through which 
a romantic and illusory set of notions about the 
workings of governments and the behaviour of persons 
who govern has been replaced by a set of notions that 
embody more scepticism about what government can do 
and what governors will do (Buchanan, 1984, 11) .
MIS demonstrates that once altruism is assumed, the difficulties 
of socialist entrepreneurship can be easily disposed of.
Presented in its crude form, Joseph Carens' argument was
rejected. Feasible socialism must be built on egoism and it is 
a comparative advantage of BES that ordinal tournaments can
harness the self-interest of entrepreneurs. Paraphrasing Adam 
Smith, it is not from the benevolence of the bureaucratic
entrepreneur that we expect economic growth but from their regard 
to their own interest. There are three principal actors within 
BES: consumers, politicians and entrepreneurs. If egoism is
assumed of entrepreneurs and consumers, consistency requires that 
the same be required of politicians (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, 
48). A belief that politicians will be inspired by a concern for 
the general welfare of their community is no more defensible than 
the assumption that entrepreneurs will be motivated by 'Social 
Duty Satisfactions'. Can BES cope with this additional 
requirement?
Using both rational choice theory and the example of Britain's
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nationalised industries, section 9.2 argues that politicians have 
little intrinsic interest in devising and enforcing efficient 
rules of competition between entrepreneurs. In previous chapters, 
attention has been pulled toward institutional design. In this 
chapter, the focus is on organisations and the construction of 
a political system which gives politicians no incentive to 
subvert efficiency. Returning to the distinction between 
hierarchical and market solutions drawn in Chapter Six, section
9.3 assesses and finds wanting two possible arrangements: 
decentralisation and constitutionalism. Finally, the foundations 
of a more acceptable solution are found in the Japanese political 
system and the work of Friedrich Hayek.
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9.2 Political Self-Interest and Entrepreneurial Efficiency
9.2.1 Rational Choice and the Theory of Inefficiency
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan (1985, 2) define rules as 
'institutional arrangements governing ... interactions'. Rules 
structure incentives and suggest behaviour. BES is characterised 
by a set of rules governing ordinal competition between 
bureaucrats. Rules determine the sensitivity of entrepreneurial 
payment, entry into and elimination from tournaments and levels 
of investment. Rules can most obviously be evaluated in terms of 
their capacity to achieve desired goals. Effective rules of 
language facilitate communication and effective rules of commerce 
facilitate exchange. Ideally, BES's rules should generate 
entrepreneurial activity without sacrificing equality, democracy 
and liberty. If the economic and political advantages of BES 
identified in Chapter Eight are to be realised, effective rules 
must be both devised and consistently applied. It will be assumed 
that through a process of trial and error effective rules can be 
discovered. The question addressed in this chapter is whether 
they will be applied.
In spheres of activity where interests do not conflict, rules of 
behaviour can evolve in the absence of a dictator. In Figure 9.1, 
individuals have the choice of whether to drive on the left or 
right hand side of the road. The game is one of coordination as 
utility is maximised if individuals make the same decision. There 
is no need for government or some other third party to enforce
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a decision: a convention will naturally emerge and will be
respected by drivers.
Figure 9.1. A Pure Coordination Game
Individual B
Individual A
Left
Left Right
5,5 0,0
Right 0,0 5,5
Within BES, preferences conflict. Bureaucrats, for example, have 
an interest in budget-maximisation that consumers do not share. 
If efficiency is to be realised, rules will have to be imposed. 
In itself this presents no problem as bureaucracy has been 
defined in terms of its organisational subservience. But will 
elected politicians any more than bureaucrats find it in their 
interest to devise and enforce effective rules?
To answer this question, politician's maximand must be specified. 
Anthony Downs (1957, 28) famously suggests that politicians
pursue office and that 'parties formulate policies in order to 
win elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies'. 
This assumption is now firmly embedded within the rational choice 
literature (Stevens, 1993, 210) and will be utilised in this
chapter.1 Initially, this assumption appears promising. If
1 A alternative assumption is that politicians are 
intrinsically concerned with policy (De Swann, 1973, 88). Whilst 
Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle employ this assumption in their
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consumers prefer effective rules to ineffective ones and if there 
are more consumers than bureaucratic entrepreneurs, politicians 
will maximise their vote by imposing effective rules. There is 
a principal-agent relationship between politicians and voters but 
no principal-agent problem as interests converge. For five 
reasons, this conclusion can be challenged: politicians will
neither devise or consistently apply effective rules.
First, politicians will not devise effective rules because voters 
themselves may prefer ineffective ones. It was noted in Chapter 
Six that individuals discount the future value of income and for 
this reason, rules that undermine long-term efficiency may be 
still be preferred if they generate short-term growth. In the 
long-term, voters may come to regret the choice of ineffective 
rules but will be immediately tempted by the prospect of the 
short-term gains that come, for example, from softening the 
budget-constraint on agencies that are felt to have failed 
because of bad luck.
Second, territorial representation encourages politicians to 
pursue the possibly sectional interests of their constituents. 
Assume that there are three agencies and it is known that 
efficiency will be maximised if the agency finishing last in the 
tournament is eliminated, the one finishing second given no extra 
capital and the one finishing first given all of its own profits 
back to invest. The three agencies are located in three different
study of coalition formation they convincingly argue (1996, 20) 
that differences between the two can be exaggerated.
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constituencies. Politician A in whose constituency the agency 
finishing last is located will find it in their electoral 
interest to propose (X) that the rules be amended in such a way
as to allow their agency to remain open. Politician B in whose
constituency the agency finishing second is located will find it 
in their electoral interest to propose (Y) that the rules be 
amended in such a way as to allow investment for their agency to 
be increased. Politician C in whose constituency the agency 
finishing first is located will also find it in their electoral 
interest to propose (Z) that the rules be amended in such a way
as to allow investment for their agency to be increased.
As Figure 9.1 indicates, whilst each politician will benefit from 
a change in the rules affecting their agency, overall efficiency 
is lowered if any concessions are made. Nonetheless, logrolling 
can be used to secure the passage of inefficient amendments 
(Fioriana and Noll, 1978, Shepsle and Noll, 1981). Politicians 
A and B can, for example, form a coalition supporting amendments 
X and Y. Although in this example one politician, C, is excluded 
from the trade, given the additional assumption of asymmetric 
costs and benefits William Riker (1982, 163-7) demonstrates that 
through a series of mutually beneficial trades from which none 
are excluded all can lose.
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Figure 9.1 Logrolling and the Supply of Concessions
Policy Demand
X Y Z
A + 6 -5 -5
1 B -5 + 6 -5
C -5 -5 + 6
Total -4 -4 -4
Third, voter's discount the value not only of future but of past 
events and place, for example, disproportionate emphasis on 
economic performance at the time of an election (Fair, 1978, 
Fiorina, 1981). Political Business Cycle theory suggests that 
politicians can exploit this attribute to manipulate the economy 
and ensure that
within an incumbent's term in office there is a 
predictable pattern of policy, starting with relative 
austerity and ending with the potlatch right before 
the election (Nordhaus, 1975, 172).
The incentive to behave in this way is unaffected by any long­
term damage to the economy. For BES, one implication of this is 
that politicians will abandon effective rules requiring closure 
of agencies if tournaments are scheduled to end immediately 
before an election. Decisions about investment and the 
sensitivity of payment will be influenced by their immediate 
electoral rather than long-term efficiency implications.
*
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Fourth, as well as accommodating their policies to the 
preferences of voters, politicians can attempt to shape 
preferences through partisan social engineering, adjusting social 
relativities, context management, organisational manipulation 
(Dunleavy, 1991, 119-25) and advertising. As John Kenneth
Galbraith (1983, 151) emphasises, individual preferences are not 
fixed: business leaders and politicians can 'create the wants 
[they] seek to satisfy'. Advertising campaigns are expensive and 
must be financed through either individual or corporate 
contributions. Whilst political scientists have found 'no simple 
and predictable connection between contributors and the desire 
for political privilege' (Heard, 1960, 69), contributions can be 
used to purchase 'protection from punitive legislation or 
sanctions, political patronage . . . access to decision-makers and 
[entry] into desirable circles' (Fischer, 1995, 4). To secure
finance, politicians may be tempted to undermine effective rules 
by softening agency budget-constraints and increasing payments 
to successful entrepreneurs in return for campaign contributions.
Donald Wittman (1995) argues that politicians' capacity to 
deceive voters in these ways is limited as opposition parties 
have an incentive to publicise and deter such behaviour. But the 
presence of a strident opposition may further discourage the 
formulation and implementation of effective rules. Neither 
socialism or capitalism can eliminate entrepreneurial risk and 
it is both inevitable and desirable that particular projects will 
fail. For two reasons, failure will often appear avoidable and 
unnecessary. First, as entrepreneurs operate in conditions of
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uncertainty but contribute to the reduction of uncertainty 
through their actions, ventures will fail for what will seem (ex 
poste) to have been predictable reasons. Second, failure will 
frequently overtake a venture that is itself intrinsically sound. 
As Joseph Schumpeter (1943, 73-4) observes, whilst 'incompetent 
men and the obsolete methods are in fact eliminated .... failure 
also threatens or actually overtakes many an able man'.
Within a capitalist system, the costs of failure are largely 
internalised and borne by employees, shareholders and managers. 
Failure rarely induces political disquiet. Consumers did not 
write to MP's to complain about Sir Clive Sinclair's lack of 
judgement in launching the C5 electric car. The costs of failure 
within BES are externalised and ultimately met by the taxpayer. 
As ordinal tournaments are not budget-balancing (7.4.2), costs 
may be considerable. Opposition parties will have an incentive 
to publicise and exaggerate failure, attacking government for not 
intervening to close agencies run by incompetent entrepreneurs 
or saving agencies run by competent ones that experience bad 
luck. For reasons of political expediency, government will either 
set ineffective rules that give it considerable discretion to 
intervene or abandon effective rules once they become politically 
costly. Economists argue that it is not monopoly but non­
contestable monopoly that threatens economic efficiency (Baumol, 
1982, Spence, 1983). In this case, it is the (democratic) 
contestability of government that threatens efficiency.
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9.2.2 Nationalised Industries and the Practise of Inefficiency
Public ownership gives government the power to determine rules 
of economic behaviour. Rational choice theory suggests that for 
this reason rules will be inefficient and the conclusion is 
strengthened by an examination of the British Government's post­
war record in managing nationalised industries. When devising the 
rules by which these industries were run, little attention was 
given to economic efficiency. Industries were constituted as 
monopolies and whilst encouraged to adopt a 'business-like 
attitude' (Coombes, 1971, 58) were given few explicit financial 
targets. Firms were not subject to a hard budget-constraint and 
closure required an act of Parliament (Swann, 1988, 196).
So far as rules were set that might have been used to promote 
efficiency, government consistently undermined them. The initial 
intention when nationalising ownership was, for example, to 
respect managerial autonomy. Ministers were given the power to 
appoint industry Chairmen but were not meant to interfere in day- 
to-day decision-making (Morrisson, 1944, 173). In practise and 
over a period of several years, political control was extended 
to include specific pricing policy (Prosser, 1986, 24) , borrowing 
limits (Curwen, 1988, 90) and investment planning. Less formally, 
ministers controlled policy formulation by secretly threatening 
to reduce future investment or increase taxes (Coombes, 1971, 42, 
Prosser, 1985, 25, Ashworth, 1991, 85).
By subverting its own rules, government could pursue its
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electoral interests. Occasionally these were narrowly partisan. 
The Conservative Party prevented British Coal from raising its 
prices shortly before the 1955 election whilst the Labour Party 
vetoed electricity price increases just before the 1950 one 
(Ashworth, 1991, 56-60). David Coombes (1971, 103) suggests that 
government also devised policies to reward valued political 
allies who contributed to party funds. Labour protected the 
interests of the National Union of Mineworkers against British 
Coal and the Conservatives helped private air operators break the 
monopoly of the state airline, BOAC.
To protect itself from electoral punishment, successive 
governments refused to impose a hard budget-constraint on 
industries: a strategy that would have necessitated redundancies 
and adverse publicity. The Conservatives withdrew plans to close 
a large number of local post offices in the early 1980's 
(Ponting, 1986, 215) whilst Tony Benn, the then Secretary-of-
State for Trade and Industry, threatened to dismiss the Chairman 
of British Steel unless he withdrew plans to close a large number 
of plants (Abromeit, 1986, 197) . For the same reason, governments 
discouraged industries from undertaking innovative action in 
which the risks of failure were high. In a critical review of 
nationalised industry performance, William Robson (1962, 196)
emphasises the costs of a managerial culture that discouraged 
innovation.
It is impossible to conduct even the most successful 
business enterprises without a considerable amount of 
money which turns out to be wasted. If the management 
is over-fearful of spending money unless it is 
absolutely certain to obtain a safe return on the 
outlay, the result is bound to be a highly 
conservative, excessively prudent, and technically 
backward undertaking.
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9.3 Controlling Leviathan: Markets and Hierarchies
In Chapter Five it was argued that exchange in a capitalist 
system depends on the presence of a third party who is able to 
enforce agreements. If the requirements for entrepreneurial 
action are to be reconciled with the achievement of socialism, 
BES also requires a third party to devise and enforce rules of 
ordinal competition between bureaucratic entrepreneurs. The state 
is the one organisation that has the sovereign power to impose 
rules on bureaucrats but because it also has the power to finance 
loses through compulsory taxation, the state is the one 
organisation that has the capacity to implement inefficient rules 
of behaviour. Democracy requires that the state be composed of . 
elected politicians but elections give politicians an incentive 
to favour ineffective over effective rules.
The problem of socialist entrepreneurship has so far been treated 
as an economic one, prompting careful consideration of the nature 
of entrepreneurial incentives, markets and ownership. It now 
appears that the problem is not economic but political. There is 
a need for a leviathan to devise and enforce rules but leviathan 
itself cannot be controlled. As Douglass North (1990, 58)
concludes,
therein lies the fundamental dilemma ... if we cannot 
do without the state, we cannot do with it either. How 
does one get the state to behave like an impartial 
third party?
*
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Drawing initially upon the distinction between markets and 
hierarchies first introduced in Chapter Six, three possible 
answers to North's question will be considered.
9.3.1 Controlling Leviathan: Markets
Opportunistic budget-maximising by bureaucrats can be controlled 
through the imposition of hierarchy but government cannot be 
controlled in this way as it stands at the apex of the hierarchy. 
A similar problem has already been encountered in Chapter Seven 
where it was noted that employers power to renege upon wage 
agreements made with employees can frustrate mutually beneficial 
cooperation. Gary Miller (1992, 162) argues that in the absence 
of hierarchy, markets can serve as an alternative and 'credible 
commitment mechanism for resolving the tension between 
undisciplined managerial self-interest and organizational 
efficiency'. In a competitive market, employees trust employers 
because they know that they consequence of employers abusing that 
trust will be bankruptcy. Can the market also be used as a 
mechanism through which the government leviathan can be 
controlled? Charles Tiebout's arguments are instructive.
Economists expect markets to undersupply non-excludable public 
goods. When asked how much of a good they are willing to pay for, 
individuals have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences: 
to free ride. For this reason, Paul Samuelson (1954) concludes 
that the state must provide and pay for public goods through 
compulsory taxation. Tiebout (1956) demonstrates that if (i)
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individuals are fully mobile, (ii) have perfect information, 
(iii) can choose between a large number of communities in which 
to live, (iv) face no restrictions upon employment and if 
communities are (v) unaffected by positive and negative 
externalities, (vi) experience decreasing returns to scale, and 
(vii) wish to attract new members so as to be able to produce at 
the lowest cost that consumers can efficiently reveal their 
preferences for public goods through moving to a community that 
offers the optimal tax-service package for them. Because the 
fifth assumption makes non-excludable public goods into 
excludable private ones, individuals will not need to choose 
between different supply schedules at the ballot box but through 
migration can ensure that 'each locality has a revenue and 
expenditure pattern that reflects the desires of its residents' 
(Tiebout, 1956, 420). One further and important implication of 
Tiebout's model is that competition between communities to 
attract residents will also ensure that each will produce goods 
at the lowest possible cost. Bureaucrats will not be able to 
maximise budgets because such behaviour will result in emigration 
and the erosion of the tax base. Decentralisation and pluralism 
secures both choice and efficiency.
Tiebout's solution suggests a means by which the leviathan of BES 
government can be controlled. In the previous section it was 
argued that government can adopt ineffective rules because its 
power to raise taxation allows it to sustain losses. If 
individuals can respond to this strategy by exiting to another 
community then government can be deterred from adopting
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inefficient rules. Migration and competition impose a hard 
budget-constraint on leviathan and eliminate monopoly. 
Furthermore and as in Tiebout's argument, markets secure 
democracy as individuals can move to that community that comes 
closest to reflecting their preferred trade-off between 
efficiency and equality. Government by the market appears an
efficient and logical extension of the principles underlying
market socialism.
Because its assumptions are so severe, it can be argued that the 
Tiebout model is of little practical relevance. Surely because 
information is imperfect, externalities do occur and employment 
is restricted, individuals cannot easily move between communities 
and so cannot discipline politicians that pursue inefficient 
policies. This objection can be challenged in three ways. First, 
in an examination of the impact of the Community Charge on 
residential movements in London, Keith Dowding, Peter John and 
Stephen Biggs (1996) demonstrate that Tiebout's assumptions are 
surprisingly robust: individuals do respond to changes in local 
community tax and expenditure policy through migration. Second, 
Austrian economic theory shows that a defence of the market need 
not depend on the kind of assumptions about perfect competition 
embodied in Tiebout's model. Third, whilst pareto optimal 
allocation of public goods depends on the applicability of
Tiebout's assumptions to all individuals, efficiency in 
production does not. If, for example, only one fifth of a
community exit in response to organisational failure, the 
resulting shortfall in revenue may be sufficient to deter
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government from adopting ineffective rules. Two more serious 
objections can, however, be levelled against market solutions to 
government failure.
First, competition between communities is unlikely to be 
restricted to the pursuit of effective rules. In Chapter Eight 
it was argued that BES cannot co-exist with a capitalist sector 
in which ownership is private and prizes for entrepreneurial 
success spectacular. Because they are free to vary the trade-off 
between efficiency and equality, governments will have an 
incentive to compete for the attentions of the most successful 
entrepreneurs by offering more sensitive payments. Competition 
will not only push governments to adopt effective rules but to 
adopt rules that secure efficiency at the expense of equality. 
It is for a similar reason that Peter Self (1993, 63) objects to 
the principle of government by the market: arguing that 'the
unequal distribution of market wealth [will be] not modified but 
compounded in the allocation of public costs and services'. Even 
if ownership remains public and all communities remain faithful 
to the basic principles of BES, competition makes entrepreneurs 
'structurally lucky' (Dowding, 1991, 137-8). All may favour a
balanced trade-off between efficiency and equality but each will 
be tempted to alter the rules to attract entrepreneurs most able 
to stimulate growth.
The second objection to the market solution is that it 
misrepresents the nature of the electoral problem. Ineffective 
rules are pursued not because government is able to deceive
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voters but precisely because electoral competition ensures that 
government faithfully reflects electoral preferences. It is 
because the electorate discounts the value of future pay-offs and 
is susceptible to opposition attacks on government that effective 
rules are not implemented. Decentralisation and pluralism will 
simply recreate national inefficiency at the local level. 
Furthermore, the government market will be extremely unstable. 
Having encouraged governments to sacrifice future efficiency, 
voter's will have an incentive to move to those communities - if 
there are any - which risked initial electoral unpopularity by 
implementing effective rules. Knowing that the future benefits 
of restraint will be shared with immigrants, communities will 
have even less reason to pursue effective rules. It is open to 
either local communities or central government to prevent free 
riding by individuals wishing to escape from the consequences of 
their own votes but to do so will undermine the efficacy of the 
exit mechanism on which the market solution rests.
9.3.2 Controlling Leviathan: Hierarchy
The power of elected politicians need not be unlimited. 
Constitutions can be used to limit the powers of politicians, to 
prevent them from pursuing particular courses of action (Elster, 
1988, 2). A distinction can be drawn between constitutional
prohibitions on (i) outcomes, and (ii) processes. Constitutional 
restrictions on outcomes are frequently negative in intent and 
prevent particular policies being adopted: slavery or arbitrary 
arrest. Constitutional process requirements are frequently
333
positive and require policies to pass certain political hurdles 
before being implemented: consideration by both houses in a
bicameral legislature and judicial review. In capitalist states, 
both can be used to limit the power of leviathan. In the United 
States, a proposed balance budget amendment (Buchanan and Wagner, 
1977, 180) will, for example, make it difficult for government 
to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes through the 
creation of budget-deficits. Process requirements that 
constitutional amendments require more than simple majority 
support also make it more difficult for American governments to 
vote-maximise by disenfranchising certain sections of the 
population. Can constitutional restrictions of either sort be 
used to prevent the adoption of ineffective rules of ordinal 
competition?
Using the example of rules of the road, the first section of this 
chapter argued that conventions can emerge in the absence of 
formal promulgation. A second feature of this rule should be 
noted: its potential stability. Once a convention has emerged
there will be little reason to change it. Only if rules of 
ordinal competition share this feature will constitutional 
restrictions on outcomes be effective. Prior to elections, a 
constitutional convention could then determine rules of payment, 
investment, entry and elimination. These rules could be fixed in 
the same way that constitutional prohibitions against slavery 
are. If voters can be made sufficiently aware of the importance 
of this initial choice, future income might not be so heavily
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discounted and effective rules chosen.2
The rules that govern interaction within BES cannot be so stable 
if efficiency is to be maximised. Even if the 'right' set of 
rules is initially chosen, preferences about the appropriate 
trade-off between efficiency and equality may change and this 
will necessitate revision to the rules. Right rules can become 
wrong rules and constitutional restrictions on outcomes make it 
impossible to respond to changing circumstances. The same 
argument can be levelled against process restrictions that make 
it more difficult to change rules by, for example, imposing a 
two-thirds majority requirement. This may allow the opposition 
to veto undesirable changes but it will also allow them to veto 
necessary ones. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's (1962, 65) 
claim that the 'external cost' of binding decisions is inversely 
proportional to the number of individuals required to take 
collective action is incorrect once a particular set of rules is 
already in operation.
The costs of constitutional inflexibility should not be 
exaggerated as stability itself enhances efficiency. Brennan and 
Buchanan (1985, 10) argue that because change destroys
2 Brennan and Buchanan (1985, 75) argue that systematic
uncertainty in the electoral process leads voters to heavily 
discount the future. Because it is not known whether politicians 
will remain faithful to their rules, little attention is paid to 
the long-term implications of adopting a specific rule. If rules 
are fixed and uncertainty reduced, voters will have less 
incentive to discount the future. Analogous reasoning explains 
Friedrich Hayek's (1993c, 112) faith in constitutional
conventions.
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information, transition costs have to be calculated.
The mere demonstration that state A would be 'better' 
than the status quo, once state A were achieved, is 
not sufficient to demonstrate that a move from the 
status quo is justified.
North (1990, 78) emphasises that rules create incentives for
individuals to invest in particular skills. If, for example, 
tournaments eliminate only one agency in each tournament 
entrepreneurs will learn to adopt risk adverse strategies. If 
preferences about the appropriate trade-off between efficiency 
and equality change then more agencies may need to be eliminated. 
Entrepreneurs will have to learn new skills and it will take time 
for them to do so. Transition costs are finite and if preferences 
change dramatically it may still be rational to change the rules 
of competition. For this reason outcome restrictions are 
inappropriate.
In chapter Seven it was argued that (input) monitoring of 
entrepreneurial performance will be ineffective because 
entrepreneurship resists simple measurement. Constitutional 
restrictions are ineffective for the same reason. It cannot be 
specified in advance what kind of amendments are undesirable. 
Process restriction might demand that amendments be submitted to 
a constitutional court for consideration but judges will be 
unable to know what politician's motives are in changing policy. 
Judges can be given discretion and allowed to block changes that
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they suspect are motivated by electoral considerations but this 
might lead to changes motivated by a genuine concern for 
effectiveness being blocked as well. A constitutional prohibition 
on slavery is possible because it is slavery itself that is 
opposed. Constitutional prohibitions on certain policies are 
ineffective because it is not the policy but the motives for 
certain kinds of policy that are opposed.
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9.4 Incentives and the Location of Discretion
Brian Barry (1990, 7) argues that 'it is a bad idea to set things 
up so there is a ... incentive to do wrong' and it is this advice 
that has animated the discussion of incentives. Shirking, budget 
and vote maximisation threaten efficiency. MIS was condemned 
because it gives individuals an incentive to shirk, PPA because 
it gives bureaucrats an incentive to maximise budgets and BES 
because it gives politicians an incentive to maximise votes. It 
has not been argued that individuals will do 'wrong' no matter 
what their position; only that they will do 'wrong' when they 
have an incentive to do so. An organisational arrangement that 
gives politicians no incentive to do wrong secures the 
feasibility of BES.
In his discussion of constitutionalism, Jon Elster (1989, 9)
argues that choice in designing political systems is between 
'rules and discretion'. This is to obscure a further and 
significant distinction. What matters is not only whether there 
is discretion but who is given discretion and what their 
incentives are in exercising this discretion. Through a detailed 
examination of Japanese economic policy it will be shown that 
discretion can be given to individuals who have no incentive to 
subvert efficiency.
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9.4.1 Computers, MITI and Economic Miracles
At the end of the Second World War, Japanese gross domestic 
product had fallen by twenty five per cent, its merchant marine 
had been destroyed and two major cities razed to the ground. Only 
by 1952 did industrial production recover to its pre-war levels. 
Yet within the space of a generation, Japan was being offered to 
the world as a model of economic success. Erza Vogel's (1979) 
Japan as Number One rode the crest of a new wave of literature 
extolling Japanese virtues. Talk of a 'Japanese miracle' is by 
now somewhat stale. As a term it is also misleading as it implies 
that the causes of Japanese growth are inexplicable. Drawing on 
Marie Anchordoguy's (1989) study of Japan's computer industry a 
familiar explanation of growth is offered: one that emphasises 
the role played by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI).
Economic growth has been actively promoted by the Japanese state. 
Ownership remains in private hands but the state regularly 
intervenes to guide entrepreneurial decisions. The most important 
government agency in promoting growth is MITI. Formed in 1949 and 
always the smallest of the economic Ministries, MITI holds two 
formal sources of power. First, it is responsible for screening 
private sector applications for loans from publicly-owned funding 
organisations like the Japan Development Bank, The Export-Import 
Bank and the Small Business Finance Corporation. Second, MITI is 
encouraged to influence market structure by regulating 
competition, controlling imports and proposing price changes.
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This is not achieved through formal commands but administrative 
guidance: 'warnings, suggestions and encouragement to individual 
firms' (Johnson, 1982, 265).
In 1960 and following extensive consultation, MITI took the 
decision to designate computing a 'strategic industry' and 
promote its growth. Although sales of computers were growing 
rapidly, Japan was almost entirely dependent on imports. Japanese 
firms accounted for only seven per cent of sales (Anchordoguy, 
1989, 34) . Over the next twenty years, Japanese market share grew 
by over sixty per cent and Japan became the only country outside 
of the Iron Curtain in which IBM was displaced as market leader. 
MITI was instrumental in encouraging the growth of the industry 
and three main strands to its policy can be discerned: 
protectionism, financial support and structural control.
(i) Protectionism MITI's first priority in 1960 was to provide 
a 'breathing space' within which a domestic industry could be 
developed. Tariff barriers were immediately raised and any 
company wishing to import a computer was told that it first had 
to apply for an import licence; giving MITI the opportunity to 
'persuade' the company to reconsider its decision. IBM was 
allowed to open a firm in Japan but only on the condition that 
it employ Japanese citizens, accept a voluntary market ceiling 
and provide full access to its patents after a specified period 
of time.
Having later joined the OECD and signed the GATT accords, Japan
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came under intense pressure to liberalise its trade arrangements. 
Eventually and after much delay, some tariff barriers were 
eliminated in 1975 but MITI had no intention of abandoning 
domestic producers to international competition. Import licences 
were still required and sometimes took years to process. The 
publicly owned Japan Electronic Computer Company (JECC) - whose 
role will be examined presently - refused to deal with firms that 
bought computers overseas and government continued to purchase 
only Japanese models.
(ii) Financial Support During the period computing was 
designated a strategic industry, government met the entire cost 
of 'pure' research and shared with individual firms the cost of 
any work that resulted in the acquisition of a patent. During the 
1960's, government spent nearly twice as much on computer 
research as all private firms combined. The 'New Series' project 
- designed to combat IBM's 'third generation' computers - 
received $235m of support and later largely unsuccessful research 
into artificial intelligence $350m (Suzuki, 1988, 38) :
MITI also secured the Finance Ministry's support for favourable 
changes to the taxation system. Corporation tax for computer 
firms was cut from forty per cent in 1950 to less than twenty per 
cent in 1968 and further tax concessions were announced for 
research work. If, to take one example, firm's research 
expenditure in any one year was greater than that in the 
previous, one quarter of the difference was refunded. Anchordoguy 
(1989, 243) calculates that $713m of tax was saved in this way
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alone. Subsidies were also made available through the JECC. 
Created in 1960, this organisation 'played a critical role in the 
development of a modern Japanese computer industry' (Anchordoguy, 
1989, 59) . JECC bought computers and leased them to private firms 
relieving manufacturers of the need to market their own products. 
Additionally, JECC operated a 'buy-back' policy for firms wanting 
to upgrade their capacity. By allaying fears that any computer 
bought might become obsolete, demand was sustained at a time of 
rapid technological development.
Finally and by exercising informal pressure and staking its own 
reputation on the success of the industry, MITI ensured that 
other organisations matched its own funding commitments. The 
publicly owned Japan Development Bank was, for example, 
encouraged to lend to firms at zero or at least negligible 
interest rates. The participation of MITI and the Japan 
Development Bank encouraged the participation of private lending 
organisations. Anchordoguy (1989, 3 6) quotes one senior executive 
as stating that
if the Japan Development Bank lends money to an 
industry, that means the government is backing it.
Other banks will also lend money because they feel 
that MITI will rescue them ... if things get into a 
pinch.
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(iii) Structural Control MITI not only subsidised but guided the 
actions of private firms. JECC was used to control the prices at 
which computers were sold and fearing the dangers of 'Kato Kyoso' 
(excessive competition) MITI controlled the number of firms 
within the industry. In the early 1970's and prompted by 
(misplaced) fears about the impact of foreign competition, MITI 
announced that
six companies in Japan is definitely too many ... we 
should use administrative guidance to make two or 
three firms, not six, to unify and to effectively use 
our engineers and thereby contribute to the 
development of the Japanese computers (quoted 
Anchordoguy, 1989, 105).
Having threatened to withdraw funding from existing projects, 
MITI succeeded in prompting the merger of NEC with Toshiba, 
Fujitsu with Hitachi and Mitsibushi with Oki. But whilst 
competition was controlled by MITI it was not eliminated 
(Johnson, 1982, 318) . JECC was told to only purchase those
computers for which there was a buoyant demand and following the 
failure of several of its projects, one firm, Matsushita, was 
forced to withdraw from the market. MITI encouraged firms to 
compete for research contracts and demanded that each firm have 
its own capital staked on the success of any project for which 
there was government funding. As Anchordoguy (1989, 167)
concludes,
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the overall effort [to develop the industry] has been 
successful because the government has generally 
structured its policies in ways that did not squelch 
the initiative of each company.
It is misleading to imply that MITI alone was responsible for the 
successful development of the computing industry. The state 
facilitated entrepreneurial action but did not itself act as an 
entrepreneur. The state provided funds for innovation but it was 
private firms that conducted the research and in whose names 
patents were registered. JECC marketed computers but it was 
privately owned firms that manufactured them. Risk was minimised 
but it was not eliminated. Furthermore and as Jon Wornoff (1990, 
152-3) emphasises, MITI's record was not perfect. A number of 
expensive mistakes were made most notably in financing expensive 
research into artificial intelligence and in providing large 
subsidies for the eventually bankrupted Japan Software company.
A number of other factors contributing to the success of the 
industry can be identified and their relevance understood in 
terms of the arguments of previous chapters. First, corporate 
structure in Japan encourages investment as firms are financed 
by debt rather than equity. This allows managers to forego the 
pursuit of short-term profits designed to appease shareholders. 
Second, the organisation of firms within 'Keiretsu's' - large 
conglomerates made up of many individual components - facilitates 
growth. The size of these combines allows them to channel large 
amounts of capital into investment and to sustain initial losses.
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This element of Japanese entrepreneurship is clearly neo- 
pluralist. Finally, Japanese firm's commitment to the practise 
of lifelong employment allows companies to invest in human as 
well as physical capital.
To argue that MITI is not solely responsible for the economic 
'miracle' is not, however, to suggest that it is irrelevant. The 
growth of the industry indicates the difference the intervention 
of one powerful ministry can make.
9.4.2 Bureaucracy, Democracy and Discretion
Two important similarities between BES and the mechanisms used 
to encourage Japanese growth can be identified. First, both 
recognise the need to control the environment within which 
entrepreneurs act: BES through ordinal tournaments and MITI
through administrative guidance. Second, both recognise the need 
to grant considerable autonomy to entrepreneurs. An important 
difference can also be observed. Whilst Japanese ownership is 
private, intervention in the market is in many ways more 
extensive. It has not, for example, been suggested that the 
socialist state should set the prices at which agencies market 
their products.
Points of divergence and convergence although worth noting are 
in themselves immaterial. MITI and administrative guidance are 
not being offered as alternatives to or rivals for BES. The 
example has been introduced because although the states act
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differently, both take decisions regularly affecting the welfare 
of entrepreneurs. A change in the level of research support will 
have as great an impact on the profits of a Japanese firm as a 
change in the levels of investment will have on a bureaucratic 
agency. Why did politicians not subvert MITI's rules for their 
own electoral purposes? Because whilst government is neither 
decentralised or constrained by constitutional requirements it 
nonetheless lacks sufficient policy capacity.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the primary objective 
of the American occupying forces was the ' democratisation' of the 
Japanese political system. The powers of the military and the 
emperor were reduced and a new constitution stating that 
'sovereign power resides with the people' (quoted Herzog, 1993, 
2 65) passed. Nonetheless and despite the intentions of the 
constitutional settlement, power was transferred not to the 
legislature but to the bureaucracy. The rule of law has been 
replaced by the rule of bureaucrats (Henderson, 1975, 195) . In 
his assault on Japanese political culture, Peter Herzog (1993, 
262) suggests that 'bureaucrats reign supreme in most government 
agencies while ministers behave like simple robots': a
description endorsed by numerous other academics (Kunio, 1986, 
Maheswari, 1987, Ito 1992, 318).3
3 In recent years a revisionist literature stressing the 
interdependency of the bureaucracy and the Liberal Democratic 
Party has emerged (Parks, 1986, Koh, 1989, Haley, 1991). Even 
then it is still acknowledged that 'in comparative terms, Japan's 
administrative elite may be among the most powerful in 
industrialized democracies' (Koh, 1989, 256).
MITI does consult with other bodies before taking decisions. 
Japan has at least four powerful groups representing the 
interests of industry and individual computer firms are 
encouraged to voice their concerns directly to MITI through 
deliberation councils. But not only does MITI control access to 
these meetings - excluding interests opposed to the dominant 
growth coalition - it retains the authority to impose unwelcome 
decisions upon firms. MITI's decision to launch JECC and to merge 
the six computer firms was, for example, taken despite strong 
opposition (Anchordoguy, 1989, 61). The organisational autonomy 
of MITI from elected politicians more susceptible to the demands 
of interest groups, makes the subversion of effective rules less 
likely.
Rules are discretionary and MITI is in a position to change them 
in response to mistakes and volatile international conditions but 
there is no incentive to abuse this discretion. In his discussion 
of the lessons that can be learnt from the Japanese model, 
Chalmers Johnson (1982, 315) comments that there is a need for 
a political system in which
the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take 
initiative and operate effectively. This means, 
concretely, that the legislature and judicial branches 
of government must be restricted to 'safety valve' 
functions.
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In Chapter Eight, the necessary actors within BES were identified 
as being consumers, agencies and government. The success of the 
Japanese system suggests that a fourth actor must be added to 
this list: a small number of elite and vigorously independent
bureaucratic guardians responsible for setting and, when 
necessary, changing the rules of ordinal competition. These 
officials will have no incentive to vote-maximise as they will 
not be elected and no incentive to budget-maximise as they will 
be given no budget beyond that necessary for administrative 
needs. Will officials shirk? If promotion and perhaps salaries 
within the organisation are made dependent on the performance of 
agencies this incentive can also be nullified through 
organisation design.
There is both an irony and a cost in positing the need for such 
a body. Whilst in Chapter Three the 'instrumental efficiency' of 
bureaucracy was challenged, Max Weber himself expresses a very 
different concern: that the very efficiency of bureaucracy leads 
bureaucrats to usurp politician's functions. Bureaucrats, Weber 
argues, make poor politicians being too conservative and 
unwilling to compromise. Bureaucratic power threatens efficiency 
and will lead to the creation of a 'politically stultified 
nation, with the vigour of the non-bureaucratic classes unable 
to express itself' (Albrow, 1970, 48) . But whilst bureaucracy has 
been defined in terms of its subservience, the feasibility of BES 
appears to depend on bureaucrats acting in non-bureaucratic ways.
The cost of the solution is evident. Socialism requires democracy
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and bureaucratic control of the rules of ordinal competition is 
undemocratic. When considering changes to the rules, unelected 
and unaccountable bureaucrats may but need not take account of 
public opinion. If the trade-off between efficiency and equality 
is to be minimised, it appears necessary to accept a further 
trade-off between efficiency and democracy. Herzog (1993) 
describes Japan as a 'pseudo-democracy'. Does the same label need 
to be attached to BES?
9.4.3. Saving Democracy: The Political Order of a Free People
The distinction between 'nomos' - spontaneous orders - and 
'taxis' - organisations designed to achieve particular purposes - 
has already been noted in Chapter Three. In The Political Order 
of a Free People, Friedrich Hayek (1982d) recognises that for 
spontaneous orders like the market to operate effectively it will 
be necessary for an organisation, the state, to construct rules 
governing behaviour. But the market, Hayek claims, has been 
undermined by governments using their unlimited powers to subvert 
rules for political purposes.
The very omnipotence conferred on democratic 
representative assemblies exposes them to irresistible 
pressure to use their power for the benefit of special 
interests, a pressure a majority with unlimited powers 
cannot resist if it is to remain a majority (Hayek, 
1982d, 128).
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Because existing organisational structure gives politicians an 
incentive to undermine efficiency, the survival of liberal 
democracy depends not on the election of a more prudent class of 
representatives but on the reconstruction of the political 
system. Hayek (1982d, 106) proposes a functional division of
labour between Governmental and Legislative Assemblies in which 
the Government Assembly is made responsible for the direction of 
government activity designed to achieve particular goals like the 
provision of public goods (taxis) and the Legislative Assembly 
is made responsible for rules of universal conduct, for providing 
a framework within which individuals can pursue disparate 
projects and goals (nomos). The Legislative Assembly will be 
charged with tasks that
include not only the principles of taxation but also 
all those regulations of safety and health, including 
regulations of production or construction, that have 
to be enforced in the general interest and should be 
stated in the form of general rules. These compromise 
not only what used to be called safety legislation but 
also all the difficult problems of creating an 
adequate framework for a functioning competitive 
market and the law of corporations (Hayek, 1982d, 114-
5) .
The problem Hayek addresses is the same one that afflicts BES. 
The proposed solution is applicable to BES as rules of ordinal 
competition are 'nomos': they provide an arena in which
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innovation and coordination can take place but do not require 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs to act in particular ways. Will the 
members of the Legislative Assembly not subvert the rules for 
their own purposes? Hayek suggests that elections should take 
place in age cohorts when individuals are forty five and that 
elected members should remain in the assembly until compulsory 
retirement at sixty. Liberated from the need to seek reelection, 
incentives to use changes to the rules as a form of vote- 
maximising are eliminated. As salaries and pensions are high but 
fixed, incentives to use changes to the rules as a form of 
personal income-maximising are also satiated and as the 
attendance of members is monitored, incentives to shirk are 
minimal.
Four advantages of this functional division of labour can be 
identified. First and unlike constitutional outcome prohibitions, 
discretion is retained. Second and unlike bureaucratic control, 
discretion is democratic. Collective control over economic 
outcomes can be achieved as members of the Legislative Assembly 
act not only on behalf of but are elected by the people. Will 
changing preferences about the appropriate trade-off between 
efficiency and equality be reflected in policy amendments? The 
absence of reelection retards the process of change but will not 
eliminate it as it will take only a maximum of eight years for 
a majority to be built around a new position. Furthermore, the 
transition costs of changing rules of competition mean that this 
delay need not be seen as a cost. Third and unlike market 
solutions, centralisation of power allows equality to be retained
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as competition is restrained. Finally and unlike many democratic 
systems, elected politicians do not have an incentive to subvert 
rules for their own purposes.
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9.5 Conclusion
Rational choice offers a new and more vigorous means by which to 
study politics but there is little that is new under the sun. 
Plato's Republic addressed many of the arguments raised in this 
chapter over two thousand years ago. Plato (1979, 145) takes
harmony to be the hallmark of a healthy society: 'the greatest
good for a city is what binds it together and makes it one, and 
the greatest evil is what pulls it apart and turns it into
many'.4 As a method of governance, democracy is rejected because
it engenders violence, selfishness, instability and faction.
Democracy leads politicians like Alcibiades - who plotted with 
Sparta and Persia against Athens - to put their interests above 
those of the common good. Justice can only be attained through 
the rule of 'guardians' and only then if guardians are given 
absolute power. Why should these select individuals act in the 
interests of all? Part of Plato's answer is that through rigorous 
education, guardians can be trained to rise above the pursuit of 
self-interest. 'They will be compelled to take their turns 
ruling, for the sake of the city . . . and [will] regard ruling not 
as something fine and splendid but as something necessary'
(Plato, 1979, 202) .
In his discussion of the guardian's broader social position, 
Plato also shows an awareness of the importance of incentives. 
Guardians are selected rather than elected because elections
4 This and all subsequent references are taken from Nicholas 
White's (1979) A Companion to Plato's Republic.
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threaten unity. Furthermore, whilst the guardians are not 
expected to live in abject poverty, they will not be allowed to 
accumulate income because the competitive pursuit of wealth 
encourages greed. 'We must keep wealth from our guardians, 
because wealth makes any practitioner of a task worse at it' 
(Plato, 1979, 108-9). Finally and to ensure their selfless
devotion, guardians are denied private property and a personal 
family life. Plato does not use government as an instrument of 
socialism designed to equalize wealth but equalizes wealth in 
order to remove a potentially disturbing influence on government.
What shall we answer if someone objects that we have 
not allowed the guardians to have much happiness? We 
shall answer that it would not be surprising if they 
are indeed happy, but in any case our aim is to make 
the whole city as happy as^possible, rather than any 
particular group in it. Moreover, we do not wish the 
guardians to have any sort of happiness that will make 
them other than guardians, because if they do the city 
will be ruined (Plato, 1979, 106).
The guardians of BES are given the same absolute power to control 
the rules of ordinal competition between bureaucratic agencies. 
Their impartiality is ensured not through positive incentives 
like, for example, performance related pay or through positive 
appeals to duty, sacrifice and altruism but through the 
elimination of incentives that encourage inefficiency.
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Plato's guardians resemble those found within the Japanese 
bureaucracy in that they are unelected and unaccountable. Karl 
Popper attacks Plato for sowing the seeds of totalitarianism, 
accuses him of placing too great a faith in the capacities of a 
small number of individuals and argues that the real question is 
not 'who should rule' but 'how can we so organize political 
institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from 
doing too much damage' (Popper, 1945, 121). If there is no one 
to guard the guardians there is nothing to stop abuses of power 
occurring. For this reason, Popper despairs of Plato's elitism 
and champions the cause of democracy. The case against democracy 
in the first section of this chapter was that it makes rulers 
more likely to do damage even if it can prevent them from doing 
too much damage. Democracy may be the risk adverse strategy but 
it is not necessarily the one that will maximise expected gains.
Hayek's Legislative Assembly treads the middle ground between 
Plato's sovereign and noble guardians and Popper's democracy. The 
Political Order of a Free People envisages a political system in 
which the abuse of power is controlled through elections but in 
which the chances of an abuse of power occurring are reduced by 
careful consideration of the incentives organisational structure 
creates for members. This proposal can best minimise the trade­
off between efficiency and equality and between efficiency and 
democracy in BES. The arguments of socialists like Karl Marx, 
Gerry Cohen, Anthony Crosland and John Roemer are not irrelevant 
to the study of socialist entrepreneurship but it is in the 
economic work of the most strident critic of socialism, Friedrich
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Hayek, that the real problem for socialism is found and it is in 
his political work that an eventual and satisfactory answer to 
the problem of socialist entrepreneurship is found.
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Chapter Ten
Conclusion
10.1 The Economics of Entrepreneurial Socialism
10.2 The Politics of Entrepreneurial Socialism
10.3 The Compatibility of Socialism and Entrepreneurship
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The compatibility of socialism and entrepreneurship can be 
evaluated in two ways: economic and political. First and other 
than capitalism, what system (if any) generates sufficient 
entrepreneurial activity? Second, which of these systems 
qualifies as socialist? The exactness with which the terms 
socialism, entrepreneurship and compatibility have been defined 
in earlier chapters facilitates discussion of both questions. 
Answers need not be prefaced by the qualification 'it depends 
what you mean by . . . ' . Socialism is a political programme 
distinguished by the pursuit of equality, democracy and liberty. 
The closer these goals come to being realised, the more socialist 
a system can be described as being. Entrepreneurship is a 
economic function involving innovation and coordination and 
requiring the bearing of uncertainty. In Chapter Two, six 
criterion were introduced by which the compatibility of socialism 
and entrepreneurship can be judged.
Requirement 1. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism offer a mechanism through 
which information about consumer's preferences for goods can be 
judged and translated into entrepreneurial action. If this 
mechanism is to be profit-driven markets, their compatibility 
with socialism must be established. If this mechanism is not to 
be profit-driven markets the efficacy of an alternative mechanism 
must be established.
Requirement 2 . The compatibility of socialism and 
entrepreneurship demands that socialism offer a mechanism through
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which the success of any particular entrepreneurial venture can 
be judged. If this mechanism is to be profit-driven markets, 
their compatibility with socialism must be established. If this 
mechanism is not to be profit-driven markets the efficacy of an 
alternative mechanism must be established.
Requirement 3. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism must provide reasons for 
a sufficient number of individuals to remain 'alert' to the 
possibility of entrepreneurial discovery.
Requirement 4. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism must offer a 'balanced' 
cost-benefit schedule. For Schumpeter, entrepreneurial activity 
is risky but promises large rewards. For Galbraith, 
entrepreneurial activity is safe but promises only minor rewards. 
If socialist entrepreneurial activity is costly and/or risky 
possible rewards must be spectacular.
Requirement 5. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism must offer a mechanism 
through which new entrepreneurs can be drawn into economic 
activity and through which unsuccessful ones can be removed.
Requirement 6. The compatibility of socialism and
entrepreneurship demands that socialism be capable of generating 
the kind of activity described in neo-pluralist, elitist and new 
right theories of capitalist entrepreneurship
10.1 The Economics of Entrepreneurial Socialism
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In the concluding chapter of Collectivist Economic Planning 
(193 5a) and having questioned the efficacy of the mathematical 
solution, Friedrich Hayek briefly evaluates the iconoclastic but 
unpublished arguments of a younger generation of socialist 
economists. The argument here is presumably directed against 
Oskar Lange's competitive solution, the details of which were 
published a year later.1 Hayek's description of what we will 
call the 'radical' solution appears curious because the 
competitive solution is actually far less radical than he appears 
to have believed; being based on an overt commitment to (i) 
centralized decision-making, and (ii) neo-classical images of the 
state as auctioneer in a perfectly competitive market. At least 
superficially, the radical solution appears to offer a more 
accurate description of BES and for this reason, Hayek's argument 
is worth examining.
1 Hayek (193 5c, 217) states that in Germany, similar
proposals 'have been published and discussed' but no references 
are provided and in his commentary on the calculation debate, Don 
Lavoie (1985) provides no further clues.
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The common [and] fundamental idea [of the radical 
solution] is that there should be markets and 
competition between independent entrepreneurs or 
managers of individual firms, and that in consequence 
there should be money prices, as in the present 
society, for all goods, intermediate or finished, but 
that these entrepreneurs should not be owners of the 
means of production used by them but salaried 
officials of the State (Hayek, 1935c, 218).
Will the radical solution work? Hayek suggests that it will not 
because in the absence of private ownership, decision-making will 
remain centralized and politicised. The argument is presented in 
a series of what he takes to be unanswerable questions, two of 
which will be mentioned. First, 'how [is the entrepreneur's]
success or failure ... to be tested' (Hayek, 1935c, 232)?
If the penalty for loss is the surrender of the
position of 'entrepreneur' will it not be almost
inevitable that the possible chance of making a loss 
will operate as so strong a deterrent that it will 
outbalance the chance of the greatest profit? (Hayek, 
1935c, 235) .
Fear of personal bankruptcy gives capitalist entrepreneurs reason 
to exercise caution when making decisions but the prospect of 
acquiring 'spectacular prizes' (Schumpeter, 1943, 73) encourages 
them to take (calculated) risks. The costs and benefits of
entrepreneurial action are balanced (requirement 4) and 
entrepreneurs have an incentive to remain alert to the 
possibility of new discoveries (requirement 3). State ownership 
means that entrepreneurs will be 'salaried officials of the 
state' (Hayek, 1935c, 218) and entrepreneurs will be aware that 
whilst they may lose their position if mistakes are made, 
successful innovation and coordination will not improve their 
position. The costs and benefits of entrepreneurial action are 
not balanced and there are insufficient incentives for 
entrepreneurs to remain alert to discoveries.
Second, 'there remains the very serious question of how to decide 
. . . whether a going concern is making the best use of its 
resources' (Hayek, 1935c, 235).
In a capitalist society the transfer of capital from 
the less to the more efficient entrepreneur is brought 
about by the former making losses and the latter 
making profits. The question of who is to be entitled 
to risk resources and with how much he is to be 
trusted is here decided by the man who has succeeded 
in acquiring and maintaining them (Hayek, 193 5c, 236).
Hayek asks whether allocation in the socialist system is to be 
determined by the same principle and answers his question with 
the assertion that it cannot. State ownership means that
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it will rest with the central authority to decide 
whether one plant located at one place should expand 
rather than another plant situated elsewhere. All this 
involves planning on the part of the central authority 
on much the same scale as if it were actually running 
the enterprise (Hayek, 1935c, 236-7).
Hayek (193 5c, 23 8) concludes that the radical solution is no more 
feasible than its mathematical predecessor and argues that whilst 
socialist economists have conceded some ideological ground, they 
have not fully understood the logic of the Austrian position.
To assume that it is possible to create conditions of 
full competition without making those who are 
responsible for the decisions pay for their mistakes 
seems to be pure illusion. It will at best be a system 
of quasi-competition where the person really 
responsible will not be the entrepreneur but the 
official who approves his decisions and where in 
consequence all the difficulties will arise in 
connection with freedom of initiative and the 
assessment of responsibility which are usually 
associated with bureaucracy (Hayek, 1935c, 237).
Hayek argues and Chapter Four accepted that markets are a 
necessary condition for entrepreneurial efficiency not least 
because they allow for consumer sovereignty (requirement 1) , 
decentralization and the utilization of tacit knowledge. With
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reference to Figure 10.1, Hayek's argument can then be summarised 
in the claim that whilst markets can be combined with private 
ownership (I) and planning with state ownership (IV), markets 
cannot be combined with state ownership (III).2 If Hayek is 
right it would appear that socialism is incompatible with 
entrepreneurship but must this argument be accepted?
Figure 10.1 Ownership and Allocation
Allocation
Ownership
Market Planning
Private I II
State III IV
Whilst it has been argued that the market is in principle an 
efficient mechanism for discovering knowledge and allocating 
resources, acceptance of the need for markets by itself means 
very little. Whether and to what extent markets will generate 
entrepreneurial activity depends on the way that the market is 
constituted and the organisational and institutional structures 
that are used to animate it and it is for this reason that it is 
misleading to speak of market socialism as if it is itself a 
solution to socialism's problems. In his discussion of the impact 
of new institutionalism on the study of political science, Robert 
Goodin (1996, 13) writes that what
2 The relationship between planning and private ownership 
(II) has already been discussed (3.2.5).
*
*•••
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people want to do, and what they can do, depends 
importantly upon what organizational technology is 
available or can be made readily available to them for 
giving effect to their individual and collective 
volitions. This presents itself to individual citizens 
as a constraint, to managers of the state apparatus as 
an opportunity.
The organizational technology available to socialist economists 
in the course of the calculation debate was extremely crude and 
compromised by a misplaced attachment to neo-classical theories 
of economics. The organisational technologies available to the 
economist, politician and doctoral student have not, however, 
remained fixed and a very different answer can now be given to 
the question 'are socialism and entrepreneurship compatible'?
Three types of market socialism have been examined. Chapter Five 
examined a form distinguished by an institutional commitment to 
moral incentives and an organisational one to kibbutzim. It was 
argued that the possibility of successfully using moral 
incentives depends on the presence of specific environmental 
factors but that these same factors discourage neo-pluralist 
entrepreneurship, violating requirement six. Chapter Six examined 
a form of market socialism distinguished by an institutional 
commitment to economic democracy and an organisational one to 
LMFs. It was argued that whilst this system is in many respects 
more efficient than capitalism, it is unable to (i) sustain elite 
entrepreneurship, again violating requirement six, and (ii) offer
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a balanced cost-benefit schedule to entrepreneurs entering the 
market, violating requirements four and five.
BES is distinguished by an organisational commitment to state 
ownership - of which more will be said presently - and an 
institutional one to the use of tournaments between bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs. Goodin suggests that institutions shape behaviour, 
constrain options and present opportunities. In his terms and 
when combined with a functional division of labour between 
Legislative and Governmental assemblies, tournaments encourage 
innovation and coordination, deny entrepreneurs the opportunity 
of acquiring spectacular prizes and so present (socialist) 
politicians with an opportunity to minimise the trade-off between 
efficiency and equality and between efficiency and democracy.
Tournaments allow markets to be combined with state ownership and 
offer a mechanism through which the success of particular 
ventures can be judged (requirement 2). Agencies finishing at or 
near the top of the ordinal ranking are judged to have undertaken 
successful ventures and those finishing at or near the bottom of 
the ordinal ranking are judged to have undertaken unsuccessful 
ventures. With specific reference to Hayek's argument, it should 
be noted that the allocation of resources in BES is undertaken 
by a different but similar principle to that found in a 
capitalist society. Those that make the most profits not only 
retain but are given more resources whilst those that make the 
lowest profits lose what they already have. There is no need for 
government to intervene in specific decisions about who is to get
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what resources, only for it to establish the general framework 
within which such decisions are made.
Because relative position determines both remuneration and future 
survival, tournaments provide bureaucratic entrepreneurs with 
incentives to remain alert to new discoveries (requirement 3). 
The penalty for failure within tournaments is, as Hayek suggests 
it will be in his discussion of the radical solution, elimination 
and loss of entrepreneurial status but because wages are 
sensitive to performance, entrepreneurs will still have reason 
to take risks.3 It has also been argued that tournaments can be 
designed in such a way as to maximise the entry of new 
entrepreneurs (requirement 5). On the condition that they offer 
some collateral, all will be given one chance to form an agency 
(8. 3. 2. 2) . Finally and because they offer a flexible cost-benefit 
schedule (requirement 4), tournaments are capable of sustaining 
new right, elite and neo-pluralist entrepreneurship (requirement
6). As decision-making within BES is decentralised, it will be 
the responsibility of bureaucratic entrepreneurs to decide what 
kind of project their agency should pursue and this decision will 
be made in the knowledge that rewards will vary accordingly. 
Elite entrepreneurship is, for example, more risky but, if 
successful, is more likely to propel the entrepreneur to the top 
of the ordinal rankings and result in a greater reward.
3 It will be recalled that Hayek (1935c, 218) suggests that 
entrepreneurs will be 'salaried officials of the state'. 
Bureaucratic entrepreneurs will be salaried in the sense that 
they are paid by the state but the term salary is otherwise 
misleading as it is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary to 
mean a fixed payment.
10.2 The Politics of Entrepreneurial Socialism
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The second question to be addressed in this chapter is political: 
does BES qualify as socialist? It is frequently argued that 
market socialism represents too great a ideological concession 
to the right (Elison, 1988, Mandel, 1988) and John Roemer (1994, 
35) acknowledges that it is possible to view the evolution of 
market socialist theory in these terms. The transition between 
different stages of the market socialist debate has been marked 
by recognition of (i) the dynamic efficiency of capitalism, (ii) 
the need to price scarce resources, (iii) the need for rivalry 
between firms, and (iv) for incentives to motivate 
entrepreneurial action. At best, market socialists are seen as 
offering a 'second best' theory of socialism (Cohen, 1991, 14) 
and at worst, critics accuse market socialists of abandoning 
socialism.
This interpretation of market socialism can been challenged. 
First, the argument in previous chapters has been based on a firm 
commitment to equality of income: a criterion that would satisfy 
the most zealous of socialists. Second and whilst recognising its 
achievements relative to 'actually existing' forms of socialism, 
it has been argued that capitalism discourages long-term 
investment and systematically undersupplies efficient levels of 
entrepreneurial activity (2.4). Market socialism need not pander 
to capitalism. Third, the form of market socialism considered 
most able to generate entrepreneurial activity, BES, 
unambiguously requires the nationalization of the means of
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production.
Social democrats like Anthony Crosland (1964, 34) believe the
location of ownership to be an irrelevance and in Chapter Four 
social democracy was defined as a system that seeks to realise 
greater equality within the confines of capitalist ownership. 
Market socialists recognise the need to constrain private 
ownership (4.6.1) but frequently argue that state ownership will 
retard efficiency and so favour 'softer' forms of 'social' 
ownership. Roemer (1994, 23), for example, now views ownership 
as 'an entirely instrumental matter' and argues (1994, 20) that 
'the link between [state] ownership and socialism is tenuous'.
Critics leap on this concession and accuse market socialists of 
intellectual confusion (De Jasay, 1990, Gray, 1993, 98). If, they 
argue, social ownership gives individuals sovereign decision­
making powers then market socialism will simply recreate patterns 
of capitalist inequality and if, as they suspect, social 
ownership is simply a linguistic cloak for state ownership then 
the inefficiencies of central planning will be preserved. Their 
argument overreaches itself in both respects. First, whilst 
social ownership in the kibbutz and the LMF does generate 
inequalities between organisations, it reduces inequality within 
them. Second and as already argued, state ownership need not 
degenerate into central planning.
Within BES, .state ownership is the foundation on which not only 
entrepreneurial efficiency but socialism is built. First, state
369
ownership allows government to set the terms of ordinal 
competition between bureaucratic entrepreneurs and to minimise 
the trade-off between efficiency and equality. Second, state 
ownership allows the electorate to influence the choice of trade­
off made. Third, state ownership also promotes equality by 
rewarding entrepreneurs only for their entrepreneurial ability 
and not for their possession of capital. Fourth, state ownership 
eliminates the source of capitalist entrepreneurs 'structural 
luck' (Dowding, 1991, 137-8) and prevents them from holding the 
state to ransom. Fifth, state ownership allows government to set 
investment levels in ways that reflect the positive externalities 
of entrepreneurial action. Finally, state ownership and 
tournaments allow government to shield new enterprises from 
premature closure. BES is not only a efficient but a radical form 
of market socialism.
The standard defence for market socialists when faced with the 
charge of ideological impurity is to respond that theirs is the 
more feasible form of socialism. Market socialists can present 
themselves as pragmatic socialists, willing to learn from 
economic theory, electoral realities and failed utopian 
theorising. As Christopher Pierson (1995, 190-1) suggests, market 
socialism is
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not for starry-eyed dreamers, but for hard-headed and 
practical politicians in an era of historic reverses 
[for socialism]. In this sense, market socialism ... 
presents the possibility of prosecuting a socialist 
political project under existing and seemingly rather 
unpromising circumstances.
How is the criterion of feasibility to be judged? Alec Nove 
(1991, 209) suggests that a model of socialism is feasible if it 
describes
a state of affairs which could exist . . . within the 
lifetime of a child already conceived without our 
having to make or accept implausible or far-fetched 
assumptions about society, human beings and the 
economy.
Defined in this narrow way, BES satisfies the requirement of 
feasibility as it does not assume the emergence of either 
altruism or economic abundance. But it should be recognised that 
what will be seen as feasible to the electorate also depends on 
the circumstances of particular countries and the size of the 
political gulf between the status quo and the proposal under 
discussion. This is not simply a matter of the costs of 
transition but of political imagination. A form of socialism that 
requires the nationalisation of the means of production will 
appear less feasible than one that, for example, seeks to realise 
socialist values within a capitalist system. Furthermore and
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because BES cannot co-exist with a capitalist sector (8.3.2.1), 
nationalisation will have to be immediate and total. For the same 
reason that reservations were expressed about the 'maximalist' 
strategy in Chapter Six, a political question mark has to be 
placed over the feasibility of BES. The commitment to state 
ownership represents a political weakness as well as a source of 
strength.
10.3 The Compatibility of Socialism and Entrepreneurship
In so far as it has been hoped to achieve ... a 
distribution of income independent of private property 
in the means of production and a volume of output ... 
at least approximately the same or even greater than 
that procured under free competition it was more and 
more generally admitted that this was not 
practicable (Hayek, 1935a, 37) .
In Chapter Four, a framework within which the trade-off between 
efficiency and equality can be understood was introduced and is 
reproduced in Figure 10.2. Austrian economists argue that the 
trade-off is necessarily severe and that this should be reflected 
in both the shape of the socialist production possibility 
frontier (SOC) and in the distance between it and the capitalist 
(CAP) one.
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Figure 10.2 Socialism, Capitalism and the Trade-off 
Between Efficiency and Equality
A
o r £
0
The notion that we can draw precise lines on a diagram to 
indicate the productive capacities of different politico-economic 
systems is ultimately a fiction. Not only will the precise shape 
of production frontiers be affected by the particular 
geographical, historical and cultural circumstances of each 
country but at the level of abstraction in which theories of 
feasible socialism deal, it is difficult to see how, for example, 
a claim that the capitalist production frontier lies above the 
capitalist one can ever be falsified. As Clifford Hooker (quoted 
Lane, 1996, 3 68) argues, theories are rarely 'reducible to
finitely, observationally verifiable assertions' and because 
accepted observationally based facts are themselves 'theory laden 
and subject to theoretical criticism', falsification is
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problematic.
Ultimately it is not the compatibility of socialism and 
entrepreneurship but only the quality of the arguments used to 
assert the compatibility or incompatibility of socialism and 
entrepreneurship that can be judged. Whilst accepting Hayek's 
denunciation of the mathematical and competitive solutions, this 
thesis has argued that one form of market socialism, BES, is able 
to (i) better manage the trade-off between efficiency and 
equality relative to both classical and other forms of market 
socialism, and (ii) reduce if not eliminate the distance between 
the socialist and capitalist production frontiers. If these 
arguments are accepted then it can be concluded that socialism 
is not incompatible with entrepreneurship.
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